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A B S T R A C T
The spread of the internet and migration are key dimensions associated with glob-
alization and range among the most salient challenges of our times. Looking at
the intersection of these two phenomena, this dissertation explores how the inter-
net enables citizens of non-democracies living abroad to partake in the political
discourse and online campaigns in their home countries. How does the fact of
living in non-authoritarian countries affect the migrant’s position inside their on-
line community? Using concepts from the contentious politics literature, I examine
why migrant netizens adopt different roles in online campaigns in the years lead-
ing to and during the Arab uprisings at the examples of Tunisia and Morocco. I
draw upon multiple empirical strategies including an analysis of web crawls of
the Tunisian and Moroccan blogospheres, in-depth interviews with a number of
key actors and frame analysis. I find that migrants were among the pioneers of
political blogging, are well-integrated in their respective blogosphere and often
occupy central positions. Political opportunity structures matter, thus the relative
absence of repression allows migrants to act as radical mobilizers in highly repres-
sive regimes like Tunisia. In contrast to that, migrant netizens in slightly more
liberal settings like Morocco are less of a driving force than an equal partner in
online discussions and campaigns, even if they might provide additional resources
and establish contacts with international actors. Finally, the frame analysis reveals
that radical migrant bloggers are likely to suffer from a lack of credibility due to
their relative immunity to repression, unless they adapt their frames to the con-
cerns of the wider blogger community, thereby enabling the creation of a broad
coalition.
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The Web does not just connect machines, it connects people.
— Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Whether one considers the impact of the invention of the printing press on the
politico-religious movement of reformation, the radio on the spread of propaganda
in Nazi Germany or the first-ever televised presidential debates on the election of
J. F. Kennedy - technological developments in the communication sector have fu-
eled debates on the effect they have on society and their prospects as instruments
of democracy (e.g. Dunham, 1938; Lerner, 1958). Today, the use of internet tools
by protests movements, for example in Moldova in 2009 (the first alleged “Twitter
revolution” (Morozov, 2009b)), nourished similar hopes regarding the potential ef-
fects of the spread of the internet on political institutions and, more broadly, in the
democratization process. In that sense, the controversy over the empowering char-
acter of the internet, encouraged by the prominence of information technologies in
the organization and publication of protest during the Arab uprisings, is only the
most recent incarnation of this general tendency (Groshek, 2010).
In addition to the focus on modern communication tools in democratization
processes, the internet especially is often portrayed as the late embodiment of
the Global Village, the contraction of the world by instantaneous movement of in-
formation using electronic communication technology, as predicted by Marshall
McLuhan (1962). From its origins as a computer network linking scientific lab-
oratories to enable communication and the and sharing of computer resources
among researchers, the internet has grown to link an estimated 3.4 billion users
worldwide in 2016. As the ultimate instrument of dissemination of technology
and knowledge, it is – next to increased trade, capital and investment movements
and migration – one of the key dimensions associated with globalization. Its struc-
ture–a network of networks, allowing people to communicate and interact beyond
borders and across long distances –is seen as a prime example of the global inter-
connectedness that characterizes our era. As people cross international borders in
unparalleled numbers and with increasing speed, the internet is a major tool for
migrants wishing to remain in contact with their home countries, providing cheap
14
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communication through email and internet telephony as well as the possibility to
stay informed about societal and political developments through news websites.
This dissertation covers the area where these phenomena intersect by presenting
the results of an investigation into the participation of migrants in online communi-
ties of two semi-authoritarian states– Tunisia and Morocco –in the years preceding
the Arab uprisings in 2011. The primary motivation for this thesis arose in the
aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring, when baffled experts of the region hotly
debated whether or not it had been fueled by the use of internet tools. On the
one hand, the Western media had heralded the internet’s ability to circumvent
state censorship, arguing that it would providing dissidents with a platform to
voice their opinions through blogs, websites and social networking sites, thereby
eroding the information monopoly of the state. At the time, the media had the
tendency to either over- or underemphasize the role played by internet tools such
as social media on the ground, portraying the events and the use of online technol-
ogy as largely spontaneous. Scholars of the Middle East, on the other hand, largely
failed to anticipate the uprisings due to the field’s pre-occupation with the region’s
failure to democratize during the “third wave” of democratization. They cited as
causes of that failure the legacies of colonialism and state-formation, a weak civil
society, rentierism, the supposed incompatibility between Islam and democracy,
regional conflicts, Western tolerance of friendly dictatorship, lack of critical prereq-
uisites for democracy or over-endowment with factors that contribute to successful
authoritarianism (Bellin, 2004). Of course, the region’s eventual slip into turmoil
– most notably the civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen – ultimately confirmed
the position of those scholars who had insisted that the region’s particularities
would impede its democratization (Springborg, 2011, e.g.). Nevertheless, it must
be noted that the curious “Arab Exceptionalism” resulted in a scholarly obsession
with the reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism in the area and gave rise to
speculation about the consequences of the (natural) death of long-term Arab lead-
ers (Schlumberger, 2007; King, 2009, amongst others), as this was the only change
imaginable for a large part of the scholarly establishment. The focus on these ex-
planations has meant that the greater social trends leading to the emergence of
popular movements calling for regime change have been largely overlooked (with
the notable exception of Bennani-Chraı̈bi and Fillieule (2003)).
Based on my own research experience in the area, I suspected that the reality
was more intricate than the absolutist arguments presented by both camps. While
it appeared obvious to me that technology cannot by itself cause a revolution,
prior investigations into online activism in Tunisia and Egypt had taught me that
online spaces had served as alternative domains for political debate in the context
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of an extremely restricted public sphere (Kuebler, 2011). Given that the regime
in Tunisia had been highly effective in censoring public debate and repeatedly re-
pressing protest, most recently in the mining basin of Gafsa in 2008, the spread of
the uprisings beyond the disaffected Tunisian south was truly puzzling and indeed
hinted at a layer of online mobilization facilitating the circulation of information.
Indeed, the increasing ubiquity of internet connectivity and the spread of portable
devices such as mobile phones in developing countries results in the fact that cy-
beractivism, in the Middle East and elsewhere, is no longer limited to “isolated,
politically motivated hackers. It is instead deeply integrated with contemporary
social movement strategy and accessible to computer and mobile phone users with
only basic skills: it is a distinguishing feature of modern political communication
and a means of creating the élan that marks social change,” (Howard, 2010, p. 11)
and I share his point of view that “Democracy - and democratization - can no
longer be effectively studied without some attention paid to the role of digital in-
formation technologies.” (p.132) Truth be told, media have accompanied insurgent
movements throughout history. In that sense, the Arab uprisings merely serve as a
new and prominent example of the broader debate on how technological advances
in the communication sector affect society and how they can serve as instruments
of democracy.
However, contrary to the claim of spontaneity (with its inherent focus on a very
narrow time frame), I suspected that the roots of the online layer of contention were
laid long before the uprising itself. It is true that internet tools allow a message
to spread with great speed; however, the number of people it is going to reach
is highly dependent on the network the sender has built beforehand.1 Without
such a pre-existing network, sending out information can be likened to a message
in a bottle, as it might be taken up by other users, but more likely will remain
unnoticed. This process is complicated in highly repressive environments, where
other users might refrain from sharing important information because they fear
retribution from the state. As a result, the relationship between democratization
processes in authoritarian countries and new media is more complicated than what
was implied both by the media and by activists themselves, such as when the man-
ager of the first Facebook page that organized the Egyptian January 25th protests,
Wael Ghonim, proclaimed that “if you want to liberate a government, give them
the internet” (Rao, 2011).
The realization that strategic planning matters prompted me to turn towards
identifying the opinion leaders in selected activist networks. Finally, international
1 In addition, on social media platforms, the algorithms play an important role. The personalization
of the kind of information each user receives has been termed “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011).
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praise for the collective Tunisian blog Nawaat – managed by Tunisians living
abroad – in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, sparkled my interest in investi-
gating how the internet allows migrants to partake in – as well as to shape –
societal debates in home countries. In fact, it appears that online mobilizations
of migrants provide a new take on a classical dilemma of how citizens can react
when they are dissatisfied with their governments. Whereas it has been long ac-
cepted that their choices include loyalty, exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970), the low
costs of internet-based communication mean that exit and voice are no longer mu-
tually exclusive. In line with previous studies analysing the use of internet tools
in transnational social movements –which underscored its potential to coordinate
loosely coupled networks over great distances –it is not astonishing that protests
against authoritarian regimes, for example in Tunisia, have benefited from online
support of dissidents living abroad. These represent marginalized political actors
who are usually neglected in the domestic sphere.
With this particular focus, the present doctoral thesis contributes to the growing
field exploring internet use in democratization efforts as well as to the nascent field
that studies the use of online tools by overseas populations or diasporas. While the
impact of a large organized overseas community on the political situation in their
home country has been an object of study for some time, notably regarding their
support of warring factions in conflicts in their countries of origin and homegrown
terrorism in the West (P. Collier, 2000; Kaldor, 2001; Crone and Harrow, 2011, e.g.),
the innovation of this dissertation lies in its investigation of how the internet em-
powers smaller groups and individual migrants. In this context, many questions
came to the fore, such as whether living abroad can be a factor predestining an ac-
tivist to be more prominent than others or how the fact of living abroad affects the
standing of a cyberactivist among his peers. The apparent successful uprising in
Tunisia was paired with Morocco, a country in the region with a similar overseas
population that experienced widespread protest without culminating in a regime
change.
thesis outline
In chapter two, I will present and discuss several concepts used in this thesis, deriv-
ing primarily from the literature on political engagement of migrants, contentious
politics, and cyberactivism. It first engages with the question of how to conceptu-
alize activism by migrants, critically reflecting on the literature on diasporas and
transnational communities. It then presents concepts borrowed from contentious
politics, examining political opportunity structures for social movements in au-
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thoritarian states and the state’s reaction in the form of repression, toleration and
facilitation. Then, the chapter lays out how dissidents use internet-based tools
as a resource, ranging from the digital augmentation of protest to new modes of
digitally-enabled collective action. It will also discuss whether the formation of a
collective identity still matters in online campaigns or whether it has become ob-
solete. Finally, the chapter lays out my hypotheses and provides their theoretical
underpinning.
Chapter three presents the research design as well as the methodology which
governs my choice and use of methods to answer my research questions. The
methods used in this thesis include link analysis of networks obtained by map-
ping blogospheres, using insights from social network analysis. This method is
supplemented by a regression analysis to assess the relationship between a num-
ber of variables. Given that web mapping and regression analysis fail to capture
the motives and strategies of actors such as bloggers and cyberactivists, a number
of semi-structured interviews were conducted as well. Finally, the chapter’s last
section is devoted to case selection, including a brief discussion of regime types
and a justification of why Tunisia and Morocco were chosen as cases.
Introducing the empirical part of the thesis, chapter four explores the power
structures in the selected online activism sphere and identifies leading figures in
the present web crawls. These leading figures will be identified by ranking the
nodes by the number of incoming links in both Tunisia and Morocco. Given that
the networks include both blogs and institutional websites of the countries of ori-
gin, the chapter also investigates how developing states use the internet to reach
out to their diasporas. Finally, a regression analysis performed on the Tunisian
dataset will evaluate the influence of variables such as the age of a website, its
type and location on a website’s centrality measure in the network.
Chapter five investigates how the very fact of being based abroad provides po-
litical opportunities to certain actors, enabling them to taking up prominent roles
in their respective cyberactivist communities. It focuses on the role of repression,
both in the shape of physical repression and online censorship, in shaping the
protest activities undertaken by online activists. The chapter will lay out how on-
line forums and blogs can serve as a free space in authoritarian regimes, that is,
as a space comparatively free from interference by the state. However, this online
freedom is not absolute, given that many authoritarian states intervene through
internet censorship, thereby affecting the political opportunity structures available
to online activities of bloggers and activists in Morocco and Tunisia.
Chapter six analyzes whether a collective identity, which is an important com-
ponent of traditional social movements but also features prominently in theories
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about diaspora, emerged inside the respective blogospheres and if so, what char-
acterizes this collective identity. The chapter also examines the different categories
of migrant activists and how they frame their political engagement in the context
of online campaigns. It shows how the development of a strong collective identity
can be impeded by exogenous factors such as linguistic and political fragmenta-
tion. Finally, the chapter focuses on how the collective identity evolves over time,
leading to durable relationships between activists.
Finally, chapter seven summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, dis-
cusses their broader implications as well as their limitations, and suggests further
research agendas.
Part I
T H E O RY A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y
2
T H E O R I E S A N D C O N C E P T S
The internet is ubiquitous in developed countries, and increasingly so in the rest of
the world. As people cross international borders in unparalleled numbers and with
unprecedented speed, the internet emerges as a major tool for migrants desiring to
remain in contact with their home countries, by providing cheap communication
through email and internet telephony as well as the possibility to stay informed
about societal and political developments. While many diaspora communities have
been vocal and produced a large amount of media in the past, the interactivity of
the internet enables migrants to engage in many-to-many conversations concern-
ing their home societies in real time, as opposed to one-way communication of
traditional media.
These properties of the internet allow migrants not only to take an active part
in online debates and political campaigns, but also to initiate them. However, it
appears that involvement of migrants varies in different contexts. Recently, interna-
tional recognition for the collective Tunisian blog Nawaat – managed by Tunisians
living abroad – in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising indicates that online engage-
ment by migrants might have played an important role in Tunisian online activism.
In other contexts in North Africa and the Middle East, however, this kind of cross-
border cyberactivism appears to have been less central. This phenomenon has
received little scholarly attention, and raises the question:
How can we explain differences in prominence of migrant netizens in online
campaigns in the years leading to and during the Arab uprisings ?
The thesis compares the relative prominence and influence of migrants in their
respective blogospheres across two cases, Tunisia and Morocco. Its primary goal
is to contribute to the understanding of internet activism in authoritarian contexts.
Furthermore, it aims at understanding if and how agency is a function of struc-
tural constraints, by studying similar internet activists in a non-authoritarian envi-
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ronment, that is activists based in the diaspora. Finally, the comparison between
the Tunisian and the Moroccan netizen communities in a most similar case design
seeks to explore how relatively similar political regimes employ distinct strategies
with regards to freedom of online speech, thereby influencing what the kind of
discourse and resistance develops online.
while the Arab uprisings provide the backdrop for this thesis, my primary goal
is not to explain the causes of success or failure in the Arab Spring, but possible
overtures for overseas citizens to partake in political mobilizations in their home
countries. Second, the difference in legitimacy of the regime may have an impact
on the form that protest takes, but will not necessarily alter the substantive goal
of the protesters, which is to overcome the arbitrariness, corruption and lack of
freedom of the authoritarian state.
To answer the research question of this thesis – namely, how we can explain dif-
ferences in prominence of migrant netizens across two cases in online campaigns
in the years leading to and during the Arab uprisings – this thesis draws on several
concepts deriving from different strands of sociology, most prominently from the
literature on contentious politics, . In what follows, I will present the key concepts
deriving from the literature on diaspora, contentious politics and cyberactivism, to
subsequently derive hypotheses from the relevant literature.
2.1 migrant netizens
In line with the rise of migration flows, coupled with the transportation and com-
munication revolution following the end of the Cold War, a growing body of lit-
erature on migration, diasporas, transnationalism, translocalism and transnational
communities emerged, treating similar phenomena from slightly different perspec-
tives. The most consequential body of research focuses on diasporas, which de-
rives from Greek diaspeirein, “to sow” or “to disperse” and was originally applied
to groups dispersed by force, namely the Jewish and the Armenian diasporas.
More recently, the term has been applied more broadly to an increasing number
of transnational migrant communities. As a result, we observe two competing
dynamics with regards to the concept. On the one hand, many migrant commu-
nities embraced the term, adopting it as a self-denomination. On the other, the
increasing ubiquity of the concept provoked a protracted academic debate on its
definition and relevance.
Indeed, rising migration flows and their multidirectional nature have heightened
the interest of politics and academia in diasporic communities, as they are deemed
increasingly relevant to international affairs. The rich literature on diasporas high-
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lights the opportunities afforded to overseas populations in their dealings with the
politics of their home country. In a first strand of literature on the subject, dias-
poras were predominantly identified with threats to domestic and international
security. Prominent studies, like the large-N statistical analysis by World Bank re-
searcher Paul Collier, for example, indicate that the presence of a large organized
diaspora in the United States increases the likelihood of conflict in the homeland,
with possible spill-over effects to neighboring countries (P. Collier, 2000; P. Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004). Research on the role of diasporas in conflict resolution found
that diaspora communities may directly financially support warring factions, or
remittances sent to families might be misused by warring parties for military pur-
poses, either through taxation or coercion (Kaldor, 2001). Diasporas might also
lobby the international community and public opinion for intervention, and avert
conflict resolution, even when their countrymen are willing to achieve a settlement
(M. B. Anderson, 1999). Newer studies highlight potentially constructive contribu-
tions of diasporas in the promotion of liberal values, economic development, con-
flict resolution and peace building (Hear et al., 2004). These new studies stress the
high social and financial capital that diasporas can invest in their home countries,
for example through the combination of knowledge of the opportunities in their
countries of origin with skills and networks they have acquired abroad (Gillespie
et al., 1999).
On the other hand, the surge of studies on the relationship of diasporas with
their countries of origin since the 1990s (Demmers, 2002, p. 86) has resulted in
a fierce debate on terminology and definitions, since related terms like “refugee”,
“expatriates”, “exile”, “immigrant” and “ethnic community” overlap (Clifford, 1994).
The main fault line proved to be whether objective (e.g. the dispersion to two or
more countries) and subjective (e.g. the presence of a group consciousness) criteria
are paramount to determine if a group qualifies as a diaspora or not, with the most
frequently cited definitions of diaspora providing a list of both objective and sub-
jective criteria to be fulfilled (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997). According to Safran, for
example, diasporas are transnational communities characterized by their disper-
sion to two or more countries, the maintenance of a collective memory or myth of
the homeland, a certain alienation from the host country, the will to return home
when deemed appropriate, a commitment to the restoration or maintenance of it,
and a continuous relationship to the home country that defines group conscious-
ness and solidarity (1991, p. 83-84). Another widely used definition was proposed
by Sheffer, who defines modern diasporas as “ethnic minority groups of migrant
origins residing and acting in host countries, but maintaining strong sentimental
and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands.” (1986, p. 3).
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Critics of this approach argue that there is a tendency to reify and essentialize
the diaspora as a given social entity longing for a distant home country. Partially
as a response to this problem, a literature on transnational communities or transna-
tionalism that eschews the notion of diaspora has gained traction. It does so on the
grounds that the concept implies a level of cohesion in terms of its identity and its
composition that is not representative of today’s migrant communities (Vertovec,
1999; Al-Ali and Koser, 2002, e.g.). In addition to this, the term evokes a desire
to maintain an identity distinctive from the society in the country of residence,
which might not necessarily be present in contemporary transnational communi-
ties (Adamson, 2012, p. 31). There have, however, also been attempts to address
these issues within the field of diaspora studies proper. Martin Sökefeld (2006)
proposes to analyze its formation as a result of mobilization processes. His def-
inition combines an ‘objective’ with a ‘subjective’ criterion, defining a diaspora
as “a transnationally dispersed collectivity that distinguishes itself by clear self-
imagination as community.” (Sökefeld, 2006, p. 267) This novel focus on how
diasporas are imagined – emphasizing the importance of a shared identity – has
the advantage to disconnect dispersal and imagination, turning them into indepen-
dent variables. Thus a diasporic community is not an automatic result of migra-
tion, but emerges through an imagination of community analogous with Benedict
Anderson’s “imagined communities” (1991), which might form years after the act
of migration proper. Finally, his approach underscores the importance of a dias-
poric discourse, given that the existence of a diaspora ‘consciousness’ is difficult to
operationalize in empirical research (Ibid.).
For the purpose of this study, I will adopt a conceptualization of diaspora in-
debted to this strand of literature based on constructivist approaches, notably on
the definition proposed by Shain and Barth (2003). They define diaspora as
“a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a perma-
nent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland
— whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under
foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identi-
fied by others — inside and out-side their homeland — as part of the
homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to
participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs.” (Shain and
Barth, 2003, p. 452)
This definition readily accommodates the internal diversity and power relations
that characterize the activist networks under study. Rather than seeing diasporas
as a static group bound together by an inevitable ethnicity, the proliferation of
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the term suggests its political salience, enabling political entrepreneurs to revert
to it to make claims and to mobilize under its banner (Adamson and Demetriou,
2007, p. 498; Tölölyan, 1991, p. 3). For instance, some scholars have argued that
political exiles differ from other diaspora members insofar as they constantly fight
for their return and refrain from establishing their life abroad as a sustainable
option (Shain and Ahram, 2003). However, political exiles might indeed serve
as political entrepreneurs, attempting to mobilize their compatriots at home and
abroad. Also, politicization can occur after immigration and political exiles are
not the only engaged in political campaigns directed at their countries of origin,
often resulting in presence of “competing stances” within the same community
(Brubaker, 2005).
Using insights from the literature on diasporas, this thesis examines a subset
of actors, namely bloggers and cyberactivists that consider themselves and are
considered by others as part of the community of bloggers of their country of
origin. This affiliation is established first and foremost through hyperlinks, that
is through the inclusion of their websites and blogs on the blogrolls, i.e. the list
of blogs a blogger considers important. However, while they clearly reside at a
physical distance outside the state, whether these actors choose to adopt the label
“diaspora” and mobilize under its banner is part of the questions to be examined.
Yet, the objective criterion of whether a blogger lives abroad or in the country at
which the political activism is directed matters, because – especially in the context
of authoritarianism – bloggers may experience certain limitations that colleagues
living abroad might not. In order to highlight the fact that a diasporic identity
and claim is not a given in the cases examined, I used the more descriptive term
“migrant netizen” both in the title as well as in many instances in this dissertation.
It pairs the portmanteau of the words internet and citizen as in “citizen of the net”,
netizen, with the objective criterion of migration. However, the question of how
these bloggers perceive themselves and are perceived by others will be explored
as well, using the literature on identity formation that has been central in the
literature on diasporas as well as in the literature on contentious politics.
2.2 contentious politics
The present study heavily relies on insights from the literature on contentious pol-
itics for its conceptual and analytical framework. Rather disconnected from the
literature on democratization and the persistence of authoritarianism, the field of
“contentious politics” has built a sophisticated toolkit designed to explain why
episodes of popular contention occur, the forms they take as well as their potential
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social, cultural and political consequences. Spearheaded by prominent scholars in
the United States – Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Dough McAdam – this current
has steered political science beyond the study of institutionalized politics towards
the inclusion of informal collective action. Through their efforts, the formerly com-
partmentalized studies on political struggle ranging from strikes, revolutions and
social movements are united under the umbrella of contentious politics, showing
how different forms of contention feature recurrent mechanisms and processes.
The initial studies of contentious politics – hitherto studied under the lens of
collective behavior – presumed a direct relation between discontent and protest,
viewing contentious politics such as riots or mob violence as random occurrences
of aggrieved individuals reacting to situations beyond their control. Soon, however,
it became clear that discontent is ubiquitous, hence not a sufficient condition to
generate protest. In response, approaches stressing the importance of resources
and opportunities for the likelihood of success of a political action gained ground.
These approaches are grounded in rational choice theory, suggesting that political
opportunities and available resources are crucial factors to propel discontented
actors into action.
2.2.1 Social movements in authoritarian states and state response
Social movements, following Diani (1992), can be defined as “networks of infor-
mal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations,
engaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective iden-
tity” (Diani, 1992, p. 13). Given the structuralist approach that characterized much
of the early works on democratization, social movements were seen as minor ac-
tors in transition processes. Instead, economic development was at the heart of
Lipset’s (1959) work, leaving little room for the role social movements might play
in the process of democratization. For Huntington (1991), on the other hand, mo-
bilization especially of the working class appears to be potentially harmful to de-
mocratization. Transitologists, on the other hand, with their focus on elite behavior
and strategies, are more inclined to take the agency of civil society into consider-
ation (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Higley and Gunther, 1992). Yet, the role
played by civil society during transition processes is seen by and large as tempo-
rary: “regardless of its intensity and of the background from which it emerges,
this popular upsurge is always ephemeral” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.55-
56). Linz and Stepan’s (1996) model of extended transition pays more attention to
civil society in democratization processes, and suggest that “A robust civil society,
with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and
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state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions
to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages
of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society
is invaluable” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.9). Nevertheless, social movements do
not feature prominently in their empirical part, underlining the fact that transi-
tology acknowledges the dynamic character of the democratization process, but
ultimately bargaining processes among individual members of the political elite in
a context of uncertainty are front and center.
On the other hand, social movement theory has not been applied frequently in
authoritarian regimes despite attempts to unite the separate literatures on political
struggle including strikes, revolutions and social movements under the umbrella
of contentious politics. Notable exceptions to this rule are applications of social
movement theory to religious groups in the Middle East (Quentin Wiktorowicz,
2004; Hafez, 2003; Gunning, 2008). Now the so-called Arab Spring has opened
an avenue to further fill this gap (see Della Porta, 2014). The idea that social
movements do not emerge in a vacuum, but have to be studied in relation to the
state they operate in is probably the most evident in contexts where the state is
particularly potent and present such as authoritarian regimes.
2.2.2 Political opportunity structures in authoritarian regimes
We are only beginning to understand how episodes of contentious politics emerge
in the context of political authoritarianism and societal norms barring people from
speaking out. While the main focus of this thesis lies on characteristics of the
membership of a group of activists, exogenous factors structure their choices. To
analyze the impact of these exogenous factors, the literature on contentious politics
developed the political process framework. Fully formulated for the first time in
McAdam’s Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970
(1982) and further developed in Tarrow’s Power in Movement (1998), it centers
on the concept of political opportunity structure (POS). While specific definitions
vary, the general sense is that “political opportunity structures influence the choice
of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment”
(Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58) and most scholarship focuses on “the opening and clos-
ing of political space and its institutional and substantive location” (Gamson and
Meyer, 1996, p. 277). It thus serves to explain why social movement contention
rises and grows in some contexts and periods and not in others, and why the
applied structures and strategies vary. Historically, research on social movements
had been divided between a European macro-theoretical tradition that focuses on
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broad social-structural changes to explain the emergence of social movements on
the one hand, and an American micro-theoretical tradition that emphasizes indi-
vidual motivations to join social movement organizations, on the other. Neverthe-
less, the development of the “political opportunity structure” concept provided
a common ground (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 238), although its popularity and vari-
ous applications in social movement studies makes “consensus regarding the term
‘political opportunity’ (. . . ) elusive” (McAdam, McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, 1996,
p. 24).
The most prevalent variables used in the literature to establish the degree of
access to the political sphere comprise the degree of formal and informal access
to political institutions and decision-making processes, the degree to which the
political system accommodates challengers, the institutional strength of the state,
the availability of allies and adversaries, the strength or vulnerability of the rul-
ing elite coalition, and the nature of state repression (Tilly, 1978; Kitschelt, 1986;
Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, 1996). Summing up previ-
ous studies, Tilly and Tarrow suggest in Contentious Politics (2015) that political
opportunity structures are influenced by “the multiplicity of independent centers
of power within it, its openness to new actors, the instability of current political
alignments, the availability of influential allies or supporters for challenges and the
extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making” (p. 59).
Finally, it is important to stress that while opportunities and threats are objective
and external to the actor, movement responses to them depend on their recogni-
tion and interpretation, as well as their “beliefs about the opportunities.” (Elster,
1989, p. 20).
Thus, while the majority of episodes of contentious politics takes place in non-
democratic regimes, the theorization of political opportunity structures is largely
based on contentious episodes in liberal democracies. Tarrow acknowledges this
limitation in the second edition of his groundbreaking Power in Movement, conced-
ing that “political process models were seldom systematically applied outside the
liberal democracies of the West” (1998, p. 19). Since then, the awareness of this gap
in the literature has spread, and the Dynamics of Contention research program
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001) improved the applicability of POS in undemo-
cratic settings by including high-risk factors and focusing on regularities found in
contentious episodes instead of searching for general laws. The literature apply-
ing social movement theory to authoritarian regimes and democratic transitions
is growing. Thus, Middle East scholars have applied it to religious movements in
an authoritarian context (Quentin Wiktorowicz, 2004; Hafez, 2003; Gunning, 2008),
and particularly with the unraveling of the Arab uprisings, this particular gap in
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the social movement literature has begun to be filled (see for example Della Porta,
2014). However, the desire to provide an all-encompassing framework including
a wide range of contentious episodes in every possible regime type can prove
problematic. Thus, Tilly’s “Crude Regime Types” – with their distinction between
the degree of state capacity and democracy – provides a simple scheme with four
possible combinations. However, this clarity comes at the expense of a clearer dif-
ferentiation between various forms of high-capacity undemocratic regimes. For
example, Morocco appears as an example of a high-capacity undemocratic regime,
of which it is said that it “features both clandestine oppositions and brief confronta-
tions that usually end in repression” (Tilly, 2006, p. 58). Tunisia, where the level
of control of society bordered on the totalitarian, would feature in the same cate-
gory. This example shows how a synthetic model aspiring to encompass a wide
range of situations, such as the political process model, can struggle to provide a
more granulated perspective, which would account for cases with extreme forms
of repression.
2.2.3 Repression, toleration and facilitation
As Tilly (1995) pointed out, the modern social movement repertoire emerged in
tandem with the development of the modern nation-state and centralized decision-
making. For Tilly, repression, toleration and facilitation are important elements in
the political opportunity structure. Repression of social movements, usually un-
derstood as “the attempt by a state or its agents against challengers in order to
end their challenge by arresting them, harassing them, or destroying their organi-
zations” is assumed to raise the cost of collective action (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015,
p. 37). Facilitation is said to occur when the cost of collective action is lowered,
either indirectly (for example, by giving a group space to operate) or more directly
(for example, by lending it strategic expertise). Toleration, however, is located be-
tween repression and facilitation. An example would be a government allowing
a movement to operate within certain boundaries without engaging with it (Tilly,
1978, p. 107). Thus, states enjoy considerable discretion regarding the degree and
target of repression. Repression thus reflects a strategic assessment of the threat
emanating from a specific form of collective action or a group or an individual ac-
tivist. Now, even in the most repressive settings, the regime will encourage certain
public performances more than others. For example, in totalitarian settings some
public performances meant to signal the allegiance of the population to the regime
become mandatory. However, even in authoritarian regimes the public display of
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allegiance – such as through a massive turnout at public appearances of the leader
– are deemed desirable.
It must be said that the field has, over time, focused primarily on the dichotomy
of repression/facilitation, largely leaving toleration aside. However, in the case of
authoritarian states toleration regains its relevance given that, depending on the
degree of authoritarianism, regime stability will set close boundaries to facilita-
tion, although the regime might indeed choose to empower one group to weaken
another. Also, although repression is multifaceted the field has tended to focus on
violent, state-based forms of repression of protest events such as demonstrations.
This conception of repression was so prevalent that it was often viewed as syn-
onymous with state-based violence, even by Tilly himself (see, for example Tilly,
2005). However, it is important to note that on the one hand, the state is not the
unique actor of repression, but repression can also be exerted by non-state actors
such as counter-movements (Earl, 2004). On the other hand, even when the state is
the primary actor of repression, controlling a movement is not limited to physical
repression and a range of measures can be adopted to discourage dissent in the
present and to encourage demobilization by dissuading future activities (Boykoff,
2007, p. 35).
Modes of suppression employed by states
and the mass media
• Mass media underestimation of chal-
lengers
• Mass media depreciation of chal-
lengers
• Demonization of challengers or the
group they come from
• Mass media manipulation
• Extraordinary rules and laws
• Harassment and harassment arrests
• Creating false documents purporting
to come from challengers
• Infiltration of challenger groups and
use of agent provocateurs
• Surveillance and break-ins
• Employment deprivation
• Prosecutions and hearings
• Direct violence [repression]
Figure 1.: Modes of suppression (Boykoff
2007)
Figure 1, reproduced from (Tilly and
Tarrow, 2015), presents a list of differ-
ent forms of what Boykoff summarizes
under the term “suppression.” While
Boykoff compiled the list in the con-
text of the United States, the same tech-
niques are applied in Middle Eastern
authoritarian states as well. Political
activists – but also bloggers – have
been harassed, denigrated in the me-
dia and sued for defamation. Often-
times activists experience great difficul-
ties finding employment. Repression
strategies that Boykoff does not men-
tion but which are also used in several
authoritarian countries include smear
campaigns. These are typically linked
to aspects of individual activists’ pri-
vate lives and to legal prosecution for
actual and alleged crimes unrelated to
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their activism (such as tax evasion or
the possession of cannabis) in order to
intimidate and silence them.
In the field of social movement studies, there is little agreement concerning the
effects of state repression on movement behavior. One school believes that there
is a linear relationship between repression and mobilization, with repression in-
creasing the cost of collective action. According to this view, high levels of re-
pression ultimately lead to demobilization (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Hibbs, 1973;
Oliver, 1980). Others, however, take psychological factors into account to argue
that repression has the opposite effect, predicting that it creates frustration and
aggression, thereby increasing the level of mobilization to fight the “unjust” op-
pressor (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982; White, 1989). Studies grounded in
large-N analyses have produced a multitude of models over the years, but suffer
from methodological problems such as the reliance on undercomplex data sources
and the will to condense the effects of a wide variety of variables into one single
curve (Johnston, 2011, p.108-112). In efforts to understand the seemingly contra-
dictory effects of repression on mobilization, subsequent studies have investigated
how varying levels of repression (Gurr, 1970), its timing (Snyder, 1976), its per-
ceived illegitimacy (Opp and Roehl, 1990), its target (Mason and Krane, 1989) or
a combination of these factors (Della Porta, 1996) influence the level of mobiliza-
tion. As a whole, these studies suggest that repression is multidimensional, with
each dimension generating variables explaining different outcomes. More recently,
scholars have proposed to focus on clarifying these various dimensions of repres-
sion to understand how they boost or discourage movement strategies (Hafez and
Quintan Wiktorowicz, 2004).
Particularly relevant for this study is the impact of selective or indiscriminate re-
pression. Still grounded in rational choice theory, Mason and Krane spell out the
impact of death-squad violence on different groups within the opposition in au-
thoritarian regimes. Here, reactions vary according to whether the regime targets
leaders, rank-and-file members or randomly selected groups of the population not
affiliated with the opposition (1989). They find that the repression of the leadership
is the earliest and most common form of death-squad violence, resulting in the re-
duction of active support of the opposition amongst the larger population because
opposition to the regime appears ineffective. Subsequently, new leaders emerging
from the rank-and-file change tactics, eschewing actions that expose them to re-
pression in favor of those promising to overcome free-rider effects, for example by
mobilizing. These tactics include the mobilization of a different part of the popu-
lation or actions with lower expected costs of participation (Ibid., p.180). However,
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if the regime starts repressing the rank-and-file, in turn, because their mobilization
has become too effective, it might intimidate some of them and radicalize others,
driving them to violent actions. The more arbitrary the violent repression is ap-
plied, the more the regime risks to convince formerly unsympathetic peasants to
actively support the insurgents (Ibid., p.181). While bloggers usually do not face
death squads, Mason and Krane’s distinction between targeted and indiscriminate
repression might still explain why different groups inside the cyberactivist sphere
radicalize or change tactics.
2.2.4 Collective action in authoritarian states
Authoritarian regimes muster considerable resources to control their populations,
raising the cost of non-state-sponsored (or otherwise tolerated) collective action
to levels that are unbearable for the majority of the population most of the time.
Hence proponents of collective action do not have the same opportunities to mo-
bilize compared to their equivalents in liberal democracies. Thus, the collective
action repertoire or repertoire of contention – that is, the form collective action
takes, or in Tilly’s definition, the “whole set of means [a group] has for making
claims of different types on different individuals” (1986, p. 2) – is shaped by these
circumstances, but also by local particularities. For instance, recent literature on
mobilization in authoritarian contexts emphasizes the importance of unobtrusive
protest events (including hit-and-run protests), event seizures (such as the shout-
ing of anti-police slogans during football matches (Chomiak, 2013)) as well as free
spaces and oppositional speech acts (Johnston, 2011). Given the frequent ban on
collective action by authoritarian regimes, individualized forms of protest such as
hunger strikes have become a recurrent if extreme feature of the collective action
repertoire in many Middle Eastern countries, as has public suicide, which was to
play a major role in the ignition of the Arab uprisings.
However, repressive states not only restrict the abilities of their citizens to mo-
bilize, but also often inhibit communication channels that are taken for granted in
democratic context. One of the characteristics of authoritarian states is a tightly-
policed public sphere, were public debate on government policies and potential
alternatives – the lifeblood of every democracy – is either restricted or does not
take place at all. If an oppositional press is officially allowed to operate, their
ability to reach large strata of the population is usually fairly limited. Even the
most basic tenants of communication – such as a simple comment or complaint –
can have severe consequences for the speaker and her family in the most repres-
sive regimes. Talking about social and political issues carries such a high cost that
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activists often refer to a “wall of fear” inhibiting the population from speaking
out. As a result, it has been argued that talking as an act of resistance should be
considered equivalent to acting in a democratic context, as it serves as a basis or
‘preparatory laboratory’ from which a later movement can emerge (Johnston, 2005,
p. 108).
Instead of taking place in the actual or imaginary coffee house, political debates
are transferred to more or less contained pockets permitting oppositional speech
– so-called free spaces. Contrary to the public sphere, free spaces are places in
which people congregate and talk under the premise of mutual trust. The concept
of free spaces first referred to voluntary associations such as social clubs or civic
and ethnic groups that provide their members with the skills necessary to enact
social change, such as black churches in the US civil rights movement. Free spaces
are defined as “settings between private lives and large scale institutions where or-
dinary citizens can act with dignity, independence and vision” (Evans and Boyte,
1986, p. 17). While the concept is far from flawless, with a wide range of usages
in a variety of contexts, most authors agree that “freedom from the surveillance of
authorities is essential” (Polletta, 1999, p. 6). Adapting the concept to authoritar-
ian contexts, Johnston defines it as “gathering places where intimate association
foments collective identity, shared grievances, oppositional frames, and tactical
innovation” (2005, p. 110).
The main difference between democracies and authoritarian states in this regard
is that in the former free spaces such as small organizations enjoy legal protec-
tion and can operate freely, whereas repression in the latter often renders open,
free, and structured organizations impossible. While their forms and prevalence
vary, these spaces do exist, to a certain degree, even in the most repressive set-
tings. However, despite the fact that their main characteristic is their escape from
direct government control and surveillance, this does not mean they are perfectly
secure. In this context, seeking to gauge whether it is safe to speak and taking
into account that speaking about politics is an act in itself, Johnston claims that op-
positional speech acts are the most fundamental free space in authoritarian regimes.
Transposing James Scott’s (1990) study of oppositional speech in peasant societies
to authoritarian regimes, Johnston claims that free spaces are not necessarily phys-
ical places, but can be a situation where participants of a conversation use codes,
double entendre, jokes and symbolism to express their opinions. According to
Johnston, oppositional speech acts are crucial because “when political opportuni-
ties are severely constricted, much of the doing of contentious politics is talking
about it” (author’s emphasis) (Johnston, 2005, p. 108). Adapting a term coined
by Polletta (1999), he states that oppositional speech acts are “prefigurative free
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spaces (. . . ) that create a microcosm of a future society in which free and open
communication is possible, but with an authoritarian caveat that one must always
be careful of spies and agents provocateurs” (2011, p. 114). According to this
view, speech acts and other coded expressions of discontent ultimately serve as
the groundwork for mobilization once state repression recedes.
2.2.5 The internet as a resource
In investigating the use of digital tools by members of the diaspora to achieve
change in the authoritarian home country, my study contributes to an emerging
field investigating the internet’s impact on politics and democratization processes
(Kalathil and Boas, 2003; Howard, 2010; Farrell, 2012; Trechsel, 2003, e.g.). This
relationship has been discussed controversially, as the use of web tools by protests
movements in authoritarian countries, for example in Moldova in 2009 (the first al-
leged “Twitter revolution” (Morozov, 2009b)), nourished hopes that these so-called
“liberation technologies” might serve to undermine authoritarian regimes’ control
of public discourse and eventually contribute to their breakdown. Twitter was also
portrayed as a critical tool for organizing the resistance of the Green Movement fol-
lowing the 2009 elections in Iran. Following the failure of the movement to make
a sizable impact, scholars pointed out that Western media had heavily relied on
the tool for information, however, given the shutdown of the internet and low user
numbers in the country, the sources for these English language tweets were Irani-
ans living abroad. This has been interpreted as an argument to dismiss the role
played by the internet in popular mobilization (Morozov, 2009a). Similarly, in the
context of the Arab Uprisings1, the use of internet tools by activists was received
enthusiastically by the Western press. Yet, as before, the main focus of investiga-
tion was on innovative uses of internet tools by activists on the ground. The use
of the internet in demonstrations is, however, only one facet of internet activism.
1 Throughout the thesis, the events which took place in the Arab world starting in late December
2010 will be referred to as “Arab uprisings”. Other denominations, such as “Arab Revolutions”,
“Arab Spring” and “Arab Awakening” have been discarded as inappropriate terms to describe the
events, for the following reasons. Firstly, the term “Arab Revolutions” (of Dignity) has been largely
favored by the activists on the ground. Eventually, however, the majority of the Arab Uprisings did
not lead to regime change, and as authoritarian regimes return to power, the term is falling out of
favor. The term “Arab Spring”, on the other hand, originated in the West. Marc Lynch first applied
it to describe the 2011 events, taking up a terminology used by neo-conservative commentators
expecting a “democratic domino effect” in the wake of the elections in Iraq in 2005 (Lynch, 2011). It
also evokes the image of an awakening after a long winter sleep, or transitional moments in history
which were halted soon after. Similarly, the term “Arab Awakening” presumes dormant societies
on the eve of December 2010. As this study intends to prove, however, societies in the Arab world
have been far from dormant, and the processes culminating in the uprisings of 2011 have been
underway for many years.
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To turn grievances into a campaign or even a revolution, much more than a simple
call for action on an internet forum is needed. Even if mobilizations can appear
and spread more rapidly than before, a sustained mobilization requires strategic
planning.
Internet activism has been predominantly studied through the lens of resource
mobilization theory. The approach was developed in opposition to traditional col-
lective behavior theory in the 1970s, most prominently by McCarthy and Zald
(1973; 1977). While theorists of collective behavior see social movements as moti-
vated by grievances, high levels of deprivation or social strain, resource mobiliza-
tion theory stresses the importance of social movements to account for the emer-
gence of protest campaigns. The theory acknowledges the significance of political
context and grievances, but emphasizes that social movements require certain re-
sources to emerge. Grievances are assumed to be ubiquitous, hence differences and
changes in resources, group organization and opportunities explain the formation
of social movements. The novelty of the approach at the time was to assume that
social movements are rational actors engaging in a strategic effort to enact social
and political change, characterized by structures and patterns that can be studied
(Jenkins, 1983). Rooted in rational choice theory, this strand of social movement
literature highlights that costs vary according to protest activity, so activities requir-
ing lower levels of commitment and risk present a lower participation threshold.
Resources thought to be critical to the success of social movements can be mate-
rial or immaterial, such as the availability of funding, property and equipment
and access to media, but also people’s time and organizational skills. The theory
faced several criticisms, notably in its inability to explain successful mobilization
of groups with limited resources. Scholars continue, however, to apply and modify
resource mobilization theory, for example to explain the use of computer-mediated
communication by social movements. From this perspective, internet tools are pri-
marily interpreted as facilitating the internal and external communication of social
movements by radically reducing participation costs, thereby enabling small orga-
nizations with limited financial resources to organize more efficiently and to reach
their target audience (Laer and Aelst, 2010, p. 6).
As social movement studies were developed before the mass adoption of the
internet, adapting its theories to explain the effects to the growing use of modern
information technologies in social movements presents a challenge. Most investi-
gations of the matter draw a strict line between online and offline protest.2 Studies
of the relation between social movements and the internet point out how, on the
2 Given the great variety of efficient tools provided online, coupled with the growing ubiquity of
the internet, which increases the reach internet campaigns can have, it is questionable if this strict
distinction between online and offline tactics will persist in the future. Most social movements
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one hand, online tools serve to augment classic offline collective action through
the facilitation of organization, mobilization and transnationalization, and on the
other, lead to the emergence of new, purely internet-based activities, complement-
ing current social movements’ repertoire of collective action. Typologies of the
digital repertoire of contention aiming at accounting for different forms of internet
activism typically divide it between facilitation of offline protest and pure online
activism.
From digital augmentation of protest to new modes of digitally enabled col-
lective action
The most elaborate typology has been presented by Earl et al. (2010). It suggests
that websites can serve as a form of brochureware, through which organizations dis-
tribute logistical information, information about the cause or on the organization
itself, their issue framing or their ideology, but also suggests they do not offer other
ways of becoming involved in their activities directly online (online donations con-
stitute a wide-spread exception to this rule). Furthermore, websites can serve to
coordinate offline protest by providing information to potential participants, which
Earl at al. term Online Facilitation of Offline Activism. A movement’s website would,
for example, offer information such as the time and place of the next protest event,
offer downloadable signs for printing and information concerning logistics. Schol-
ars have argued that in this case the relatively low costs associated with the use of
the internet leads to a scale-change, enabling the movement to spread its message
internationally and to build a global network of support. The underlying dynamics
of its struggle, however, are not altered (Earl, Kimport, et al., 2010, p. 431).
Potentially model-changing uses of digital tools include what Earl et al. call
Online Participation. These activities range from online petitions, so-called email
bombings (the overload of mailboxes through the sending of enormous volumes
of email to a single address), the temporary shutdown of websites through Dis-
tributed Denial of Service attacks, to hacking the websites of large companies, or-
ganizations or governments. In this form of online activism, scholars have found
certain aspects which differ from findings of classical social movement studies. For
example, Brunsting and Postmes (2002) argue that online activists are more moti-
vated by the perceived effectiveness of their actions than by group solidarity. On
the other hand, the ability to considerably lower the threshold for participation has
raised concerns about the commitment of participants in online “flash campaigns”,
today resort to a mixture of offline and online strategies, leading certain scholars to argue that the
distinction should be completely abandoned (Bimber, 2000).
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also termed “five-minute activists” (D. Bennett and Fielding, 1999). In this, social
network sites play an important role, because through their working mechanism
(notably the so-called newsfeed), chances of reaching beyond the already commit-
ted members are higher than via mailing lists. Especially in authoritarian regimes,
activism on social network sites can be important since the blurring of the distinc-
tion between public and private spaces in social networks like Facebook can lead
to so-called information cascades (Lohmann, 1994). These are related to the inher-
ent coordination problems in an authoritarian context, in which information on
other actors’ intentions is limited, since those disagreeing with the regime fear re-
pression. By highlighting that acquaintances or a friend’s friend approves a certain
political statement, oppositional views become increasingly visible online, and pre-
viously intimidated bystanders might lose fear and are encouraged to voice their
dissent as well.
Earl et al.’s category Online Organizing, refers to campaigns and movements that
emerge and are organized solely online, such as vote swapping in American presi-
dential elections (Schussman and Earl, 2004). In this context, Earl and Schussman
discovered that leaders of online movements tend to have technical backgrounds
(such as Web masters, computer scientists etc.) and are less likely to have prior ac-
tivist experience (Schussman and Earl, 2004, pp. 448-450). Other studies highlight
that internet-based cause-oriented campaigns can arise instantly as a response to
grievances (Gurak and Logie, 2003). Central movement leadership is in this con-
text far less important, as predicted by Manuel Castells (1997). Earl and Kimport
conclude from these studies that such online developments go beyond scale-related
changes and instead demand theoretical changes in social movement theory (2011).
They find that the ease with which online campaigns are launched significantly
reduces the importance of resources necessary for the emergence, growth, and suc-
cess of social movements in certain contexts, thereby questioning the relevance of
research mobilization theory as put forward by McCarthy and Zald (1977).
2.3 digitally enabled diaspora activism
Another aspect highlighted by Earl and Kimport (2011) is the decreased need for
co-presence in online supported political campaigns. These are characterized by
the fact that they act together, such as working on a campaign or signing an online
petition, physical and temporal co-presence is not required anymore (ch.6). Time
and space of protest events are decoupled, enabling participants to join protest ac-
tivities at different locales at different moments in time. This aspect is particularly
relevant for campaigns addressing issues transcending borders like the Global Jus-
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tice Movement, but also for dispersed groups like diasporas. Previous research
has found that internet tools allow members of the diaspora to build distinct on-
line networks in order to negotiate their identities, spread their culture, influence
politics in their home- and host societies and to discuss subjects of common interest
(Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 11). These networks have been called either ‘digital
diasporas’ or ‘e-diasporas’, whereby the main difference between the terms consti-
tutes the attempt of the latter to avoid associations with related buzzwords like
‘digital natives’ or ‘digital immigrants’, which denote whether a person grew up
during the internet era or not (Diminescu, 2012). The collaborative, so-called Web
2.0 can be characterized as an “info-sphere constitut[ing] a postnational or global
media that transcends national boundaries, creating a deterritorialized space or cy-
berspace”, realizing the utopia of internet pioneers envisioning “deterritorialized
communities, bounded by common interests and not by space or time” (Licklider
and Taylor, 1968, cited in Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010, p. 8).
2.3.1 Collective identity in online communities
In the study of diaspora, cognitive aspects such as a group consciousness and the
maintenance of a collective memory or myth of their homeland, are at the core of
its very definition. Analyses of the use of the internet by members of the diaspora
have, so far, focused on its potential to facilitate the collective expression of dias-
poric identities, which in a second step enables them to engage in collective action
both in their host and their home countries. Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, in her study
Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement (2009), emphasizes the inter-
net’s influence in fostering the development of a diasporan hybrid identity. This
“in-between”, arising from the mixing of cultural traits of the home and the host
country (in the context of the tolerance of cultural diversity by the host society,
such as the United States’ tolerance for hyphenization), is deemed to enable mem-
bers of the diaspora to conserve cultural practices compatible with liberalism and,
in addition, to adopt values of the host country like pluralism, democracy, and
human rights, through socialization and integration (Shain, 1999, p. 22)(as cited in
Brinkerhoff 2009). This in turn would turn them into likely proponents of democ-
ratization processes, as opposed to earlier studies highlighting diasporas’ role as a
security threat.
The concept of collective identity has equally been used by social movement
scholars seeking to explain how social movements emerge and manage to main-
tain commitment and cohesion over time. According to Alberto Melucci, collective
identity is “an interactive process through which several individuals or groups de-
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fine the meaning of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints for
such an action.” (Melucci, 1989, p. 793). Collective identity is thought to alleviate
the possibly negative repercussions of the participation in social movements, like
social stigmatization and other risks associated with protests (Fantasia, 1988). In
classical social movement theory, collective identity is often presented as requiring
face-to-face interaction in shared spaces. Early theorists of the internet stressed that
being online meant being in another place, similar to the agora of political theory
or in the literature on deliberative democracy and the public sphere (Habermas,
1991). This literature pointed out that sending an email to a friend, comment-
ing on a blog, and posting on newsgroups or a social network site all constitute
social interactions. These exchanges – sometimes random and sporadic, some-
times prolonged and regular – can foster a sense of community and lead to the
emergence of virtual communities, first described by Howard Rheingold: “social
aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on [...] public
discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal
relationships in cyberspace” (Rheingold, 2000, p. 5). Contemporary, decentralized,
informal and self-governing online fora have in common the fact that they gather
internet users, who have not, for the most part, met in person. Written conversa-
tions disconnect the participants from the constraints of time or place, as one can
join or leave a conversation at any moment. Nevertheless, thick, virtual commu-
nities can emerge, which enable people to empathize with each other, similar to
physical communities. Online communities can provide online emotional support
during a stroke of fate, while on the other hand they are recurrently afflicted with
gratuitous, and deliberately disruptive conflicts (Rheingold, 2000). The interaction
in those spaces remains, despite its computer-mediation, social, and it can lead to
the creation of a collective identity and subsequent collective action.
2.3.2 Collective identity in cyberactivism
Recently, some research challenges the notion that online participants in chat
rooms are able to build a collective identity online (e.g., Ayres, 1999; Nip, 2004).
Other sociologists of the web have questioned the idea of the necessity of a col-
lective identity in the context of internet-based collective action. As most cyber-
activism does not require co-presence, Earl and Kimport suggest that building a
collective identity is not critical to what they call e-tactical participation, that is
entirely online movements such as online petitions (2011, p. 144). They argue that
e-tactics are neither dangerous nor costly and rather episodic, therefore the barri-
ers for participation are low, and a collective identity less important. While this
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might be true for online activism in Western contexts, I argue that in authoritar-
ian contexts characterized by intensive online monitoring and control, this is not
the case. Instead, here, the online world can be a free space akin to “duplicitous
groups,” that is official civil society groups in authoritarian states whose activities
provide citizens with a space in which they can speak without fear of reprisals,
such as church groups or cultural associations (Johnston, 2011, p. 116-119). The
establishment of this free space involves the building of trust between the partici-
pants, which precludes some kind of collective identity.
The question here is, however, what kind of collective identity will evolve. Cur-
rent research assumes that members of the diaspora use the internet to form a
distinct collective identity necessary for subsequent collective action directed at
the home country. It portrays diaspora engagement in a unilateral manner: the di-
aspora community as an isolated group engages in a concerted action towards the
society in the homeland. This might be true on discussion boards which have been
the object of Brinkerhoff’s study (2009). This viewpoint overlooks, however, the
interaction that occurs between those abroad and those remaining in the country
of origin, and common initiatives that may emerge. The many-to-many commu-
nication enabled by internet tools (as opposed to one-to-many communication of
traditional media like television, radio and the press) allows diasporic communi-
ties not only to keep up with developments in their country through a potentially
greater offer of online news coverage, but also to maintain ties and to engage in
a conversation with people remaining in the home country, overcoming the iso-
lation from fellow countrymen pre-internet diasporic communities often suffered
from. One way this can be achieved is by participating actively in the home state’s
national blogosphere, the virtual universe that assembles all blogs from a given
country.
2.4 investigating online activism power structures
As we have seen, cyberactivism can take different forms ranging from offline ac-
tions accompanied by information online to purely online activism. Given that in
an authoritarian context, the former is likely to provoke state repression, this the-
sis focuses on campaigns and movements that emerge and are organized entirely
online, and in particular on the leaders of its blogospheres.
Technically, a blog is defined as a webpage with a list of articles in reverse-
chronological order (i.e. the newest is at the top) written by a single author or
an author collective, even though the chronological order of the entries is often
spurious (Ringmar, 2007, p. 17). Blogs are enhanced with tools facilitating linking
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to other pages, such as blogrolls, permalinks and trackbacks allowing bloggers to
easily follow conversations in their networks. Today, blogs are often used as an
easy way to set up one’s own website. In the early days of the internet, setting
up a website was a cumbersome process, because it necessitated to learn how to
write HTML code. Blogs were the first manifestation of the rise of so-called user-
generated content, whose other forms include wikis, images, video and audio files
produced by users and published using dedicated web services. The populariza-
tion of tools facilitating the publication of user-generated content is one of the
features of the so-called Web 2.0 (Graham, 2005).
If discussion boards usually feature rules of conduct and etiquette, which may
include a ban on certain taboo topics or the omission of strong language, the advan-
tage of a blog is that the user decides the issues he wants to address and the tone
he wants to employ. These characteristics have made blogging a nearly costless
way to address a worldwide audience, amounting to what Ringmar calls a “self-
publishing revolution” (2007). The ease of self-publishing has made interlinked
communities of blogs, or blogospheres, one of the main scenes of online activism,
next to social network sites. This can be linked to the absence of credible and
reliable media outlets in many Arab countries, hamstrung by state regulation and
censorship - Reporters without Border’s pre-uprising 2009 Press Freedom Index
lists the majority of Arab countries at the bottom of its ranking (Reporters with-
out Borders, 2009). Despite the fact that commercial social media platforms like
Facebook and Twitter gain in importance in cyberactivist campaigns, many of the
most committed activists continue to entertain their own websites. But who are
those committed activists? This leads to my first exploratory subquestion:
1. What are the power structures in the selected online activism
spheres? Who are the leading figures?
The subquestion asks for the identification of opinion leaders. In the physical
world, studies have found that advice from friends, family and experts matters
when a person makes decisions. Those individuals whose experiences, opinions,
and suggestions are sought after have been termed “influentials” (Keller and Berry,
2003). The question of opinion leadership in specific groups is not new. Already
in 1955, Lazarsfeld and Katz published their theory on information flows and
personal influence on individual decision-making (1955). Contrary to the state of
research at that time, which assumed a direct influence of the mass media on atom-
ized individuals, they found what they called the Two-step flow of communication,
in which the majority of people form their opinions influenced by opinion leaders,
who are in turn influenced by the mass media. They found that the individuals
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that were identified by their peers as having influenced them in a decision-making
process shared certain characteristics. They were respected members of the com-
munity, and even though they were not part of the mass media, they had a greater
exposure to them than the other members of the group. Lazarsfeld and Katz
concluded that opinion leaders were avid consumers of media and subsequently
shared their interpretation of media messages with others.
It has been argued that the ease of setting up a blog will result in the deposition
of traditional elites by allowing everyone with internet access to publish their views
to a wide audience, leading to the democratization of the public debate. The
most prominent proponents of this claim among media scholars are Shirky (2008)
and Papacharissi (2010). It has also emerged, however, that blogospheres develop
hierarchical structures as they grow. In fact, the readership and hyperlinks blogs
receive are unequally distributed, meaning that only a small number of leading
bloggers attracts the majority of the traffic, whereas the majority of blogs have
hardly any readers, following a power law distribution.
“A new social system starts, and seems delightfully free of the elitism
and cliquishness of the existing system. Then, as the new system grows,
problems of scale set it. Not everyone can participate in every conver-
sation. Not everyone gets to be heard. Some core group seems more
connected than the rest of us, and so on.” (Shirky, 2003)
Similarly, social network scholars, investigating the growth of the internet as a
whole, revealed that it grows through what they termed “preferential attachment”,
where “older [. . . ] vertices increase their connectivity at the expense of the younger
[. . . ] ones, leading over time to some vertices that are highly connected, a “rich-get-
richer” phenomenon” (Barabasi and Albert, 1999, p. 6). This is a variation of the
“Matthew effect”, a term coined by sociologist Robert K. Merton to describe the
phenomenon that established scholars will receive more credit for their work than
relatively unknown scientists, even if their work is comparable (Merton, 1968).
Empirical studies of the internet have concluded that contrary to the expectation
of equal opportunities to be heard and read online, the structures are hierarchical,
even though the mechanisms leading to this hierarchy are not yet fully understood.
Computer scientists Adamic and Huberman (2000), for example, claim that prefer-
ential attachment is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon, otherwise all highly
connected nodes would have to be older nodes. Instead, they suggest that every
website has its intrinsic growth rate, possibly depending on factors such as qual-
ity, interest, or investment in money (Adamic and Huberman, 2000). This second
mechanism was later included in the Albert and Barabasi model. This means that
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not every new node is destined to remain unread relative to older nodes. Applied
to the blogosphere, it means that a large number of incoming and outgoing links
of a blog increases the probability of acquiring new incoming and outgoing links,
respectively. From these premises, I assume that
Hypothesis 1.1: The studied blogospheres are characterized by hierar-
chical structures.
In terms of political blogging, the importance of a resonating topic, a captivating
writing style and regular contributions appear to explain a successful blog. On the
other hand, the literature on the growth of the web indicates that authorities in
the studied blogospheres will be the most connected. The hierarchical structure of
the network linking blogs impedes the sudden surge to prominence of a newcomer,
unless they are promoted through being referenced by one of the more widely-read
bloggers. Unless a blogger decides to be less active, that is, to be less dedicated
to blogging, we can expect that his prominence will prevail. As such, the most
dedicated early adopters of blogging are likely to remain prominent.
Hypothesis 1.2: In the blogospheres, the nodes with the highest in-
degree are likely to be older nodes.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States, it soon emerged
that the terrorist network al-Qaeda had made extensive use of the internet for orga-
nizational purposes (Filiu, 2009). Given the fact that the terrorists lived and studied
in Western countries prior to the attacks, coupled with the surge of so-called home-
grown terrorism carried out by descendants of immigrants, the use of the internet
by members of the diaspora became the focus of public attention. The use of inter-
net tools in more recent terror attacks in Europe as well as by migrants during the
so-called European refugee crisis fuel a primarily securitarian perspective among
state authorities.
In an attempt to nuance this view, academics have advanced the capacity of
ICTs to foster identity formation, as well as interactions of dispersed populations
as “virtual” or “digital” diasporas. So far, there are two book-length examina-
tions of the subject, a comparative study by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff entitled “Dig-
ital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement” (2009) and an edited vol-
ume, “Diasporas in the new media age: Identity, politics and community” (Alonso
and Oiarzabal, 2010). Brinkerhoff draws on case studies of nine diaspora orga-
nizations from five primarily U.S.-based diasporas (Afghan-Americans, Egyptian
Copt-Americans, Tibetan-Americans, Somali-Americans and the Nepali Diaspora),
through which she explores how the internet can help build a virtual community
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among members of a given diaspora and how they coordinate collective action.
The study allows important insights into identity formation online and its central-
ity in constructing physical migrants into “imagined” diasporans.
Thus, by and large, these studies focus on community building, arguing that the
internet provided a means to form a community across several continents separate
from their fellow citizens remaining in the country of origin. There is thus a ten-
dency to regard diasporas as monolithic groups, which, in a second step, engage
in a concerted action towards the homeland. While this perspective is fairly com-
mon in diaspora studies, diasporas, like most other larger groups, are “stratified
by class, caste, education, occupation, religious affiliation, cultural interests, urban
or rural background” (Werbner, 1999, p. 24). It will therefore be interesting to see
whether we find a relative coherent diasporic community or rather a multitude
of groups engaging in different ways with the home country, and how this is ex-
pressed online. From the literature on diasporas, we expect that the shared identity
and interest in the home country would induce bloggers based abroad to link to
other bloggers and websites dealing with this issue, resulting in a distinct cluster.
Hypothesis 1.3: The diaspora nodes form a cluster distinct from the
rest of the blogosphere.
2.4.1 The place of migrants in the cyberactivism spheres
In the context of new technology like the internet, the adoption of which necessi-
tates computer hardware and literacy, initial users were a select group who could
afford it or who were granted early access due to professional reasons. Through-
out the world, academics belonged to the latter group, as the internet developed
primarily as a tool for resource sharing among universities. Likewise, developing
countries connected their research institutions to the network first, long before the
more user-friendly World Wide Web existed.3 At that moment, computer experts,
engineers, scientists and librarians were mainly using the system. Besides this
select group of professionals, access to the internet remained restricted until the
early 1990s. (Leiner et al., 2009)
2. How can we account for migrants taking up prominent roles in
their respective political blogosphere?
When the internet was eventually opened to the broader public, it was quickly
embraced by a growing part of the populations of the USA, Europe and Asia,
3 The World Wide Web was invented by the English computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee in 1989
while being employed at CERN in Switzerland.
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although differences in technology adoption persisted, a phenomenon termed
the “digital divide” by Pippa Norris (2001). In this now classical critique, re-
searchers argued that the use of the internet is linked to one’s educational and
socio-economic background (access issues) as well unequally-distributed fears and
risks associated with the technology (skill issues). The literature on the digital di-
vide found that internet access continues to depend on economic circumstances,
education, race and age. That means, younger, higher educated and wealthier
individuals were overrepresented among internet users.
Supposing similar mechanisms at work in the migrant population, it neverthe-
less emerges that internet activists living abroad were more likely to be early in-
ternet adopters than those living in developing countries. This is particularly true
in the so-called developing countries, including the Middle East, where internet
access was reserved to elites despite numerous efforts of local governments to en-
courage its use (Abdulla, 2007). The low degree of internet penetration in countries
with a large migrant population living in Europe and North America might have
resulted in the prevalence of these migrants in their ethnic virtual communities,
and later in the blogosphere. The different rates of internet use result in the fact
that migrants were part of a digital vanguard in home societies, even if in the
host country context they were part of the mainstream. Therefore, migrants and
members of the diaspora have a comparative advantage over their peers at home,
with considerable resources at their disposal in terms of early access and computer
skills, enabling them to take up leading positions in the cyberactivist sphere.
Hypothesis 2.1: Migrants and members of the diaspora were overrep-
resented in the digital vanguard in their home countries.
The internet can serve as a platform for the promotion of oppositional speech, es-
pecially in countries that strictly monitor this medium and prosecute bloggers. In
addition to actual technical censorship, activists on the ground face possible per-
sonal consequences, such as the loss of their employment or the harassment of
their families, or even imprisonment. The risk taken in an individual case depends
on the personal situation of the activist. Following rational choice theory – which
made its entry into the field of study of collective action with Mancur Olson’s
(1963) thesis on its irrationality – there are high costs associated with challenging
a repressive state, and actors weigh the costs and benefits of protest. Perceived
high costs can induce internet users in the home country to be cautious. Apply-
ing caution from daily life into acts online, they use symbolism and underground
humor and jokes, following tacitly understood rules of speech about what is ap-
propriate to criticize the regime during oppositional speech situations (Johnston and
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Mueller, 2001, p. 115). The diaspora activist, if well established in the host country
(such as having a residence permit or even citizenship), does not suffer directly
from the negative effects of her activism. She can be relatively free from fear in
expressing her political opinions online in the context of internet monitoring and
censorship. Despite attempts by government to control citizens beyond national
borders, members of the diaspora of highly repressive regimes living in liberal
democracies benefit from their relative immunity from state repression. Therefore,
they benefit from an opportunity structure that is more open than in their country
of origin, influencing their strategic choices (Kriesi, 2004).
Hypothesis 2.2: The relative absence of repression, both online and
offline, facilitates dissident migrant cyberactivism.
If the activist plans, however, to return to his or her home country, either to visit
or to relocate permanently, he or she might adapt her activist behavior to avoid
harassment on the return. Possible tactics include to remain anonymous, to mod-
erate one’s discourse or to disguise the message instead of the messenger. This can
give way to a witty, indirect and coded style where keywords possibly attracting
censors are substituted with references to symbols of the regime. Finally, cyberac-
tivists’ anonymity, may not solely be linked to fears of personal persecution, but
the result of fear that relatives might suffer from their political activities as well.
When netizens have the impression that they are immune to state repression, or
able to play on both sides, they might adopt a more outgoing approach, aiming
at openly promoting themselves and their cause. This might be the case for long
established opposition leaders, who live abroad but wish to maintain their appeal
to their audience in their home country.
Hypothesis 2.3: Strategies employed vary according to the perception
of risk and rewards involved.
2.4.2 Diaspora cyberactivist categories
3. Which diaspora activists will be most prominent in the respective
contexts?
Migrant populations are diverse. They comprise individuals whose reasons to emi-
grate vary, just as well as the length of absence from their home country, displaying
a diversity of political views (Zunzer, 2004, p. 26). The differences in the defini-
tions also touch upon the question whether diasporas should be studied according
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to apparently objective criteria. The literature on diasporas has emphasized the
importance of identity for the maintenance of diasporas, a longing for the home-
land in the imagination of an individual is a key marker that he or she belongs to a
diaspora (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997). Members of the diaspora differ in their iden-
tity from those remaining in the home country, but they also vary in the degree of
the assimilation to their host society and their identification with the homeland, as
well among generations of settlement and the identification with subcultures like
clans and ethnicities of their homeland (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 32). Previous studies
on online diasporic communities suggested that online conversations about iden-
tity are also shaped by the physical location of their participants. The language
used can also serve as a marker of the “virtual performance of ethnicity” (Alonso
and Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 115). From these premises, we can expect the following
politically active groups inside an online diasporic community:
1. Exiles
Exiles are, by definition, opposed to the regime that induced their exile.
Given their prior political record, we can expect exiles to be particularly ac-
tive in the political realm.
2. Recent migrants and students
Exposure to a radically different political system might lead to political ac-
tivism. In the context of encapsulated media in an authoritarian regime,
access to information abroad, unavailable in the home country, can lead to
the creation of political awareness. Examples from recent history show the
confrontation with a radically different political system, for example through
a prolonged stay abroad in a Western country, can deeply influence one’s
stance towards the situation in the home country. Notable examples include
Sayyid Qutb, whose three-year stay at the Colorado State Teachers College
in the United States was the turning point in his radicalization. Disturbed
by what he viewed as American materialistic greed and moral and spiritual
degeneracy, he developed a radical vision of Islam in his Islamic manifesto
Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), justifying the overthrow of misguided gov-
ernments (Calvert, 2000).
3. Second generation immigrants
It has been suggested that while first generation immigrants are keen to main-
tain strong ties to their homelands, their children are less inclined to do so
(Kasinitz et al., 2008). On the other hand, we have noted that Kim Butler
requires at least two immigrant generations to qualify a community as dias-
poric as opposed to a temporary exile (2001, p. 192). That said, children of
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immigrants grow up in a transnational social field influenced by their par-
ents’ origins. Their interest in their parents’ home country might stem from
a disconnection with their own experiences in their societies, or a search for
their roots. Studies suggest that while the majority of children of immigrants
readily adopt the norms and institutions of the country where they grow up,
a minority are more deeply influenced by their parents’ culture. According
to Kasinitz (2008) certain groups, such as women and those living with a
partner from the same ethnicity, as well as avid consumers of ethnic media
were more likely to engage in transnational activities. Finally, Levitt (2009,
p. 1239) underlines the importance of class, with upper- and middle-class
families being able to exploit advantages in their respective home and host
country due to their social and cultural capital. She finds that religion can be
a driving force as well.
From this we can assume that
Hypothesis 3.1: Exiles will be the most active among cyberactivists
living abroad.
Another aspect to consider is the degree of institutionalization of diaspora activism.
Throughout history, migrants have formed physical migrant communities in their
host countries. Migrant or diaspora organizations offered networks of solidar-
ity, helping newly arrived members to find employment in the community, for
example. On the other hand, they also help migrants to maintain the cultural
identity of their country of origin, by providing language classes to their children
and social activities aiming at creating a sense of community. Historically, these
diaspora associations have been a source of social capital (Wescott and Brinker-
hoff, 2006, p.12). Prior studies have also highlighted potential constructive con-
tributions of diasporas in the promotion of liberal values, economic development,
conflict resolution and peace building in their home countries (Hear et al., 2004).
They emphasize the comparative advantages of diaspora groups in terms of access
to networks and information on the ground, making them potential watchdogs
of human rights abuses and policy implementations of homeland governments
(Brainard and Brinkerhoff, 2006).
As a result, networks of oppositional politicians or activists – spreading to like-
minded activists in their host countries – constitute a part of a diaspora orga-
nization’s social capital, which can serve as a resource for further mobilization
against the regime in their home country. The spread of internet access presents
an opportunity for the formation of additional online communities. Its capability
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of communication beyond borders and community building makes it particularly
valuable for dispersed communities like diasporas. Brinkerhoff’s work highlights
precisely the adoption of technology by physical diaspora associations and, in par-
allel, the formation of diaspora communities existing entirely online (Brinkerhoff,
2009). However, in highly authoritarian contexts governments might attempt to
control formal diaspora organizations, thereby potentially rendering them uninter-
esting for politically-inclined migrants. When the government seeks to extend its
control to the population living abroad, diasporic organizations might not appear
as a viable conduit for political debate and action. When the participation in asso-
ciations is perceived as futile because they cannot act on the ground in the country
of origin, citizens living abroad might chose to become online activists in matters
regarding their home societies, as a substitute to engagement in formal diaspora
organizations.
Hypothesis 3.2: The majority of political diaspora bloggers in the
context of severe governmental control is not affiliated with a formal
diaspora organization.
2.4.3 Questions of identity and framing
As we saw earlier, collective identity is an important element both in social move-
ments and in diasporas. If we assume that migrants actively take part in their
home country’s blogosphere, the question is how this participation is framed. De-
veloping a strong diaspora identity might be perceived as an impediment to the
development of a powerful, unified social movement.
4. How do diaspora activists frame their political engagement?
Investigating mobilization of members of the diaspora on online discussion boards,
Brinkerhoff found that they used the online space to strengthen their diasporic
identity. It appears sensible that the identification with the home country is a nec-
essary condition for diaspora mobilization, but it does not preclude success. On
the contrary, political exiles and members of the diaspora are frequently consid-
ered as being detached from the reality in their home country (M. B. Anderson,
1999). To increase the chances for the success of a campaign led by members of
the diaspora, the interpretations of the situation in their homeland as proposed by
the organization should resonate with the grievances felt by those still living there.
In the blogosphere, the display of a strong diaspora identity can be perceived as
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problematic by the bloggers who stayed in the home country. Even though a sub-
community of diaspora bloggers might exist, those wanting to integrate or lead a
national campaign might chose to adopt a more inclusive identity.
Hypothesis 4.1: Cyberactivists living abroad engaged in political ac-
tion directed at their home societies will downplay their diasporic
identity.
2.5 conclusion
In this chapter, I have laid out the subquestions and hypotheses guiding my re-
search, in the quest to explain different patterns in migrant cyberactivism in the
years leading to the Arab uprisings. To answer the various subquestions and to
assess the validity of my hypotheses, the concepts and theories developed in the
literature on contentious politics will be central to this thesis. Given that the the-
sis analyzes how online movements operate in authoritarian states, the concept of
political opportunity structures will help us to understand how exogenous factor
such as the threat of repression structure the choices actors make. In view of these
restraints, dissidents retreat to free spaces such as the internet to debate issues of
social and political nature. For citizens of particularly severe authoritarian states,
the internet becomes one of the few places where these debates can take place.
Whereas in the literature on social movements, the emphasis has been to assess
how the internet helps small organizations with limited financial resources to or-
ganize more efficiently and mobilize their target audience, new research highlights
its potential for campaigns and movements that originate online. However, while
the internet lowers entrance barriers due to the low cost of communication, hier-
archical structures emerge online as well and influence whose voice will be heard.
Furthermore, the question remains whether this form of online campaigns requires
the formation of a collective identity or whether the nature of online organizing
renders it obsolete. Collective identity is also at the core of the literature on diaspo-
ras, conceptualized as a transnational imagined community. Given that bloggers
engage directly with other bloggers remaining in the country of origin, the devel-
opment and projection of a strong diasporic identity is unlikely. In the next chapter,
I will present the methodology and methods used to test the hypotheses presented
here.
3
M E T H O D O L O G Y
This chapter describes the research design and specific methodology adopted by
this study to examine political activities of citizens living abroad, directed at their
country of origin. The chapter consists of three sections: Section 3.1 details the
methodology of this study; section 3.2 outlines the methods and procedures for
data collection and analysis, and finally section 3.3 explains the case selection.
3.1 methodology
The diffusion of digital media and the need of social scientists to make sense of
their impact on society has led to the development of a new set of techniques
for the social sciences, which competes with traditional methods of quantitative
and qualitative sociology. These are called digital methods, which have been chiefly
developed by the Digital Methods Initiative at the University of Amsterdam (Rogers,
2010). The main principle of this approach resides in studying internet phenomena
by using the data the medium relies on, such as links, tags, spheres, search engines
and websites (Rogers, 2009). Using the internet itself as a source, as opposed to
treating it as a mere object of study, digital methods thus advocate an ontological
shift. While the tools grouped under this label have so far been very heterogeneous,
they are all based on digital artifacts as a source of information for the study of
social phenomena.
Prior to this development, the internet was primarily studied using methods im-
ported from the humanities and the social sciences. Online surveys, interviews,
as well as online field observations and participant-observation, known as virtual
methods, were developed chiefly by the Virtual Society Program (1997-2002) based
at the University of Oxford. In the context of a discourse portraying the inter-
net as a virtual realm apart, research in this period aimed at showing that real
life differences condition how individuals interact with the medium. Today, the
advent of so-called Big Data – that is, of vast amounts of digital information gener-
51
3.2 methods and data analysis 52
ated by people and their electronic devices – coupled with the automation of data
collection and analysis heralds a new era of internet research. The accessibility
of massive data sets entails news challenges as well, ranging from questions of
reliability over inflated expectations of the data’s objectivity to the claim that cor-
relations based on a vast amount of raw data suffice themselves, rendering social
theory obsolete (Boyd and Crawford, 2012).
While these recent developments in the field reflect the undeniable ubiquity of
digital media in everyday life, internet research does not have to be preoccupied
with the divide between the real and the virtual to take both into account. No-
tably, most data on the internet is ephemeral. As Joi Ito, the director of the MIT
Media Lab, points out, ”Big Data is about exactly right now, with no historical
context that is predictive” (Bollier, 2010, p. 19). Thus, despite its current allure,
Big Data is not going to eclipse internet research based on methods imported from
the social sciences. Instead, the combination of these methods will yield the best
results when assessing not only what people do online, but also why. Precisely be-
cause the online world is not a realm apart, digital artifacts are best complemented,
where possible, with evidence about the person behind the website. This avoids
any masking of people’s intentions when being active online associated with the
sheer volume of data and large patterns.
3.2 methods and data analysis
Given this need for a comprehensive analysis of the subject matter, this thesis
makes use of a “mixed methods approach ”. By studying cyberactivism, it thereby
also responds to a “call for a more ambitious and strategic mix of qualitative and
quantitative research strategies in the study of social movements and contention
” (McAdam, 2003, p.5), which is, so far, dominated by qualitative methods. The
methods employed range from link analysis, web mapping, multiple regression to
interviews with key actors.
3.2.1 Link analysis and graph visualization
In order to answer subquestion 1, which relates to the identification of leading
figures in online activism spheres, the analysis of links emitted and received by
the studied blogs appears to be particularly relevant. In fact, web-based media
such as blogs, but also websites of traditional media outlets, form networks based
on hyperlinks. These references to other websites or data can be mapped and their
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linkage patterns analyzed. By proceeding to map the relations between websites, it
is possible to detect who is referencing whom, to identify leading figures or hubs,
and to uncover patterns of affiliation or aversion.
In social network analysis (SNA), a network is defined as a set of two or more
nodes (also named: actors, entities, agents or vertices) connected by links (also
named: relations, ties, arcs or edges). SNA has been used to analyze micro-level
interactions between people or macro patterns and structures, where the ties or
connections refer to interdependencies such as friendship, financial relationships,
and common interests. The main goal of the procedure is to identify clusterization
and hubs. In recent years, a growing community of researchers studying rela-
tional structures and processes has developed, contributing to a growing body of
literature with shared concepts and measures (Knoke and Yang, 2007, p.1).
These insights from social network theory have been increasingly applied in the
study of blogs. Link analysis is a common method used to analyze relationships
(connections) between nodes in a dataset. While in traditional social network lit-
erature nodes represent persons or organizations, here, each node represents a
website, and the links, representing the form and content of the connection be-
tween the nodes, are the hyperlinks connecting the sites. Thus, this is based on
the idea that hypertext links between websites can be used as a proxy for social
ties. Applied to the world of blogs, this technique is based on two widely observed
online social practices:
• Website owners do not cite other websites unless they share a thematic or
social interest;
• Website owners do not cite other websites that present a point of view con-
trary to their own, not even on the same topic.
Whereas the first practice is not unexpected, the second behavior is remarkable.
Empirical research has found that internet users who have opposing positions tend
to ignore each other online. Negative citations are sparse, instead, bloggers barely
cite their opponents at all. One of the first studies revealing this mechanism is the
map of the political blogosphere in the Unites States (Adamic and Glance, 2005).
On this map, the links between the considered websites create two distinct clus-
ters, the liberal and the conservative blogs. While the practice of ignoring one’s
opponents is not of benefit of the internet user desiring to gather information on
different points of view, it is very useful for scholars researching the web. In
fact, homophily – that is, the internet user’s preference to connect to link-minded
people –underscores the fact that the web is organized according to a voluntary
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pattern, as opposed to a random network. By creating links between their own
discourse with the discourse of others online, web users establish hierarchies and
clusters (Gibson, Kleinberg, and Raghavan, 1998). Social network theory has devel-
oped several concepts to analyze these hierarchies, notably the concept of degree
centrality, which quantifies a node’s number of connections, that is incoming and
outgoing links. In the case of networks of websites and blogs, connections are
usually directed, meaning that it is possible to distinguish between incoming and
outgoing links. For our purpose, the number of incoming links will be of particu-
lar interest, since nodes with a large number of incoming links can be interpreted
as authorities in the network.
Concretely, these maps are created using two types of tools. The first step in-
volves exploring the web, usually with a crawler. A crawler is a computer program
that allows navigation through a series of web pages and to scrape the outlinks
of the visited websites. Crawlers can be automatic or, more rarely, manual, which
enables researchers to perceive the context of links and thus to avoid a black box
effect. The operation principle of network crawlers is similar to the mapping of the
World Wide Web by search engines like Google or Yahoo, albeit on a much smaller
scale. Commonly used web crawling software developed for the needs of social
sciences research are issuecrawler.net (automatic) and Navicrawler or its successor
Hyphe (semi-automatic). The e-Diaspora Project relies primarily on the web crawler
Navicrawler, an add-on for the Firefox internet browser created by Mathieu Jacomy.
It is a semi-automatic crawler, which collects the out-links of a given website in-
side a list, allowing the researcher to manually select the websites to be included
in the network or to reject them. Thus, whereas the networks resulting from au-
tomatic crawlers can only be amended after the data collection is completed, the
semi-automated approach of tools like Navicrawler allows the researcher to take
into account the context of a given link, resulting in curated networks. Finally, after
the initial selection of the relevant websites, the e-Diaspora Project used automatic
crawls to establish the strength of the links between the included nodes. Finally, it
is important to note that while the e-Diaspora Project made its network data openly
available online, it does not list which nodes were used as starting points. How-
ever, the relevant working papers provided on the project’s website mention an
exploratory keyword query in a search engine as the first step in the collection of
the starting points (Graziano, 2012, p. 12).
Crawlers are a useful tool to map websites, but they face certain limitations. One
of these is that nowadays social network sites play a major role in social mobiliza-
tion. However, crawlers can only trace the openly accessible web, whereas social
network sites like Facebook are so-called walled gardens, that is a closed platform
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accessible only to registered members. While there have been attempts to explore
data on Facebook for research purposes (Rieder, 2013), concerns about user data
have induced the platform to heavily restrict the kind of data that can be scraped
from it. Thus, conclusive research on Facebook data can only be conducted with
direct access to the database, which is generally reserved to in-house researchers
or direct cooperation between the company and a research institution. Another
oft-cited social network site, Twitter, is comparatively open, but was found to be
marginal in the studied cases. The inclusion of certain blogging features such
as discussion threads in these platforms results in a blogosphere with fuzzy bor-
ders whose actors mutually acknowledge each other. Therefore, it is important
to cross-reference the initial decision about whether a person can be considered
as a cyberactivist or not with the actors on the ground. This involves the reputa-
tional method, during which knowledgeable actors are asked to name members,
as well as the event-focused strategy that includes actors in a network according
to “participation or interest in one or more events, activities, or concerns ”, which
in our case involves the participation in specific campaigns (Laumann, Marsden,
and Prensky, 1991, p. 72). Thus, while Facebook activists do not appear on the
networks used for this thesis, I was able to interview some of them to complement
the analysis.
Finally, content on the web is ephemeral, with studies indicating that the average
half-life of a website (that is, the time required for half of the defined websites to
disappear) is about two years (Koehler, 2004). As a result, web crawls are compara-
ble to snapshots and it is not possible to operate them retroactively (Masanés, 2006,
p. 6). Due to the time frame during which this thesis was written, we are going
to rely on and adapt web crawls created for a university project, the e-Diasporas
Project developed at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris. As
we are going to see in chapter 4, the data emanating from this project is not flaw-
less. However, it is the best freely available data collected at a relevant moment
in time. While it was not possible to influence the data collection process, a few
corrections have been made ex post, with a number of nodes removed because they
did not conform to the boundaries of the research (i.e. these were not bloggers or
diaspora-related websites). For example, blog aggregators, which by design link
to a great number of websites without producing any content of their own, were
removed from the network. In addition to the removal of nodes, some duplicate
nodes were merged. A complete list of included as well as removed and merged
nodes is presented in the Appendix. All tables and figures in chapter 4 are the
result of this refinement of the data collected by the e-Diasporas Project.
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Finally, the adapted networks were visualized using the graph manipulation soft-
ware Gephi1. This program’s Force Atlas algorithm creates a visual representation
of the relationships between nodes by simulating a system of physical forces, com-
bining repulsive and attracting forces until an equilibrium is reached. In addition
to the layout of the network, the software integrates a number of key concepts of so-
cial network analysis. For this thesis, we will rely mostly on the concept of degree
centrality, that is the number of in- and out-links a website or blog receives and
emits. Given that the number of in-links serves as a proxy for authority, the size of
the nodes in the visualization was rendered proportional to the amount of in-links
of a website, that is to say the number of links it receives from other websites in
the network. This measure can be considered representative of the authority of the
website in the network. Furthermore, nodes were colored in monochrome shades
to indicate the location of the blogger in question.
3.2.2 Regression analysis
The network data initially provided by the e-Diasporas Project was augmented by
recording the month and year a blog was created, in order to assess hypothesis
1.2; that is, whether the nodes with the highest number of in-links (or in-degree)
are indeed those created earlier than others. Subsequently, this hypothesis was
tested on the dataset that most closely follows my own research agenda. In other
words, it investigates the relationships between diaspora bloggers and the broader
national blogosphere. Using a number of variables, including the date of creation,
the location and whether a node represents a blog or a website, several regression
models were build using the statistical software Stata.
3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews
Since web mapping fails to capture the motives and strategies of the actors at stake,
other methods were necessary to gather the information necessary to answer my
other subquestions. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a
select number of internet activists in Tunisia and Morocco and abroad to fill this
gap, as well as a content analysis of the most salient online campaigns. The web
crawls served as a starting point for the selection of the interviewees. However,
given certain shortcomings of the web crawls discussed in chapter 4, such as the
absence of important Facebook activists in Tunisia and large parts of the Arabic
1 Gephi is open source graph visualization and manipulation software. https://gephi.org/
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language bloggers in Morocco, additional efforts were undertaken to represent
their perspectives, notably through snowball sampling.
Many activists that formally lived abroad have since returned to their country of
origin, hence interviews were conducted in France and Canada, but also in Tunisia
and Morocco. Furthermore, a number of interviews were conducted using video
calls or written electronic communication. All in all, 34 bloggers and activists’ tes-
timonies were collected for this thesis, out of which 13 were part of the Moroccan
and 21 part of the Tunisian internet activist and blogosphere.
Interviewing bloggers
In my quest to speak to as many key activists as possible, I encountered a num-
ber of obstacles. Following the departure of Ben Ali in Tunisia and the resigna-
tion of Hosni Moubarak in Egypt, bloggers were at the center of media attention
and invited to numerous conferences. This was especially true for the Tunisian
case, but Moroccan bloggers also told me that they had been invited “all over the
place”. Some bloggers rose to post-revolutionary fame, hailed as poster boys and
girls in newspapers and one of them, Lina Ben Mhenni, was nominated for the
Nobel peace prize. She subsequently published a pamphlet entitled “A Tunisian
Girl,” which was also the title of her blog.2 Other former cyberactivists created
non-governmental organizations with the help of international organizations and
Western government agencies. This was particularly true for bloggers having lived
abroad. For example, the collective blog Nawaat was turned into an association,
and the activist Amira Yahyaoui co-founded the government watchdog Al-Bawsala.
As one of my Tunisian interviewees bluntly put it to me, Tunisian cyberactivists
receive a high number of interview requests. My only chance to land an interview
was to be either be referred by someone else, to study at a prestigious university
(“Harvard”) or to prove that I had more knowledge about the case than the average
researcher. This experience was rather sobering.
In addition to being overwhelmed with interview requests, many activists were,
at some point, on the verge of being physically and mentally exhausted because
they were continuously engaged in the political struggle in their home country, but
also helping their friends and allies across the Arab world in their endeavors . As
a result, the willingness of activists to conduct interviews was cyclical. Somebody
not answering my inquiries using several channels would answer them a year later.
Others would reply in writing detailing why they did not want to be interviewed
at all, claiming that it was too long ago and that they found the very idea of
2 “Connectez-vous” in the original version, is inspired by Stéphane Hessel’s pamphlet “Indignez-
vous” (eng.:“Time for Outrage”) that motivated the Spanish Indignados movement.
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intellectualizing their experience by being part of an academic research project
disillusioning, pointing out that it was a “lived experience and not an object of
study, so it just doesn’t feel right to treat it as something for the archives, rather
than the improvisational, revelational, and personal process of discovery that it
was” (Eatbees, personal communication, 15 August 2015). Many activists also
mentioned growing tired of answering the same questions over and over again.
This is not to say that it was impossible to interview bloggers and cyberactivists.
Some of the most coveted bloggers were very responsive and willing to be inter-
viewed. It is also important to remind oneself that blogging was and is a hobby,
even though the Arab uprisings have allowed a number of bloggers to become pro-
fessional activists or journalists. Responding to interview requests is not part of the
“job description” of a blogger, and they do not have office hours or a professional
phone number. Not everyone has the time to commit him- or herself to blogging,
which is probably the reason why there are a large number of students among
bloggers. Nevertheless, compared to my experience when interviewing Tunisian
expatriate bloggers and Egypt-based bloggers in early 2010 – that is, prior to the
Arab uprisings – the difference was striking. Before the revolution, many Tunisian
bloggers were fearful of potential governmental reprisals, while Egyptians were
relatively open to speak in public. This fear disappeared in the Tunisian case and
was also not mentioned in my interviews with Moroccan bloggers, even though
in the Moroccan case, many preferred to remain anonymous nevertheless, often
citing the wish to separate their online persona from their private and professional
life.
3.2.4 Validity
Regarding the internal validity of this research, it is important to recognized that
the accuracy of a network crawl depends largely of its starting points. To map
issue-based online communities, the seed nodes have to relate directly to the topic
under study. Seed nodes can be selected using sources of authority, for example
official websites of an association dealing with the issue, or by relying on an expert
on the subject matter. However, this method uniquely reveals networks between
websites at the moment of the crawl, analogous to a snapshot. Given the inter-
net’s volatility, with new websites emerging while others lay abandoned, it is not
possible to retroactively map a hyperlink network. In order to study networks
of the past, a researcher can only rely on crawls operated by other scholars in a
given moment of time, analogous to a historic document. This implies the loss of
control regarding the choice of seed points. However, it has been shown that dif-
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ferent samples of the same blogosphere can differ significantly in size, time span
and coverage, while they can nevertheless be consistent in their aggregate network
properties (Shi, Tseng, and Adamic, 2007).
Another difficulty arises when a website included in a historical crawl has since
ceased to operate. Using the Internet Archive WayBack Machine,3 it is, however,
possible to visit a website at a previous moment in time. In this archive, many
websites, but not all of them, are available in a stripped-down version. In these
versions, occasionally links are dysfunctional, thus the archive is not a reliable tool
to perfectly retrace online discussions. However, basic information regarding the
moment of establishment of the website and information on the owner can usually
be extracted. However, sometimes not even this is possible, because blog owners
can request the WayBack Machine to ignore their websites by inserting a short line
of code in a file (robot.txt). This practice was particularly common among certain
activists to avoid being tracked by governmental agencies. As a result, the date of
creation was impossible to determine for two blogs, which were coded as missing
values in the dataset.
Regarding external validity, it must be recognized that digital activist networks
in repressive environments tend to be context specific. Intervening factors can be
external, such as the degree of access to the internet, a country’s demographics,
the existence and nature of censorship and repression, as well as a country’s prior
experience with activism. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa share
many of these features and furthermore share a language, similar (and sometimes
common) media outlets, authoritarian regimes and rapidly increasing levels of
technology diffusion. It is therefore expected that my research provides gener-
alizations on how diasporas can engage with digital activism networks in their
countries of origin in the Middle East, and possibly beyond.
3.3 case selection
While activist networks transcend borders and individual bloggers can reach in-
ternational audiences, generally speaking blogospheres remain centered within
particular countries (Etling et al., 2009). Therefore, mapping national blogospheres
including so-called bridge bloggers, who connect a national blogosphere to other,
usually broader ones (e.g. the English or the Francophone blogospheres) (Lynch,
2007, p. 11), is crucial to identify opinion leaders. However, the role of diaspo-
ras in the cyberactivist sphere cannot be fully understood by focusing exclusively
on apparent successes, but cases where diasporas did not play an instrumental
3 http://web.archive.org
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role in their respective blogosphere are equally important. Despite a comparable
socio-economic situation, an equally sizable diaspora population and the fact that
both states faced protest events in 2011, the diaspora involvement differed, just as
the outcome of the contention. Thus, according to Przeworski and Teune (1970),
Moses and Knutsen (2007) and Tarrow (2010), the “most similar systems design”
stems from the idea that “all cases share basic characteristics but vary with respect
to some key explanatory factor” (Moses and Knutsen, 2007, p. 98). The rationale
behind the selection of the cases of this thesis is, therefore, a comparison of most
similar cases. In the following section, I will briefly assess the regime type of the
cases examined in this study and subsequently I will lay out why Tunisia and
Morocco present ideal cases for this research.
3.3.1 Regime types
The spread of democracy across the globe during the so-called third wave of de-
mocratization led to the emergence of a notable body of literature on democratic
transition and consolidation. Whereas the so-called transitology literature focused
primarily on strategic bargaining processes within the elite of a given regime dur-
ing critical junctures to explain democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
Higley and Gunther, 1992; Przeworski, 1992), the consolidation literature concen-
trated on the institutional setup, such the existence of a parliamentary democracy
and proportional representation to explain the consolidation of new democracies
(Lijphart, 1991; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Frye, 1997). These approaches have
been criticized for their emphasis on short term factors, ignoring deeply-rooted
causes of democracy such as economic development, income equality and a strong
civic culture that might ultimately shape the strategies of decision makers (Lipset,
1959; Boix, 2003; Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, as democratization stalled in many
countries of the “third wave ” (Huntington, 1991), doubts were cast on the premises
of these theories . Of particular interest in these critiques were the teleological ten-
dencies of these theories, which cast democracy as the only conceivable outcome
of a transition process. The term authoritarianism was coined and defined on the
backdrop of the persistence of a number of pre-Second World War regimes and
the collapse of many democracies in Latin American in the 1960s and 1970s (Linz,
1964). Yet, when regimes emerged that combined authoritarian and democratic
characteristics, they were not perceived as partially authoritarian but as lower
forms of democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.2-3).
Instead of highlighting the peculiar nature of these emerging regimes, the field
largely treated them as If they were still in transition. The classification of regimes
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developed into a burgeoning subfield, leading to a proliferation of definitions, stan-
dards and measurements to determine when a particular regime can be deemed
democratic. The need to properly define democracy has not only been felt by
academics, but also by policymakers. The publication of yearly rankings by or-
ganizations such as Freedom House – which has, since 1973, published an an-
nual Freedom in the World index – attests to this. Generally speaking, there have
been two partially overlapping approaches to determine when a regime qualifies
as democratic. Many approaches follow a Schumpeterian, minimalist and proce-
dural view that classifies a regime according to whether competitive multiparty
elections with an uncertain outcome are held 1947. Other approaches add Dahlian
elements of polyarchies, such as freedom of expression and organization as well as
working institutions to make those free, fair and competitive elections meaningful
(1971). Terms coined by different authors denoting “democracies with adjectives”
proliferated, such as ‘façade democracies’ and ‘quasi-democracies’ (Finer, 1970),
‘electoral democracies’ (Diamond, 1999), ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria, 1997), to
name only a few.
Thus, more than a quarter century since the beginning of the third wave of de-
mocratization, comparativists still lack consensus regarding the characteristics of
democracy and struggle to classify ambiguous regimes. It was at the end of the
1990s that scholars eventually reckoned that these regimes should be defined in
terms other than as imperfect democracies (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Lev-
itsky and Way, 2002). The benefit of this new approach was the realization that
instead of a wave of mass democratization, the end of the twentieth century had
witnessed transformation processes not leading necessarily to democratization. As
a result, authoritarian regimes came back into view. However, Linz’s positive def-
inition of authoritarianism, which ascribes particular characteristics to authoritar-
ian regimes, is not applied in the contemporary academic literature. Instead, it
uses the term by and large as a residual category of all regimes that are neither
democratic nor totalitarian. However, when the shift away from “democracies with
adjectives” (D. Collier and Levitsky, 1997) occurred, scholars returned to the liter-
ature on various types of authoritarianism developed in the 1970s, only to find
concepts such as military regime, single-party system and sultanistic regime to
be inadequate to describe contemporary regimes. Some have called regimes that
are neither democratic nor authoritarian in the typical sense of the two terms com-
petitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002) or anocracies (Fearon and Laitin,
2003). However, it was the term hybrid regime that prevailed (see, in particular Karl,
1995; Diamond, 2002; Wigell, 2008).
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The term hybrid regime was, as opposed to a residual category for all non-
or imperfect democracies, designed a class of “deliberately, carefully constructed
and maintained political systems” (Ottoway, 2003, p.7) fusing formally inconsistent
democratic and authoritarian institutional traits. Hybrid regimes are characterized
by the co-occurrence of formally democratic institutions, such as competitive elec-
tions and a multiparty system, with authoritarian practices of governance. In this
apparent synthesis, the authoritarian practices lead to the systematic transforma-
tion of the rules otherwise guaranteed in democratic regimes (Schedler, 2002; Lev-
itsky and Way, 2002; Ottoway, 2003). While scholars concede that hybrid regimes
are not a novelty per se (Diamond, 2002, p.23), others point out that hybrid regimes
have flourished in the later stage of the third wave of democratization, making
them “the modal type of political regime in the developing world” (Brownlee,
2007, p.25), while again others contend that hybrid regimes have been common
since the end of the Second World War (Gandhi, 2008).
Both cases selected for this study qualify as hybrid regimes, although they dif-
fer in some regards. Pre-2011 Tunisia was a highly closed authoritarian regime
with totalitarian traits that did not tolerate open political opposition. At the same
time, however, Tunisia featured democratic institutions. It’s electoral code of 1969
stipulates that suffrage is “universal, free, direct and secret.” However, the first
multi-party parliamentary elections were held only in 1981, resulting in an over-
whelming victory for President Bourguiba’s party. The dominance of Bourguiba’s
party was so strong that a law reserving 20 percent of the seats for opposition par-
ties and independent candidates was introduced prior to the 1994 elections. The
country has only known two presidents in the last forty years, first the leader of the
independence struggle against France, Habib Bourguiba, and second his former
Prime Minister, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who deposed the 84 year-old Bourguiba
during a bloodless coup. Tunisia’s presidential election was formally established
as a multi-candidate race in 1999, but usually produced results above 90 percent
for the incumbent, Ben Ali. During the final presidential election under President
Ben Ali, the supposed challengers from the legal opposition used their allocated
television airtime to openly encourage people to vote for the incumbent.
In Morocco, the enthronement of King Mohamed VI raised hopes for an even-
tual democratization. The young and modern king, married to a commoner, was
called to follow the example of King Juan Carlos, who successfully democratized
Spain in the aftermath of Franco’s death. While Morocco undertook significant
reforms, most notably the 2004 reforms of the Moroccan family code (Moudawana),
granting women significantly more rights in marriage, as well as the establishment
of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to appraise the so-called Years of Lead
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marked by state violence against political opponents under his father Hassan II, a
genuine democratization did not occur. By mid-2000, the comparison with Spain
was repeatedly rejected by the monarch himself, who stated that the two monar-
chies were not comparable, since Moroccans desire a strong executive role for the
monarchy (Brouksy, 2014, p.1). Subsequent reforms of the constitution resulted in
Morocco’s self-identification as a constitutional monarchy, although the executive
and the judiciary are dominated and controlled by the monarchy. Elections are
held, but the king is not bound by the vote and chooses the prime minister and the
members of the government at will. Thus, Morocco is a typical case of “Upgraded
Authoritarianism”, which describes the strategy of authoritarian regimes in the
Arab world that have consolidated their power by promoting liberal-democratic
reforms (Heydemann, 2007).
Thus it becomes clear that while both countries organized multiparty parlia-
mentary elections (and in the case of Tunisia, presidential elections), the adopted
democratic procedures did not satisfy even the minimalist Schumpeterian criteria.
They fared even worse with characteristics of Dahlian polyarchies, most notably
freedom of expression, alternative information and associational autonomy. While
Ben Ali acceded to power in 1987 with the slogan “Change”, promising economic
prosperity and democratization, the window of toleration of dissenting viewpoints
rapidly closed again. The Human Rights supporters and Islamists that initially
welcomed his coup soon realized that there was a great gulf between Ben Ali’s
statements and the actual behaviour of his government in a tactical move to sway
support from the population and of international donors. Subsequently, a closely
knit grid of informants and patronage was used by the governing party to control
the general population, and harassment of outright political opponents made sure
that they did not pose a threat to the regime. In Morocco, there was a degree of
freedom of opinion regarding the performance of the government, and the country
was known for its rather liberal press code laws (Kavanaugh, 2004, p. 298). How-
ever, while criticizing the government was tolerated, questioning the monarchy, the
person of the king, the territorial integrity (notably regarding the issue of Western
Sahara), the nation and religion were considered red lines, which could result in
prison sentences for journalists and bloggers alike (OpenNet Initiative, 2009, p. 1).
Besides their political systems, Morocco and Tunisia share, like many other coun-
tries in the region affected by the 2011 uprisings, similar socio-economic challenges,
high growth rates in internet connectivity and sizable migrant communities abroad.
The socio-economic and political challenges they face included demographic pres-
sures, corrupt authoritarian regimes, and an educated, un- or underemployed, dis-
affected youth. The age bracket between the ages of 15 and 24, that is those on the
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verge of higher education and the job market, represent one fourth of the region’s
total population (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi, 2011). This is also the group that is
most likely to adopt new technologies, including the internet, which makes them
more likely to engage in cyberactivism. In fact, while other demographic groups
– notably women – are quickly catching up, the prototype of the active netizen
remains close to how Jonathan Katz described the first users of the Web in 1997:
“The Digital Nation constitutes a new social class. Its citizens are young, educated,
affluent. [. . . ] The members of the Digital Nation are not representative of the
population as a whole: they are richer, better educated, and disproportionately
white. They have disposable income and available time ” (1997). While reliable
numbers on the profile of the average internet user in both countries are scarce,
the Arab Social Media Report of 2011 shows that 78 percent and 81 percent of
Tunisian and Moroccan Facebook users, respectively, were between the ages of 15
and 29 in December 2010. In terms of the gender breakdown, Tunisia sports 58
percent and Morocco 62 percent males (Mourtada and Salem, 2011, p. 7-9). Falling
costs of internet connections (combined with the spread of mobile internet access),
and the popular sentiment that the internet and especially Facebook are the main
location where news can be found, have resulted in an ever-growing number of
internet users in the region.
In fact, the Arab world has seen particularly high growth rates in internet con-
nectivity in the 2000s, featuring rates of 1,500 percent for the region at large from
2000 to 2007, and even relatively poor Morocco climbing up to 15 percent, repre-
senting a seven-year growth rate of 4,500 percent (Wheeler, 2010, p. 306). Blogging
has also been very popular in the Arab world, with an estimated 25,000 blogs in
2006, despite a rather low internet penetration rate compared to developed coun-
tries (Lynch, 2007). Three years later, researchers estimated that there were around
35,000 “active” blogs (Etling et al., 2009). The Arab blogosphere in particular is
unique because it is trilingual, using Arabic, English and French. Furthermore,
Arabic as a common language has resulted in the creation of a transnational blog-
ger community. Although researchers have found that the blogospheres remain
structured as predominantly country-based networks, bloggers increasingly com-
municate across borders. The common language, coupled with similar grievances
related to dictatorship and Internet censorship, has led to the emergence of a
transnational activist network. This being said, it must be stressed that the re-
lationship between internet penetration and political mobilization is not a simple
one. While a low internet penetration makes mobilization using the internet un-
likely, a high internet penetration alone is not a guarantee for mobilization, as the
cases in the Gulf region show.
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Given that the aforementioned factors are comparable in most states in North
Africa, selecting countries from this geographical area will ensure the comparabil-
ity of the case studies. By proceeding this way, it will be possible to single out key
features that differ and could explain the differences of prominence of diaspora
engagement in the countries under examination. Finally, among the MENA states,
North African states in particular have in common that they maintain sizable mi-
grant communities abroad. Out of these, two cases – Tunisia and Morocco, have
been selected – due to a substantial emigrant population living, for the greater part,
in Europe. The exact number of Tunisians and Moroccans living abroad varies ac-
cording to different sources. In fact, they are counted on the one hand by the
consular services of their countries of origin and on the other by institutions in the
country of residence. While consular statistics seek to capture the whole expatriate
population – including second and third generation immigrants – statistics in the
country of residence usually only count foreign nationals, resulting in consider-
ably lower numbers (MPC Team, 2013a; MPC Team, 2013b). Given that this thesis
explores (amongst others) the online political activities of the different strata of the
respective expatriate population, the numbers of the country of origin appear to
be more relevant. In the Moroccan and Tunisian cases, it appears that roughly ten
percent of their respective populations resides outside the country, with a growing
tendency.
Figure 2.: Number of Moroccans abroad
It must be noted that in the field of Middle East studies, the selection of these
two cases in a comparative study was for a long time considered unusual. It was
a convention not to compare the authoritarian republics with the usually equally
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Figure 3.: Number of Tunisians abroad
authoritarian monarchies, because it is assumed that those monarchies possess a
legitimacy the republics lack. As we will explored in the chapters to come, the cur-
rent Alaouite dynasty in Morocco emerged in the seventeenth century and claims
direct descent from the Prophet Mohamed. In addition, the king also performs
a religious role, as the commander of the faithful in Morocco. Despite these dif-
ferences, I believe that a comparison of Tunisia and Morocco is useful for this
thesis for two reasons. First, while the Arab uprisings provide the backdrop for
this thesis, my primary goal is not to explain the causes of success or failure in
the Arab Spring, but possible overtures for overseas citizens to partake in political
mobilizations in their home countries. Second, the difference in legitimacy of the
regime may have an impact on the form that protest takes, but will not necessarily
alter the substantive goal of the protesters, which is to overcome the arbitrariness,
corruption and lack of freedom of the authoritarian state.
3.3.2 Tunisia’s diasporic community
The Tunisian blogosphere is particularly relevant. This is because the Arab upris-
ings were ignited there and, as we will see, bloggers played an important role both
in reporting about protests when national mainstream media ignored them, as well
as acting as contacts on the ground for international media outlets like Al Jazeera
(Kallander, 2013, p. 14). In the months following the uprising, the contribution
of Nawaat, a collective blog whose founders were based abroad, was recognized
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in the form of numerous awards, such as the Reporters Without Borders Netizen
Prize, the Index on Censorship Award, as well as the EFF Pioneer Award.
As already observed in figure 3, Tunisia’s diasporic community represents ap-
proximately one tenth of the country’s population; that is, one million migrants
living mostly in Europe (France and Italy) compared to a population of roughly
ten million living in Tunisia. In 2009, the diaspora in France in comprised roughly
600,000 individuals, or 54.6 percent of the total diaspora, according to the Office of
Tunisians Abroad, which includes second and third generation migrants.4
The Tunisian diaspora comprises former working migrants that moved to Eu-
rope starting from the mid-1960s, embraced by the Tunisian government as a
means to alleviate rising unemployment (López Garcı́a, Planet Contreras, and
Ramı́rez Fernández, 1996, p. 248). Political exiles fleeing political repression repre-
sents a second group inside the diaspora. Prominent exiles include the journalists
Sihem Bensedrine and Taoufik Ben Brik, the president of the Islamic party En-
nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, human rights activist Moncef Marzouki and many
others. Many exiles returned to Tunisia after the revolution to reprise their po-
litical activity and stand for election. Tunisians living abroad have been entitled
to vote in national elections since 1989, and were called to participate in the first
truly democratic election of the country on 23 October 2011, voting for 18 specific
representatives in six extraterritorial constituencies in the Constituent Assembly.
Historically, Tunisia’s community in France was characterized by strong control
through the regime of their country of origin. The Tunisian state entertains an ex-
tensive network of consulates in France, with one office for every 11,000 Tunisians,
intended mainly to maintain ties with their migrant workers (Gildas, 1979, cited in
Brand, 2006). In addition, the “Amicales des Travailleurs Tunisiens” (“Tunisian
Workers’ Friendship Societies”) were created to preserve the ties between emi-
grants and the home country through sport teams, the celebration of religious
festivities and Arabic language courses (Zekri, 2009). Unofficially, the Amicales
were tasked to extend the monitoring of the population, as practiced inside Tunisia,
to the population abroad. In fact, after the 2011 uprising it was revealed that the
former Tunisian Cultural Center in Paris served as the Parisian antenna of the Con-
stitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party of Ben Ali. Protesters discovered thou-
sands of documents on Tunisians living abroad, including lists of party members
4 It must be noted that migration statistics are contested, due to diverse definitions of who is a
migrant and the difficulty of accounting for irregular migration. As such, Tunisian consular records
list a higher number of Tunisian abroad than host countries because they include citizens with
dual nationality and descendants of migrants. On the other hand, registration with the consulate
is neither obligatory nor automatic, and irregular immigrants (who are numerous in Italy) are not
allowed to register. Despite this, consular figures are believed to under-estimate the real number of
emigrants.
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in France, photos and financial documents, information on Tunisian dissidents in
exile together with files on French politicians and journalists (Ryan, 2011).
3.3.3 Morocco’s diasporic community
Following the ouster of the president of Tunisia in January 2011, a series of demon-
strations were staged across Morocco by the 20 February Movement. The group
used a variety of online tools, including a Facebook page and a YouTube cam-
paign video to mobilize for protests against rising food prices, lack of civil liber-
ties, corruption and a variety of related causes. Contrary to Tunisia, the Moroccan
monarchy managed to dissuade growing mobilization by making concessions. On
March 9, 2011 – only a few weeks after Ben Ali fled to his Saudi Arabian exile –
King Mohammed VI initiated a constitutional reform process, relinquishing some
of his powers, and held parliamentary elections in November. The new constitu-
tion, confirmed by a referendum in July, makes explicit reference to Moroccans
living abroad, protecting their rights as citizens and to participate in Moroccan
elections.5
Similar to Tunisia, Morocco’s community abroad is equal to roughly one tenth
of the population, with over three million emigrants on a population of 32 million
in Morocco itself in 2012 (see figure 2) At that moment in time, 90.6 percent of Mo-
roccans abroad lived in Europe, mainly in France (28 percent), Spain (17 percent),
Italy (12 percent) and the Netherlands (9 percent) and Belgium (7 percent). The
country’s emigration soared in the 1960s, primarily through bilateral guest worker
agreements with European countries such as France, Germany and the Nether-
lands. After entry limitations were implemented in those countries, Morocco’s
often irregular migration was redirected towards Spain and Italy since the mid-
1980s. Similarly to Tunisia, emigration was perceived as an essential instrument to
mitigate pressures on the domestic labor market (Brand, 2006, p. 59).
Besides the growing dependence of the state on emigrant’s remittances, the re-
lationship between the Moroccan state and its community abroad was not free of
conflict. Europe served as exile for opponents to the monarchy, such as the leftist
dissident Mehdi Ben Barka, who was abducted and subsequently ‘disappeared’ in
Paris in 1965. Others were recruited into the struggle as students based in Eu-
rope via organizations like the Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM).
The growth of an activist student and worker emigrant community coupled with
5 Out-of-country voting was first introduced in 1984 for parliamentary elections, but was abrogated
without further explication for the next round in 1993. It was reinstated for the referendum on the
amendments of the constitution and for the subsequent parliamentary elections. (Brand, 2014)
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a prominent, radical opposition in exile prompted the Moroccan state to increase
the monitoring of its citizens abroad. In 1973, Moroccan state security services
infiltrated student groups and set up state-sponsored associations, so-called “Am-
icales des travailleurs et commerçants” (“Workers’ and Businessmen’s Friendship
Societies”), whose number rose to 128 by the early 1990s. Next to serving as liai-
son offices between the administrations of the two countries and to tie Moroccans
abroad to their home country, their goal was to gain a certain control of the com-
munity abroad (Brand, 2006, p. 71ff).
3.4 conclusion
In its quest to analyze the dynamics within the online activist communities of
Tunisia and Morocco, this thesis employs a combination of digital, qualitative and
quantitative methods. The cases were selected due to their similarity in terms
of the size of their migrant population coupled with comparable socio-economic
and political challenges, which led to social mobilizations in 2011. Digital methods
such as webcrawls enable us to trace links between websites and blogs, thereby ren-
dering social ties within the community explicit. Concepts of social network theory
such as degree centrality are useful to determine which are the most authoritative
actors in a network. A statistical analysis of the relationship between the date of
creation of a website or blog and the number of inlinks adds a quantitative layer
to the investigation of the blogospheres. Finally, semi-structured interviews with
a select number of cyberactivists provide insights on their motives and strategies.
Part II
E M P I R I C A L R E S U LT S
4
M A P P I N G T H E B L O G O S P H E R E
This chapter aims at exploring the Tunisian and Moroccan activist blogospheres,
tackling the first subquestion of this dissertation, asking for the power structures in
the selected online activism sphere and the identification of leading figures. Given
that the web crawls of the e-Diasporas Project we will use contain also websites
of classic diaspora organizations, a first section of the chapter provides a brief
overview on the history of Tunisian and Moroccan diaspora activism. As we will
see, Tunisian and Moroccan emigration started in the first part of the twentieth
century as student and working migration. Overseas communities were initially
supportive of the policies of their countries of origin in the first years following
independence. However, shortly after these states attempted to extend the con-
trol of their population beyond their borders. On the eve of the 2011 uprisings,
the Tunisian community abroad was still largely caught in this long-standing au-
thoritarian grip, whereas the Moroccan state had largely diffused conflict there
by initiating political reforms and actively courting the Moroccan diaspora. This
different relationship between the state and its overseas population also plays out
online, as we will see when we analyze the power structures in the web crawls
in the second part, attempting to confirm hypothesis 1.1. Whereas the Moroccan
state heavily invested in the web to connect to its community abroad, the Tunisian
state persisted in its heavy-handed approach, mainly consisting of surveillance.
Blogospheres tend to be self-contained communities largely disconnected from in-
stitutional and associational websites, in which several actors emerge as authority
figures. The visual assessment of the networks will also include a focus on clusteri-
zation; that is, whether we can distinguish distinct communities within the greater
blogosphere, such as a separate political or diasporic sphere. Finally, we will assess
the impact of age and location on the position of blogs in the Tunisian blogosphere
in quantitative terms, using linear regressions.
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4.1 a brief history of tunisian and moroccan migrant activism
Given that Tunisian and Moroccan migration to Europe – and especially France –
dates to the 1920s, successive waves of workers and students have prompted the
creation of a great number of organizations over time. Many of these organizations
both from Tunisia and Morocco have a web presence, and as we will see in the
course of this chapter, these appear on the web crawls operated by the e-Diasporas
Project in between 2010 and 2011. Those appearing in the crawls represent, how-
ever, only a fraction of the associational life of both migrant communities. As we
will see in this brief section on the history of Tunisian and Moroccan diaspora
activism, new groups and objectives evolved with the changing demographics of
the emigrant population, whose composition shifted from mainly students to a
majority made up of blue-collar workers, to the emergence of a second generation
of immigrants. Years of working migration, coupled with the repression of po-
litical movements in their home countries and the realization that their presence
in Europe was going to be permanent, shifted the main objectives from political
activism directed at their home countries towards the fight for more rights in their
host societies.
4.1.1 Student and Working migration
Starting with Maghrebi organizations such as L’Etoile Nord Afri-caine (1926) and the
Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains (AEMNA, 1927), the subsequent
development of the associational scene mirrors the different phases of Tunisian
and Moroccan emigration. In the years prior to their country’s independence, Paris
emerged as the stage of student political engagement, for Tunisians in particular.
They benefited from the fact that they enjoyed greater freedoms to organize in
France than in Colonial Tunisia. As such, the newly founded Tunisian student
syndicate, l’UGET (Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie) held its inaugural
congress in Paris. During the years following both countries’ independence in
1956, students at home and abroad were highly politicized and enthusiastic about
the prospects of development of their countries (Waterbury, 1970, p. 243).
Their enthusiasm and support for the policies of their countries of origin waned,
however, in the 1960s. President Bourguiba’s policies were met with growing re-
sistance amongst Tunisians studying in Paris, leading to the emergence of left-
ist groups competing for power inside UGET. In the case of Morocco, King Mo-
hammed V and his successor King Hassan II (from 1961 on) sought to build a
constitutional monarchy founded on religious legitimacy, whereas the left party
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UNFP aimed at creating a parliamentary monarchy rooted in democratic rules
and procedures (Dumont, 2013, p. 158). The ensuing suspension of the 1961 consti-
tution and growing repression of leftist groups after repeated strikes and two coup
attempts in the 1970s accelerated the emigration of activists to France. Exiled lead-
ers of the UNFP, together with activists of various political strands then founded
(in January 1961) the Association des Marocains en France, aiming at supporting the
left-wing political parties in Morocco.
In addition to members of the UNFP party, the exodus of leftist students during
the so-called Years of Lead was embraced by the Moroccan government as a means
to relieve itself of potential agitators (Baroudi, 1978, p. 103-104). In fact, a great
number of student militants including the leader of the Marxist-Leninist student or-
ganization UNEM (Moroccan Students National Union), Abdelaziz Menehbi, fled
to Paris after repression increased following its congress in 1973. Subsequently,
associations affiliated with UNEM multiplied in French university cities. In the
1970s, its membership increased to equal that of its French counterpart, UNEF
(Geisser, 1997, p. 102), before practically vanishing when it was legalized again in
Morocco in 1981. On the other hand, if the departure of leftists was convenient for
the Moroccan regime, influential politicians agitating from abroad were not safe
from repression, as illustrated by the case of Mehdi Ben Barka, who was abducted
and killed in Paris in 1965.1 Ben Barka’s family has remained vocal over the years,
calling upon the authorities to shed light on the events and organizing a vigil in
Paris every year on the anniversary of his disappearance (Tual and Boucreux, 2015).
However, even fifty years after his death, this subject remains a societal taboo.2
In addition to student emigration, post-independence Tunisia and Morocco saw
economic migration of low skilled workers as a way to alleviate pressures on the
domestic labor market. Emigration was seen as the solution to excess labor supply
and poverty, thereby preserving political stability. To this effect, both countries
concluded bilateral labor conventions with several European countries starting in
1963, when Morocco signed within days conventions with France and Germany,
and Tunisia with France later that year. In addition, Morocco signed labor con-
ventions with Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969).3 In addition to France,
1 The exact circumstances of the disappearance of Ben Barka have never been established. It is
thought that this major figure in the Third World movement was assassinated by the Moroccan
secret service, with the help and knowledge of other secret services.
2 The art installation Face au silence about Ben Barka by artist Mounir Fatmi shown since 2014 at the
Museum Mohammed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art might indicate a slow change in the
monarchy’s approach to the matter.
3 With the end of Europe’s ”open door” immigration policy after 1973, the kingdom also signed a
series of agreements with Arab states, but Moroccan emigration to these states never reached a
substantial size.
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Tunisia signed agreements with Germany (1965), as well as with Belgium (1969),
the Netherlands (1971), Italy (1984) and Libya (1971). In their development plans,
Tunisian governments considered temporary jobs abroad equivalent to domestic
employment (Brand, 2006, p. 94). As a consequence of these agreements, emigrant
workers quickly outnumbered students. Their first encounters with the Tunisian
community abroad were often with informal networks based on primordial ties
such as to their village of origin or family relations (Dridi, 2013). Subsequently,
students, especially Moroccans, sought to mobilize workers, notably after the left
was effectively repressed in Morocco after 1973, and remained primarily active
in Europe (Dumont, 2013, p. 159). After involvement in a series of car industry
and miners’ strikes, the Association of Moroccans in France (Association des Maro-
cains en France (AMF)) firmly established itself as a migrant workers’ organization,
fighting for the equality of French and immigrant workers, morphing into the Mo-
roccan Workers Association in France (Association des Travailleurs Marocains en
France (ATMF)) in January 1982. The growing emigrant population, coupled with
repression of the left and the student movement induced the creation of initiatives
of solidarity and later organizations of support, bringing together political exiles,
students and immigrant workers.
4.1.2 State control beyond borders
In the face of continued anti-regime activity among the communities abroad, both
Tunisia and Morocco developed strategies to control their citizens living abroad.
In the Tunisian case, first so-called Amicales or Widdadiyyat (”friendship societies”),
inspired by the Algerian model, were created between 1956 and 1960 in Paris, Lyon,
Marseille and Nice. These associations, residing either inside consulate buildings
or offices otherwise rented or bought by the state (Gildas, 1979, cited in Brand,
2006), were officially created to preserve the ties between emigrants and the home
country through sport teams, the celebration of religious festivities and Arabic
language courses (Zekri, 2009). As Geisser points out, the main mission of the
Tunisian Amicales was to maintain the myth of return and combat ”disastrous”
political, associational and syndicalist influences (Geisser, 2012, p. 160). Here, alle-
giance to the country of origin implied allegiance to the regime and party in power
– at first Bourguiba’s Socialist Destourian Party and later Ben Ali’s Constitutional
Democratic Rally (RCD). The Amicales, whose presidents were chosen directly by
the party, extended the monitoring of the population as practiced inside Tunisia
to the population abroad. In the case of Morocco, 1973 was the watershed for the
country’s relationship with its community abroad. Its persistent activism, coupled
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with the fact that even after the disappearance of Ben Barka, other major opposi-
tion figures were still based in Europe – who used their resources to support an
insurgence in several Moroccan regions (Brand, 2006, p. 70) – highlighted the need
for increased control. This was achieved through the penetration of Moroccan stu-
dent groups by informers, on the one hand, and on the other by the creation of an
extensive network of Amicales. This move was welcomed by French industrials to
bring the syndicalist activities of Moroccan workers to a halt. By the early 1990s the
federation of Moroccan Amicales counted 128 associations in France alone (Brand,
2006, p. 71). Activists identified by consular authorities were arrested on their
return to Morocco (Lacroix and Dumont, 2012, p. 3).
4.1.3 New objectives - the second generation
The ban on recruitment of foreign labor in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and rel-
atively liberal family reunion policies reshaped associational life for Tunisian and
Moroccan communities in Europe. In the early 1980s, a European-born second
generation of Maghrebi claimed their right to define and embrace their identity
and their right to be different from the social majority. With a return to the coun-
try of origin becoming increasingly improbable, the second generation and their
parents living in the disenfranchised suburbs of the big cities turned towards Islam
as a vehicle for identity (Kepel, 1991). A new kind of migrant association rose to
prominence, answering the call for a new identity, such as the UOIF (Union des as-
sociations islamiques en France - Union of Islamic associations in France), in which
Tunisians close to the Islamic movement Ennahda played a particularly important
role (Rogler, 2014, p.55). Due to their focus on Islam as an identity that transcended
community borders, the Islamic organizations were more inward-looking and did
not engage in political action directed at a particular country. Instead, in the words
of Abdelaziz Chaambi, one of the most prominent figures of the Islamic movement,
young Maghrebis aimed to distance themselves from the religious practices of their
parents – cutting the umbilical cord linking them with their countries of origin –
and to embrace a new Islamic identity transcending nationality (CRI France, 2011).
In the context of this awakening of the second generation of the so-called Beur
movement, the political activism of former students permanently settled in France
shifted from the struggle against the regimes in their home countries towards immi-
grant rights in France, such as the fight for recognition of undocumented migrants,
campaigns against racism and marginalization, and battles around questions of
citizenship (Geisser, 2012, p. 166). This redirected activism was further boosted by
the electoral victory of the French Socialist Party under Mitterrand, which imple-
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mented public policies addressing many grievances of immigrants and abrogated
the 1939 law on foreign associations. This gave a new impetus to immigrant asso-
ciational life, leading to the creation of ATF (Association des Tunisiens en France)
in 1982, congregating several local organizations in other regions of France. This
adjusted focus from the immigrant workers’ cause towards broader issues such as
citizenship is reflected in the renaming of the first proper Tunisian immigrant or-
ganization, founded in 1974 as the Union des Travailleurs Immigrés Tunisiens, which
was twenty years later to become the Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté
des deux Rives. Finally, the composition and destinations of both the Tunisian and
the Moroccan immigrant community at large diversified, with a growing number
of students attending France’s esteemed ”Grandes Ecoles” and migrants going as
far as the USA and Canada, leading to the creation of local as well as professional
associations there. In addition, formerly labor-exporting countries like Italy and
Spain have attracted important irregular immigration flows from Maghreb coun-
tries.
Meanwhile, the receiving states – most notably France – were keen to enter-
tain good relations with both the Moroccan and the Tunisian regimes. Especially
France, which has deeply rooted economic, political and cultural ties due to its
historical bond with the Maghreb, pursued a policy of non-intervention at least
until the 1990s (Daguzan, 2002). With regards to Morocco, this attitude of non-
interference gradually changed in the 1990s, notably after Gilles Perrault’s Notre
ami le Roi, revealed the Moroccan monarchy’s disregard for human rights and
democratic processes and denounced the complicity of French elites in promoting
sanitized images of what was in practice a corrupt and repressive country (Perrault,
1990). Similarly, in 1999 journalists Jean-Pierre Tuquoi and Nicolas Beau published
Notre ami Ben Ali about Tunisia, mirroring Perrault’s criticism of the French elite’s
leniency towards King Hassan II. The publication of the book coincided with the
implausible 99.4 percent victory of Ben Ali during Tunisian presidential elections,
leading to the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries, which
culminated in 2001 when political relations were temporarily frozen (Daguzan,
2002, p.139). The book, the obviously fraudulent elections and the hunger strike
of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April 2000 have been credited with the revival
of interest in Tunisia by the general public and the reactivation of civil society in
Tunisia and abroad (Ravenel and Lamloum, 2002, p.249-251).
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4.1.4 ’Controlling’ or ’courting’ - The situation at the eve of the 2010-2011 uprisings
As we have seen in this section, in both cases, migrants engaged politically fol-
lowing similar trajectories. As the case of Ben Barka attests, the relationship of
the Moroccan state with its overseas population was at times more confrontational
than Tunisia’s. During the 1990s, however, the state’s grip on civil society loosened.
After Morocco’s poor human rights record was increasingly criticized by the inter-
national community, Hassan II initiated a series of reforms, amongst which was
a general amnesty allowing exiled leftist dissidents to return. These reforms cul-
minated in the appointment of Abderrahmane Youssoufi, a leftist exiled in France
for fifteen years, as prime minister of a left-center government in 1998. Despite
these advances, the reforms remained limited and while the fear of the left faded,
the civil war in bordering Algeria turned Islamists into the prime target of state
repression, analogous to Ben Ali’s policies in Tunisia. In addition to internal re-
forms, the state reformed its approach towards its citizens abroad, which shifted
from ’controlling’ towards ’courting’ (Haas, 2007). Acknowledging the permanent
nature of their settlement abroad while at the same time claiming their continued
Moroccan identity, the government changed the official denomination from “Tra-
vailleurs Marocains de l’Etranger” (TME, Moroccan workers abroad) to “Résidents
marocains à l’Etranger” (RME, Moroccans residing abroad). Actually, in line with
the country’s wish to preserve its connection with the diaspora, the 2007 reform
of its citizenship code extended the right to transmit their nationality to Moroccan
women through ius sanguinis (Perrin, 2011, p. 12). In addition, Moroccan citizen-
ship is intertwined with the religious belonging and the presumed perpetual alle-
giance to the King, who is also the religious leader of the country. Thus, while the
law formally recognizes the possibility to renounce Moroccan citizenship passed
on by blood, it is in fact nearly impossible to do so, which occasionally has put
Morocco at odds with countries with significant Moroccan immigrant communi-
ties, notably the Netherlands (Qattab, 2008).
Besides reasons linked to Morocco’s history and culture, there are monetary in-
centives to cultivate the relationship with its diaspora. For one, Moroccans living
abroad are one of the country’s principal sources of foreign currency through remit-
tances, which amounted to nine percent of the country’s GDP in 2010 (Tchounand,
2012). The process of courting the diaspora was already initiated under King
Hassan II, with the creation of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing
Abroad, as well as the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad in 1990,
deemed to offer support to non-residents while in Morocco and promoting de-
velopment projects involving Moroccans living abroad. These deliberate policies
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were continued by his successor King Muhammad VI, who created the Council
for the Moroccan Community Abroad, a consultative body meant to represent the
interests of Moroccans living abroad in government policy, in 2007. This changed
approach of the Moroccan state with regards to its diaspora went hand in hand
with the abandonment of the surveillance via the Amicales (Schüttler, 2008, p. 4). It
also coincided with a shift of diaspora engagement from civic and socio-cultural or-
ganizations towards development organizations directed at migrants’ hometowns
(Lacroix and Dumont, 2012, p. 6). These appeals for developmental help by the
Moroccan state were met with growing concerns about the absence of the right to
vote and of parliamentary representation of the diaspora, voiced during the first
campaign on the occasion of the 2002 parliamentary elections. Despite repeated
promises, however, the authorities did not make provision for out-of-country vot-
ing until July 2011, when the reformed constitution was adopted in reaction to the
Arab Uprisings.4 On the eve of the Arab Uprisings, the chilling effects of govern-
ment surveillance had waned, however, the emigrants’ energy had largely been
channeled into development efforts.
As for Tunisia, on the eve of the uprisings in December 2010, the diaspora was
largely disaffected. After a wave of enthusiasm during the first years after Ben Ali’s
take-over in 1987, a rejuvenated Amicales reinstated surveillance of the diaspora
community, thereby effectively smothering political activism directed at Tunisia,
especially of French-Tunisians. Although the second generation recognized the
plight of the political exiles and their status as victims of the regime, they did not
recognize themselves in their cause (Geisser, 2012, p. 169). Furthermore, fear of
retaliation against their families in Tunisia is mentioned as a reason for inaction
(Geisser, 2012, p. 163). This fear was justified, given that after the uprisings in
2011, it was revealed that the “Rassemblement des Tunisiens en France,” officially a
Tunisian cultural center in Paris, was in fact the headquarters of the RCD in France.
After the building was stormed by activists, thousands of documents including
photos, financial records, lists of RCD members in France, information on members
of the Tunisian opposition, as well as files on French politicians and journalists,
were uncovered (Ryan, 2011). Nevertheless, rumors about the abuses of the family
in power circulated in the diaspora analogous to Tunisia itself. These stories were
substantiated by books written by French journalists like “Notre Ami Ben Ali”
or the 2009 “La régente de Carthage”5, forbidden in Tunisia, and later by the
Wikileaks cables published prominently by the website Nawaat in November 2010,
4 At the time of writing in 2015, out-of-country voting has yet to be implemented.
5 Nicolas Beau published the former together with Jean-Pierre Tuquoi and the latter with Catherine
Graciet.
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causing the gradual delegitimation and demystification of the regime. Therefore,
even though only a few notorious leftists in exile continued to protest publicly, a
greater part of the diaspora did not believe the regime’s claims that the protests in
the south of Tunisia were the doings of terrorists and Islamists, and came out to
demonstrate in solidarity with the movement. In the aftermath of the revolution,
the number of associations exploded, however at the time of writing their number
and activities remain to be explored. There are indications that contrary to the
past, when Tunisian associations were either in direct opposition to the regime
of Ben Ali or affiliated to it, like the Amicales, these new associations emphasize
their political independence or even label themselves explicitly as “apolitical”, even
though their activities revolve around politics (Khamira, 2013).
As we have seen, due to a long history of Tunisian and Moroccan emigration, a
plethora of associations of both diaspora communities developed, the majority of
which are based in France. According to figures of the Office of Tunisians Abroad
(Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger - OTE), in 2011, there were 154 associations of
Tunisians abroad. Of these, 65 were in France, 25 in Italy, 16 in Belgium, 13 in
Canada, 8 in Germany, 8 in Switzerland and 7 in Austria OTE/DIRP, 2011.6 In
the case of Morocco, Lacroix and Dumont identify 1605 associations in the French
online database of associations, the online Journal Officiel. However, a mere 13 of
those are listed as ”political,’ concerned with homeland issues such as Morocco’s
Western Sahara policy, the country’s democratization process or are branches of
political parties (Lacroix and Dumont, 2012, p. 4). Even though these numbers
necessitate further scrutiny, they make clear that any online political engagement
by the overseas population did not develop in a vacuum, but against a backdrop
of associational life and surveillance by the country of origin. As we will see in the
following section, some of those organizations maintained an online presence, a
presence that appears in the web crawls under analysis. However, their interaction
with their respective blogosphere varies.
4.2 analysing web crawls
Web crawls – that is, maps created by a computer program by following the links
connecting one page to the other – can be analyzed using the concepts and tools
of social network analysis. There are two kind of linking patterns that are particu-
larly relevant in the analysis of the respective blogospheres in our quest to identify
6 These numbers are to be taken with caution. First, they do not necessarily include all the associ-
ations created in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Second, they only include the associations
recognized by the Tunisian government.
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clusterization and leading figures. Nodes emitting and attracting a high number
of links are called hubs. An increasing number of hubs leads to a better connectiv-
ity of a network, decreasing the distances between the nodes. Clusterization can
be identified in the visual representations of the network. In addition, crawls of
networks of websites and blogs are characterized by directed connections, mean-
ing that it is possible to distinguish between incoming and outgoing links. The
practice of linking to other websites is most prevalent amongst blogs, where the
inclusion of a blog into a blogroll can be considered as a recognition of interest.
Thus, the number of incoming links a website receives is particularly noteworthy,
since it can be interpreted as an authority within the network, similar to frequently
cited authors in the academic world. In this context, nodes with a high number of
incoming links are an indicator for an authoritative leadership role.
Unfortunately, the crawls used in this study, created by the e-Diasporas Project,
have several shortcomings, most notably that they did not follow exactly the same
methodology in their creation. In fact, the Moroccan case was one of the project’s
trial studies, therefore its data collection preceded the others, ranging from late
2009 and until May 2010, when the later uprisings were incalculable (Marchandise
and Renault, 2011, p. 40). The crawl was updated in July 2011, thus at a moment
when the mobilization in Morocco was already beginning to slow down, given that
the reformed constitution was confirmed by referendum on 1 July. The primary
focus of the first crawl is the investigation of the topology of the Moroccan diaspora
online and less the relationship between the diaspora and the blogosphere of the
homeland. Therefore, the initial set of websites were selected either because their
operators were migrants or because they referred to Moroccan migration as a topic.
The follow-up in July 2011 does not add any new nodes, but it updates the links
between them, which has some repercussions on the roles of certain actors, but
the general patterns remain unchanged. This focus on migration resulted in the
under-representation of the blogosphere in the network. Thus, the Moroccan crawl
does not lend itself to a conclusive analysis of the Moroccan blogosphere, however,
Diminescu and Renault’s (2011) data still provides an interesting basis for the study
of the relationship between Moroccan state institutions and diaspora associations
with bloggers.
The crawl available for Tunisia, on the other hand, was created after the 2011
uprisings, which influenced its focus on the connections and roles taken by mi-
grants in relation to the political blogosphere of their country of origin. While
it still focuses on the online presence of the diaspora, it takes political activism
as a starting point. As we have established in the previous chapter on research
methods and design, the choice of starting points determines the outcome and ac-
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curacy of a network crawl. In this particular case, the investigator Teresa Graziano
(2012) used a series of keywords in a search engine to find websites operated by
Tunisians dealing with political affairs, between April 2011 and July 2011. Us-
ing the semi-automatic web crawler Navicrawler and two subsequent automatic
crawls, she constructed a corpus of websites highlighting the connections between
the Tunisian diaspora and the homeland in terms of political activism.
4.2.1 Tunisia - Overall structure
The Tunisian network, as provided on the website of the e-Diasporas Project, origi-
nally comprised 162 nodes connected by 1039 links. The crawl was subsequently
modified by the removal of a number of nodes as well as the merge of duplicates.
As such, the blog aggregators tn-blogs.com, tuniblogs.com and tn-bloggers.com
were removed, because they increase the connectivity of the network by design
through linking to the majority of blogs. Furthermore, a website of a German jour-
nalist sarah-mersch.de was removed. Finally, due to recurrent censorship, a num-
ber of bloggers created duplicates of their websites to ensure their websites were
accessible from inside Tunisia. For my analysis, these duplicates were merged, re-
sulting in a final network of 154 nodes and 854 edges. Several attributes have been
added to the dataset by Graziano, most importantly the geographical location of
the websites. This coding was by and large reliable, however, some locations had
to be adjusted (for details on changes in the dataset, see the Appendix).
The Tunisian network consists of a large cluster of connected websites surrounded
by a number of isolates; that is, nodes that do not receive or emit any links. Isolates
make up 18 percent of the network. As we see in table 1, the average degree – that
is, the average number of in-links and out-links – is 5.5. The average path length
between any two nodes is 3. Density in social network analysis denotes “the extent
to which links that could possibly exist among persons do in fact exist” (Mitchell,
1969, p. 18).
Table 1.: Descriptive statistics
Tunisia 2011
Share of blogs 70.8%
Average degree 5.5
Av. path length 3.0
Density 3.6 %
Diameter 9
Number of nodes 154
Edges 854
For this graph, the density amounts
to 3.6 percent. This is a rather sparse
density. However, it must be kept in
mind that this is a directed network.
A directed network will have half the
density of its undirected equivalent, be-
cause there are twice as many possible
connections, given that we count both
inlinks and outlinks. Without the iso-






























































































































Figure 4.: Tunisian e-diaspora in 2011, light nodes located abroad, dark in Tunisia
(based on Graziano, 2011)
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lates, the average degree rises to 6.8 and
the graph density to 5.4 percent. Of all
154 nodes, blogs constitute 70.8 percent, whereas roughly 20 percent are websites
of institutions and media organizations. The remainder consist of a few collective
blogs (amongst which are campaign websites), portals and forums. The diameter
denotes the longest of all the shortest (geodesic) paths between any two actors in
the network. Given that the networks under study are directed, the shortest paths
can only use the paths when they follow the right direction, which leads to a lot of
dead ends. Thus, the diameter of this network is 9.
Throughout the network, bloggers based abroad are overrepresented among the
nodes receiving the greatest number of inlinks, which we use as a proxy for author-
ity in the network. As we see in table 2, among the top 16 websites in the network,
corresponding to the top ten percent of nodes, two thirds (11 out of 16) are based
abroad, even though 58 percent of all nodes are located in Tunisia. Out of these, a
number of nodes capture our attention, because they are either a hub, an authority
or both. Four of them are located at the center of the blog cluster, namely trapboy.
blogspot.com (29 inbound edges, 20 outbound edges), blog.kochlef.com (27 in-
bound edges, 9 outbound edges), carpediem-selim.blogspot.com (26 inbound
edges, 42 outbound edges), and tareknightlife.blogspot.com (26 inbound edges,
27 outbound edges). These blogs represent the mainstream Tunisian blogosphere,
which tend to be cautious in their approach to politics. Big Trap Boy, the most
important authority node in the network, started blogging in 2006 and is widely
recognized among Tunisian bloggers for his rich and witty writing style. While
preferring a cautious approach – avoiding direct indictments of President Ben Ali
– his fame among Tunisian bloggers is striking, leading some to grand statements
such as “Big Trap Boy is among the best writers in Arabic. I am sure that he was
politically more influential than established figures of the opposition, maybe even
more than Ennahda” (Arabasta, personal communication, 7 July 2014).
It is important to note that while Big Trap Boy is the most prominent node in
the network, there are a number of other nodes that are comparable in influence.
Kochlef, who started blogging in 2005, comes a close second with 27 inlinks, mak-
ing him another authority in the network. Carpe Diem, on the other hand, is
a hub, increasing the connectivity of the network as a whole by connecting to a
large number of websites. Tareknightlife, on the other hand, is both an author-
ity and a small hub at the same time. The quartet is complemented by the node
zizoufromdjerba.com (25 inbound edges and 6 outbound edges) in the lower part
of the graph, which is an authority node in this part of the graph. Maybe the obvi-
ous sign of his influence on his fellow bloggers is that one blogger chose to mimic
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Table 2.: Most important nodes - Tunisia 2011
In-degree Out-degree Degree Country
trapboy.blogspot.com 29 20 49 Tunisia
debatunisie.canalblog.com 27 26 53 France
blog.kochlef.com 27 9 36 Canada
carpediem-selim.blogspot.com 26 42 68 France
tareknightlife.blogspot.com 26 27 53 USA
zizoufromdjerba.com 25 6 31 Tunisia
nawaat.org 25 1 26 Netherlands
houblog.net 24 7 31 Canada
nadiafromtunis.blogspot.com 24 16 40 France
samsoum-blog.blogspot.com 22 12 34 USA
tarek-cheniti.blogspot.com 21 2 23 UK
tnkhanouff.hautetfort.com 20 9 29 Tunisia
manichaeus.blogspot.com 17 16 33 France
myblog-wallada.blogspot.com 17 3 20 Tunisia
kahaw.blogspot.com 16 11 27 Tunisia
tunisnews.net 16 3 19 Sweden
the title of his blog by naming hers “Nadia from Tunis” (Nadia A., personal com-
munication, 1 November 2015). Of these five most important bloggers, three were
living abroad before the uprisings, although it must be said that Kochlef moved to
Canada in November 2010, just weeks before the uprisings started.
Finally, there is a subcluster on the upper left, which is composed of the most ac-
tivist blogs and websites. In this subcluster, nawaat.org, on the upper left, is an au-
thority node (25 inbound edges, 1 outbound edge). On the right hand of this node,
there are also websites such as tunezine.com, reveiltunisien.org, takriz.com
and tunisnews.net, which were the pioneers of the Tunisian political web in the
pre-blog era in the early 2000s. Takriz, TUNeZINE and RéveilTunisien were among
the first political websites tackling taboo topics such as religion, sex, human rights,
and freedom of expression. Takriz (Tunisian for “fed up”) was set up in 1998 as a
mailing list before turning into a forum in January 2000, which was characterized
by crude humor and satire. Its spinoff TUNeZINE, launched by former Takriz
member Zouhair Yahyaoui in July 2001, was a more genuinely political forum
going beyond the mocking tone of the former, were caricatures of the president
circulated and the regime’s newspeak as ridiculed. RéveilTunisien, in turn, was
created in 2002 as an online journal complementing TUNeZINE’s forums. Finally,
tunisnews.net, founded in 2000 by Tunisian refugees of the persecuted Islamist
Ennahda movement in Sweden, acted as an alternative news outlet where opposi-
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tional parties and associations would publish articles and editorials. Finally, there
is tunisiawatch.com, the blog of the dissident judge Mokhtar Yahyaoui (the uncle
of Zouhair Yahyaoui), who would publish texts denouncing the corruption of the
judiciary before he was forced from his job after publishing an open letter to Pres-
ident Ben Ali and put under surveillance. Today, some of these pioneer websites
are still online, while others have been abandoned. As the above makes clear, the
first political websites in Tunisia were largely intertwined and all were in some de-
gree supported by contributors living abroad. However, their target audience went
beyond the diaspora and explicitly aimed at engaging in a conversation involving
Tunisians at large.
Nawaat itself was founded in 2004 by a small group of cyberactivists whose
blogs samibengharbia.com, astrubal.nawaat.org and stranger-paris.blogspot.
com7 are found in the lower part of the subcluster. This group of activists was char-
acterized by a degree of technical sophistication and overall perseverance at a time
when the broader blogosphere largely refused to engage in political discourse, let
alone action. It is important to highlight that while Nawaat is the authority node,
it is the personal blogs of its contributors that contribute to the connection of the
activist subcluster to the broader blogosphere. This indicates that bloggers pre-
fer to link to individual blogs rather than to websites engaged in activism, even
if the latter are managed by the very same people. This bridge function of the
individual blogs of activists is also performed by the caricaturist -Z- blogging on
debatunisie.canalblog.com in the upper left corner of the graph. With 27 in-
bound edges and 26 outbound edges, it ranks second in terms of authority in the
overall graph and serves as a hub as well. The quality of -Z-’s powerful, political
and occasionally crude drawings was thus recognized by both the activist and the
general blogosphere. This is most likely because he took up the symbolism that
emerged among more cautious bloggers to talk about the regime and used it to
great effect in his caricatures.
This bridge function of debatunisie.canalblog.com is best exemplified with
the node manif22mai.wordpress.com. It is one of a number of websites created
uniquely for political campaigns, together with the isolate freearabicca.wordpress.
com. As we will see in later chapters, “une manifestation réelle pour une liberté
virtuelle” (“a real protest for a virtual freedom”) in May 2010 resulted from the
eventual synthesis of the activist and the broader blogosphere. The bridge posi-
tion taken by -Z- indicates that his active participation in the protest might have
played a role in the mobilization of other bloggers. More generally, the existence
of campaign websites in the network are palpable evidence that Tunisians used the
7 Malek Khadraoui joined the Nawaat team only in 2006.
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internet as a resource to protest online, and this, using a variety of tools available
to them. The node freearabicca.wordpress.com was used as a website to publish
calls for the release of a blogger in 2009 (Fatma Arrabicca, whose blog appears in
the right side of the overall cluster), in what can be classified as Online Participa-
tion. The node manif22mai.wordpress.com, on the other hand, served as a tool of
Online Facilitation of Offline Activism by providing information for a demonstration
in real life for the end of internet censorship (Earl, Kimport, et al., 2010). It is im-
portant to underline that these campaign websites appeared well before the 2011
uprisings. In addition, other campaign websites calling for the fight for freedom
of expression were created in prior years, even if they do not appear in the graphs
analyzed here (Jansen, 2010).
In addition to the blogs and websites I identified as the authorities of this net-
work, the network hosts a number of isolates, i.e. nodes which are not connected
to others. In order to make the network more legible, they have been omitted in
the graph. In her paper, Graziano points out that the majority of these nodes are
websites of institutions such as the Tunisian embassies in London and Paris, but
also of associations like Tunisiens de Belgique, Association d’Amitié Tunisie Canada or
Asociación de Tunecinos en España. Their position at the periphery of the graph bears
witness to the fact that institutions and formal organizations often keep websites
qualifying as brochureware; that is, a generally static website with information on
the organization (Earl, Kimport, et al., 2010). They are representative of one-way
communication without offering their audience opportunities to engage with the
organization online. However, Graziano fails to point out two exceptions to this
rule, namely the websites of the Association des Tunisiens en France de Paris (ATF)
atf-paris.fr and Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives (FTCR)
www.citoyensdesdeuxrives.eu. These exceptions are notable given that ATF, the
oldest Tunisian migrant organization, established its website in 2007, using it to
share reports of past events and announcements of future ones, as well as press
releases on issues of concern. While it still largely qualifies as a brochureware
website, the link section provided hyperlinks to migration-related organizations,
media outlets and citizen media websites. Under the section “Solidarité”, news
on political movements in a growing number of countries is listed, with the latest
news also appearing on the main page. Reflecting the prior disaffection of the com-
munity with politics in the home country, the first political conflict mentioned in
this rubric in February 2007 was not the political situation in Tunisia, but an article
on Palestine. Politics in Tunisia was covered only months later on the occasion of
the 20th anniversary of Ben Ali coming to power. Subsequently, the website serves
mainly as an information hub on current events like the uprising in the mine basin
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of Gafsa in 2008, amongst others through republished, critical articles by Florence
Beaugé, a correspondent for the newspaper Le Monde. In addition, it served as
a showcase of the association to the outside, offering few ways to engage directly
online, with the exception of a comment function, which was, however, seldom
used. Conspicuously sparse are links to the blogosphere, although a visit of the
website via the Wayback Machine reveals that post by portals like Nawaat were oc-
casionally republished. In the e-Diasporas Project crawl, however, the ATF receives
a mere two inlinks from houblog.org and carpediem-selim.blogspot.com, and it
sends a unique link to the remainder of the corpus, that is to the website of the
Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives.
In contrast to ATF, the website of the FTCR, created in 2009, is well connected
to the main cluster, sending out a total of 34 links to other websites, ranking third
among the websites in terms of out-degree (behind carpediem-selim.blogspot.
com (42) and samibengharbia.com (35)). The majority of these links point towards
blogs, although this is not because articles of the blogosphere are being discussed
prominently on its main page. The website’s focus, similarly to ATF, lies on an-
nouncements of events such as solidarity protests, press releases calling for action,
as well as news on migration politics in France and events in the home country.
The links to the blogosphere appear to originate from a dedicated section with the
title “La planète blogs,” listing a number of Tunisian blogs on the right frame of
the website, analogous to a similar section on the Tunisian press. This list is not ex-
haustive and the mechanisms and criteria leading to the inclusion of a blog on the
aforementioned list are unclear. The section appeared after a re-design of the web-
site was launched in 2009. Before this restructuration, blogs such as Tunezine and
Nawaat were mentioned on a list with links to Tunisian websites, itself a subcate-
gory of a page dedicated to weblinks. Accessing this list necessitated two clicks,
hence blogs were much less visible on the association’s website. In addition to
these links, however, the association occasionally took up news stories from blogs.
For example, the Wayback machine reveals that the website republished an article
from Nawaat on a scandal involving the theft of yachts by a member of the Pres-
ident’s family, explicitly noting seen on “Nawaat” (vu sur “Nawaat”) in February
2010 (FTCR, 2010). The mention of the name of the blog in the title also indicates
that Nawaat was, at that moment, considered to be known to the FTCR public.
Also, a query of the website’s search function reveals that FTCR took notice of a
protest against internet censorship on 22 May 2010, without calling for participa-
tion in the solidarity protest in front of the embassy of Tunisia in Paris, however.
Compared to the high number of links going out to the blogosphere, the num-
ber of incoming hyperlinks is relatively small. Only four websites link to Citoyens
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des deux Rives, in addition to the aforementioned ATF link, there are two blogs
(tnkhanouff.hautetfort.com and lesraisinsdelacolere.blogspot.com) and the
Association des Travailleurs Maghrébins de France.
4.2.2 Morocco - Overall structure
The Moroccan network, as created in 2010, features originally 156 nodes and 397
edges. A few nodes were removed before the analysis because their activity does
not conform to the boundaries set for my study. Contrary to the Tunisian crawl,
the nodes removed were not connected to the network, thus while the total drops
to 152 nodes, the number of edges remains unchanged at 397.
Table 3.: Descriptive statistics
Morocco 2010 Morocco 2011
Share of blogs 30.9% 30.9%
Average degree 2.6 3.2
Av. path length 3.2 3.5
Density 1.7 % 2.1 %
Diameter 8 9
Number of nodes 152 152
Edges 397 481
The main difference between the Tunisian and the Moroccan network – namely,
that the Moroccan is polycentric whereas the Tunisian is a rather dense cluster – is
obvious at first glance. This is partly the result of the focus on websites dedicated
to the diaspora, as decided by Diminescu and Renault, which is reflected by the
ratio of blogs in the network, amounting to nearly 31 percent, whereas 33 percent
of the nodes are categorized as websites of associations, 14 percent as institutional
and 13 percent as community forums. The remainder of nodes are composed of
media, cultural and business websites. As we see in table 3, the average degree
of the nodes in the graph (i.e. the average number of the sum of incoming and
outgoing links of each node) is 2.6, which is considerably smaller than the 5.5 we
saw in the Tunisian case, indicating a much sparser network. This is confirmed
by the density metric, which at 1.7 is half the density we found in Tunisia (3.6).
The diameter of the network, with 8, is slightly smaller than that of the Tunisian
network, indicating that the Moroccan network is somewhat more compact.
As we see in the graphical representation of the network in figure 5, the cluster
of the Moroccan blogosphere – or Blogoma – is relatively contained, linking pri-
marily to itself with few exceptions. However, this is a feature of blogospheres in
general and not specific of the ones under study here. The most important node
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Table 4.: Most important nodes - Morocco May 2010
In-degree Out-degree Degree Country
larbi.org 24 10 34 France
yabiladi.com 17 2 19 Morocco
www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma 16 9 25 Morocco
alwatan.ma 12 0 12 Morocco
bladi.net 12 0 12 Morocco
moroccoboard.com 11 17 28 USA
louladekhmissbatata.wordpress.com 10 12 22 Canada
lemythe.com 10 1 11 France
www.eatbees.com/blog 9 18 27 Morocco
lailalalami.com 9 4 13 USA
labelash.blogspot.com 8 11 19 Spain
blogreda.blogspot.com 8 10 18 Morocco
monagora.fr 8 0 8 France
cabalamuse.wordpress.com 7 12 19 other
murmures.net 6 15 21 Canada
wafin.com 6 8 14 USA
Average degree: 2.6
of the network is larbi.org, a blog located in France created in October 2004, to
which most of the other blogs link. With an in-degree of 24 and an out-degree of
10, it can be considered the main authority of the graph. Larbi’s inlinks almost
exclusively stem from other blogs. In fact, out of a total of 46 other blogs, more
than half (24) emit an outlink to Larbi, attesting to his influence within the French-
language blogosphere. According to Citoyen Hmida, a retired bank director who
started blogging in 2005, Larbi had “more than a certain talent” in writing on social
and political issues from a left-wing point of view. The personal nature of writ-
ing on personal blogs contributed to the development of a discourse characterized
by the personal experiences and leanings of individuals. Thus, “Larbi considered
himself Lenin, or Che Guevara. I, due to my old age, was the wise man, and Ibn
Kafka [a lawyer] considered himself to be the blogosphere’s Minister of justice”
(Citoyen Hmida, personal communication, 31 October 2015). Unfortunately, the
absence of both Citoyen Hmida and Ibn Kafka in the dataset compiled by Dimi-
nescu and Renault is an indicator of a flawed dataset. Within the other blogs in the
blog cluster, louladekhmissbatata.wordpress.com and lemythe.com only receive
10 inlinks, highlighting how comparatively influential Larbi is. Among the top
ten percent of nodes, 10 out of 16 are based abroad. Out of this total of websites



























































































































Figure 5.: Moroccan e-diaspora in 2010, light nodes located abroad, dark in Mo-
rocco (based on Diminescu and Renault, 2010)
based abroad, ten are blogs, while the other six are either message boards or other
websites serving the diaspora community.
While Citoyen Hmida considered Larbi to be among the most political bloggers
in the Blogoma, we do not witness a separate activist cluster like in the Tunisian




























































































































Figure 6.: Rerun Moroccan e-diaspora in 2011, light nodes located abroad, dark in
Morocco (based on Diminescu and Renault, 2011)
case. In fact, within the French-language Blogoma especially the tone was gen-
erally apolitical and navel-gazing, dominated by intimist online diaries and com-
mentaries on current affairs (Ibn Kafka, personal communication, August 21, 2015).
Occasionally, blogs would be the scene of political outrage and ad hoc cyberactivist
activities, however, contrary to the Tunisian case, there were very few Moroccan
bloggers who would dedicate their writing solely to political affairs. There is
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one website in the blog cluster, which represents an effort to bridge the gap be-
tween the various linguistic and political communities within the Blogoma, namely
talkmorocco.com. Talk Morocco was founded in 2009 by Moroccan cyberactivist
Hisham Almiraat (whose blog almiraatblog.wordpress.com is unfortunately not
present in this graph) and American activist Jillian C. York with the explicit aim
of creating a shared platform to debate issues of common interest. However, Talk
Morocco only receives three inlinks, at least in this web crawl. Even though one
of them from Larbi is powerful, potentially driving a number of his visitors to
Talk Morocco, it indicates that at the moment of the initial data collection in May
2010, Talk Morocco did not necessarily achieve its aim of uniting the Moroccan
blogosphere.
Contrary to the Tunisian network, the Moroccan network is characterized by the
presence of a great number of associational and governmental websites. To bet-
ter illustrate the connections between the different spheres, figure 7 represents the
categories of websites in different shapes, with institutional websites being repre-
sented as circles, blogs as triangles, websites of associations as squares, community
websites (i.e. forums) as pentagons and finally media websites as hexagons. This
form of visualization reveals that the upper right part of the network is populated
mainly by institutional websites, in fact primarily Moroccan consulates, as well as
websites of diaspora associations, which are well connected internally through
the governmental websites www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma and www.alwatan.ma,
which appear as large dark grey circle nodes at the center of the subcluster. These
nodes are the websites of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad
and the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, respectively. The upper
black circle represents the website of the Foundation, which is more proactive than
the Ministry’s, with nine outlinks going almost exclusively to consulates in vari-
ous countries, and receiving inlinks mainly from consulates, but also a few associ-
ational websites and blogs. The website of the Ministry, however, solely receives
links from consulates and does not send any link to the other websites.
The behavior of these websites is plausible, given that the Hassan II Foundation,
for example, aims to provide services to the community. One of these services
is to provide links to websites relevant to the community, such as consulates. The
Ministry’s website, on the other hand, is a mere showcase presenting the Ministry’s
policies, comparable to brochureware as described by Earl (2010). This property
of institutional websites explains as well why associational websites tend to link
more to institutional websites than the other way around. The linking strategies
employed by the Moroccan institutions speaks to the policies pursued by Moroccan
governments since the 1990s, that is to accumulate know-how and remittances
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Figure 7.: Moroccan e-diaspora in 2010, light nodes located abroad, dark in Mo-
rocco (based on Diminescu and Renault, 2010)
from the diaspora for development purposes, as also suggested by Renault and
Marchandise (2011, p. 42). They are not, however, leading actors beyond their
institutional and associational subclusters.
As a result of the linking strategies of websites inside the institutional subcluster,
there are very few if any direct links to the blogosphere. Instead, two so-called com-
munity sites, yabiladi.com (17 inlinks and 2 outlinks) and bladi.net (12 inlinks
and 0 outlinks), serve as brokers between these distinct spheres. Both websites are
well-established francophone news sites aimed at a diaspora audience, created in
4.2 analysing web crawls 94
2002. They are, however, based in Morocco. In their function as authorities, they
receive inlinks almost exclusively and do not link back. The main source of inlinks
for Yabiladi (“oh my country”) and Bladi (“my country”) are institutional web-
sites scattered in the vicinity. However, blogs link to these community websites as
well, which indicates that these websites are recognized both by the associations
and the blogs as important actors. For example, Larbi (represented by the largest
triangle in the blog subcluster) links to both websites, but they do not link back.
While the institutional websites do not link to the blogosphere at all, the cluster
gathering websites of associations is connected to the Blogoma via the media web-
site www.moroccoboard.com on the right side of the network. Around this node,
a number of mainly US-based, English-language association and community web-
sites cluster. However, MoroccoBoard links to US-based blogs as well, which are
otherwise well integrated in the blog cluster in the lower half of the network.
Table 5.: Most important nodes - Morocco July 2011
In-degree Out-degree Degree Country
larbi.org 26 30 56 France
yabiladi.com 22 2 24 Morocco
www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma 14 3 17 Morocco
labelash.blogspot.com 12 21 33 Spain
louladekhmissbatata.wordpress.com 12 15 27 Canada
alwatan.ma 12 0 12 Morocco
bladi.net 12 0 12 Morocco
lemythe.com 11 5 16 France
lailalalami.com 11 3 14 USA
kingstoune.com 11 3 14 France
blogreda.blogspot.com 10 19 29 Morocco
murmures.net 10 15 25 Canada
moroccoboard.com 10 5 15 USA
www.anasalaoui.com 10 5 15 France
www.eatbees.com/blog 9 20 29 Morocco
monagora.fr 9 18 27 France
Average degree: 3.2
The 2011 rerun was not an update of the growth of the blogosphere, but served
to update the power relations between the nodes included in the 2010 graph. In-
deed, we notice that the connections between the nodes have increased, rising from
397 to 481. The number of websites based abroad rises from 13 to 15 and the av-
erage degree rises considerably as well, from 2.6 to 3.2. Although blogging had
entered secular decline globally by 2011, due to the rise of social network plat-
forms such as Facebook and Twitter, this updated graph attests to the vitality of
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the Blogoma between 2010 and 2011. In fact, the connectivity between blogs rose
considerably, leading to a total of eleven blogs appearing in the top ten percent
of the most connected nodes, all but two located in the diaspora. The increase in
links affects the power structures as well, as visible in figure 6. Larbi, already the
most connected node in 2010, moves towards the center of the blog cluster. This
shift of Larbi’s node is due to the fact that a greater number of blogs of the blog
cluster link to the bridge node yabiladi.com. As we see in table 5, the number
of inlinks to Yabiladi increases from 17 to 22, with the increase stemming entirely
from the blogosphere. Whereas in 2010, four blogs linked to Yabiladi, in 2011, this
number rises to nine, indicating that the portal played an increasingly important
role as a news source during the period between May 2010 and July 2011 for the
blogosphere and possibly beyond. This contrasts markedly with the other bridge,
Bladi, whose number of inlinks remains unchanged. Furthermore, the political
platform Talk Morocco doubled its inlinks from three to six, thereby advancing to-
wards the core of the part of the Moroccan blogosphere represented in this graph.
This development equally signals that the platform’s recognition among bloggers
increased over time. Finally, there are also some minor actors such as the student
forum amge-caravane.com, whose slightly changed linking behaviour causes the
attached subcluster of associational websites to change their position from the left
to the right of the graph. Furthermore, small groups of nodes that were previously
self-contained are now connected to the main cluster.
The visual assessment of the networks, complemented with the investigation of
their structure through the analysis of in-coming and out-going links, supports
hypothesis 1.1, namely that the studied blogospheres are characterized by hierar-
chical structures. In fact, we note the presence of several clusters as well as nodes
attracting a particularly high number of inlinks, indicating that they serve as the
networks’ authorities. Furthermore, hypothesis 1.3, namely that diaspora nodes
form a cluster distinct from the rest of the blogosphere, was not confirmed. While
there are clusters of blogs dealing with politics in Tunisia and clusters of institu-
tional websites in Morocco, blogs based in the diaspora do not form a distinct
cluster. It is worth mentioning, however, that a number of websites of diaspora
associations link to each other in the Moroccan network, thereby forming a sub-
cluster. In the next section, we will explore which languages bloggers use and
where they are based.
Language and location
The pronounced focus on websites and blogs based in the diaspora in the Moroc-
can crawl as opposed to a focus on the blogosphere as a whole becomes imme-
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diately apparent during the analysis of the languages used. Concerning specific
attributes of the websites included in this graph, we see on table 6 that 69.1 per-
cent of them use French as their main language, 14.5 percent use English and 8
percent Spanish. Whereas a separate attribute on all languages used indicates that
7.9 percent combine French and Arabic, only a mere 4 percent use the latter as
their main language. This thus represents a striking absence of a sizable group
of websites or blogs primarily using Arabic. Unfortunately, this shortcoming indi-
cates that the sample is representative only of one specific sphere of the Moroccan
blogosphere; that is, its non-Arabic part. As my interviewees pointed out, the Mo-
roccan blogosphere was split along language lines, thus there are very few blogs
that link to blogs written in Arabic and blogs written in French. Whereas the
Arabic blogosphere was more important in numbers, the Francophone part was
more visible to the outer world and “believed in the illusion of representativeness”
(Lbadikho, personal communication, August 30, 2015). Hence, the omission of the
Arabic part of the blogosphere can be explained by the absence of links between
the two groups, but also by the focus of the study. Given that Morocco served
as a test case at the very beginning of the project, the primary focus was on the
diaspora, while the diaspora’s connection to the blogosphere in the motherland
was secondary (contrary to the Tunisian crawl where this connection was a pri-
mary object). Finally, while the omission of the Arabic-language blogs impacts
the representativeness of the crawl regarding the blogosphere, it can be forgiven,
given that even bloggers themselves struggle to keep the overview, as Lbadikho
points out, “it is impossible to say that one knows the entire blogosphere because
there are plenty of micro clusters and often these clusters don’t know of each other,
and every member of every cluster believes that he knows everybody” (Lbadikho,
personal communication, August 30, 2015).
Compared to the absence of Arabic websites in the Moroccan crawl, the Tunisian
crawl appears to be slightly more balanced, even though French language blogs
largely dominate. More than half of the websites in the Tunisian web crawl ei-
ther use French (almost 45 percent) or combine French with Arabic (27.9 percent).
Arabic as the sole language is used by a minority of 11 percent (Graziano did not
record the main language used, but recorded all languages on a given website).
What is striking when comparing the two cases is the greater variety of languages
in the Moroccan case. While this is related to the inclusion of a great number of
websites of embassies in a variety of countries, this does not explain the promi-
nence of English and Spanish. The use of the latter is the heritage of the Spanish
influence and protectorate in Morocco. English, however, appears in the crawl on
message boards of the Moroccan diaspora, but also on individual blogs. On the
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Table 6.: Attributes
Tunisia Morocco
State of residence Tunisia 57.1% France 35.5%
France 19.5% USA 15.8%
Canada 4.6% Canada 15.1%
USA 3.3% Morocco 12.5%
UK 2% Spain 6.6%
Spain 2.6% Belgium 4.6%
Germany 2% Netherlands 2%
France/Tunisia 1.3% other 7.9%
Belgium 1.3%
other 6.5%
Languages French 44.8% French 69.1%
French/Arabic 27.9% English 14.5%
Arabic 11% Spanish 7.9%
Fr/Ar/Eng 4.6% Arabic 4%
English 3.3% Dutch 1.3%




Number of nodes 154 152
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one hand, this is reflective of a dispersion of the diaspora to a multitude of coun-
tries as opposed to the high concentration of the Tunisian diaspora in France. On
the other, it also reflects an attachment to the French cultural and political sphere
that seems to be slightly less pronounced in Morocco than in Tunisia.
With regard to the websites’ location, the original data collected by Matthieu Re-
nault relied on a query of the website’s registration data using WHOIS8. While the
use of this method produces reliable results because the data is easily retrievable
from online resources, it gravely lacks in accuracy. For instance, the Moroccan em-
bassy in Norway registered its website in Denmark, and the Moroccan consulate
of Pontoise, France, registered its website in Germany. The use of WHOIS to deter-
mine a website’s location is particularly ill-suited for blogs, given that their WHOIS
is going to be equivalent to the place where their blogging platform is registered,
which means, for example, that all Blogspot blogs are “located” in Mountain View,
California. Thus, in an effort to correct this flawed method, the location of the
websites and blogs was corrected by gathering information on the location of the
owner on the website directly or by inquiries among the owners themselves or
among fellow bloggers.
Given that Diminescu and Renault focused on the diaspora, it should not be sur-
prising that only a minority of the nodes are based in Morocco, that is 12.5 percent.
This contrasts to the Tunisian crawl, in which roughly 57 percent of all nodes are
located in Tunisia. Given the sizable communities in the former metropolis, France
comes second in both cases, with 35.5 percent for the Moroccan crawl and 19.5 per-
cent for the Tunisian. However, it is notable that the Moroccan online community
is much more widely dispersed, with a much greater number of blogs and web-
sites located in Canada and in the USA (15.1 percent and 15.8 percent) compared
to the Tunisian community (4.6 and 3.3 percent respectively).
4.2.3 Determinants of degree centrality
Following this morphological study of the networks, the data produced by the net-
works also lends itself to quantitative analysis in order to investigate whether the
age of a node influences its position inside the network (as predicted by hypothe-
sis 1.2). As laid out in the chapter on theoretical approaches, one of the theories
attempting to explain the accumulation of inlinks of a website is “preferential at-
tachment”, where “(. . . ) vertices increase their connectivity at the expense of the
younger (. . . ) ones, leading over time to some vertices that are highly connected, a
8 WHOIS (pronounced who is) is a protocol used for searching databases containing registration
details of Internet resources.
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“rich-get-richer” phenomenon” (Barabasi and Albert, 1999, p. 6). Meanwhile other
studies, such as Adamic and Humberman (2000) claim that preferential attach-
ment is not sufficient to explain why some nodes attract more inlinks than others,
with every website sporting its own intrinsic growth rate based on factors like the
quality of writing and the interest the website generates, amongst others.
It would be interesting to analyze to what extent the age of a website affects
its in-degree given that I was able to identify the month of creation of almost
every website in the Tunisian data set (there are two missing values), and whether
this effect varies according to the location of the website. The reason to examine
only the Tunisian case is that, as mentioned before, institutional and associational
websites are overrepresented, while blogs are underrepresented, in the Moroccan
dataset. There are three variables of interest – in-degree (a continuous variable,
ranging from 0 to 29), the number of months between creation of the website
to the date of the data collection in April 2011 (age), as well as the location (a
binary variable “diaspora”, with websites located abroad coded as 1 and websites
in Tunisia coded as 0). Also, I seek to investigate if this effect is more pronounced
for bloggers, given that the practice of linking to other websites is particularly
prevalent amongst them.
Table 7.: Dependent Variable: In-degree
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
age 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)












cons 2.77** -2.00 1.75 2.86** 1.60 1.50
(0.89) (1.463) (1.71) (0.94) (1.15) (2.36)
N 152 152 152 152 152 152
R2 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.26
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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As we can see in Model 1 in table 7, the linear regression investigating the effect
of age on in-degree returned a significant effect accounting for 10 percent of the
variance in the dependent variable. According to the constant, at the age of zero
months, a node in the network is expected to receive 2.77 inlinks. The coefficient
on age is positive and statistically significant, indicating that with every month, a
node is expected to gain 0.07 inlinks. Although the effect is not large, the results
confirm hypothesis 1.2, that the older a website, the higher the predicted in-degree.
Adding a dummy variable for blogs in Model 2, the coefficient for age remains
positive and statistically significant, with an expected 0.09 inlinks for every addi-
tional month in terms of age. The coefficient on blogs is positive and statistically
significant as well, which means that blogs (as opposed to websites) have an ex-
pected in-degree of 5.24 when aged zero months. Overall, the model accounts for
19 percent of the explained variability in in-degree.
Given that people living in the diaspora had more ready access to technology,
thus making it likely for them to be among the first to create websites or to start
blogging, we should assess if there is an interaction between diaspora and age.
An interaction term was added in Model 3, resulting in the positive coefficients
of age and blogs, however they are not statistically significant. The coefficient on
the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. It renders the direct
effects of age and blog insignificant. This indicates that it is not age or being a
blogger per se that increases the in-degree, but the age of bloggers. In other words,
only bloggers benefit from age, while websites do not. This model has the largest
explanatory power, accounting for 26 percent of the variability in in-degree.
In Model 4 and 5, we investigate the effect of location; that is, whether a website
abroad is more likely to receive more inlinks. In this case, the coefficient on age
remains positive and statistically significant. However, both in Model 4 without
and in Model 5 with an interaction term, the results for diaspora are not statis-
tically significant. This means we cannot rule out the possibility that the effect
of location is nil, and we would reject any hypothesis that claimed that nodes lo-
cated abroad receive more inlinks than those located in Tunisia. Finally, Model
6 contains all variables used before in order to test whether being located in the
diaspora matters when controlling for bloggers. However, while the interaction
between the variables blog and diaspora is positive, indicating that bloggers in the
diaspora have a higher in-degree, the results are not statistically significant, as is
the interaction between the variables blog, diaspora and age.
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4.3 conclusion
This chapter has examined the power structures in the Tunisian and the Moroccan
blogospheres as well as identifying the leading figures. Hypothesis 1.1 has been
confirmed; contrary to earlier beliefs and hopes, the blogosphere is characterized
by hierarchies. Given that linking to fellow blogs is a widespread practice among
bloggers to indicate other blogs of interest, we have been able to identify a number
of nodes that serve as references in their respective blogospheres. This common
linking practice combined with the fact that bloggers primarily provide a personal
commentary on current events and matters of interest has induced me to interpret
a high number of inlinks served as a proxy for opinion leadership.
In the case of Morocco, it is not possible to make conclusive statements regard-
ing the role played by bloggers living abroad in the larger blogosphere due to a
potentially flawed dataset and the general stratification of the Moroccan commu-
nity of bloggers according to language and political leaning. However, it is clear
that among the data collected, the blogger Larbi was undeniably the leading voice
in the French-language blogosphere. Over time, his influence grew, as did the
role of the platform Talk Morocco, which was created with the aim to bridge the
divides between the different linguistic spheres within the Moroccan blogosphere.
The Tunisian network, on the other hand, shows a higher number of connections
between the blogs, which speaks to a much higher interaction between the actors.
While some of the difference can be attributed to a slightly different methodology
in the Moroccan case, the difference in average degree remains striking. The pres-
ence of a subcluster of blogs and portals dedicated to politics, including several
campaign websites, highlights how the internet was used as a resource, primarily
in the fight for freedom of expression. However, these political blogs and websites
are to be found at the periphery of the blogosphere, even though nodes such as
the cartoonist -Z- and the individual blogs of activists connect this subcluster to
the general blogosphere.
Furthermore, this chapter revealed that diaspora organizations and blogs writ-
ten by migrants interact rarely. The Moroccan case displays an extensive cluster
of institutional and associational websites, however these associations are largely
oblivious to the blogosphere. The high number of development associations and
consulates – linked together by government institutions – is an online expression
of the government’s attempt to mobilize the diaspora for its development efforts
in contrast to Tunisia, which before the uprisings conceived its population abroad
as more of a threat than an opportunity. The websites bridging the various clus-
ters are recognized as authorities by both, but do not actively engage with the
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blogosphere. In contrast, in the Tunisian case, two associations linked to the blogo-
sphere and republished texts, which had appeared on blogs previously. This use
of blogs as a source of information for association highlights that blogs performed
an important function in the context of a highly restrained public sphere in the
home country. While the Tunisian associations were not on the forefront of the
battle against Ben Ali, they maintained a loose connection to the activist strata of
the Tunisian blogosphere.
From the regressions, we can confirm hypothesis 1.2, namely that there is an
observable effect of the month of creation on the number of inlinks a website
receives. This indicates that the ”rich-get-richer” phenomenon is at play here, as
predicted. However, this effect is not very pronounced. The impact of the month of
creation on the amounts of inlinks was revealed to be higher for blogs than for all
websites confounded. Thus, the model predicts that the older a blog is, the more
inlinks it will have accumulated. This result is sensible, given that the practice of
linking to other blogs is one of the characteristics of the blogosphere. Interestingly,
according to the statistical analysis, the fact of living abroad did neither influence
the number of inlinks, nor did this fact intervene with the other variables.
Finally, hypothesis 1.3, which assumed that diaspora nodes form a cluster dis-
tinct from the rest of the blogosphere, was not confirmed, at least in the case of
Tunisia (the section of the Moroccan blogosphere in the dataset is too incomplete to
draw such a conclusion). On the contrary, blogs located in Tunisia and abroad are
interconnected and do not constitute separate spheres, thus, we do not see a dis-
tinct diasporic community. However, there is a group of political websites, which
entertains fewer connections with the general blogosphere. In the next chapter, we
will focus on this group of political bloggers, part of whom lived abroad and there-
fore potentially benefited from political freedoms their fellow bloggers in their
country of origin lacked.
5
P O L I T I C A L O P P O RT U N I T I E S A N D S T R AT E G I C C H O I C E S
In this chapter, we will attempt to answer sub-question two; namely, how we can
account for migrants taking up prominent roles in their respective cyberactivist
communities. We will focus on the role of repression in shaping the protest activ-
ities undertaken by bloggers and seek to confirm my hypothesis that the relative
absence of repression, both online and offline, enables dissident migrants to act
more freely and to take on the role of radical mobilizers. To prove this point, we
will concentrate on how the perception of risk of repression forces activists to take
certain decisions regarding the extent of their activism. In a first part, we will
revisit how the internet can serve as a free space in authoritarian regimes; namely,
a place relatively free from state intrusion. However, this online freedom is only
relative and partial because most states do intervene, mostly through internet cen-
sorship. In the second part of this chapter, we will see how differing political
opportunity structures conditioned the online activities of bloggers and activist in
Morocco and Tunisia.
5.1 a free space in authoritarian contexts
The increasing ubiquity of internet access across the world led to its entrenchment
in contemporary lives, and it serves a number of functions depending on the po-
litical context. Although it is increasingly used by mainstream political actors to
fuel their election campaigns, social movements of all kinds use it as a channel for
alternative information and to mobilize, given ease of access and its rapid spread
of information to wide audiences, even in democratic settings. While the internet
as a means of communication to spread news can be conceptualized as a resource,
it also serves as a place where people who are otherwise barred from speaking
their minds about politics can congregate and exchange their ideas. It is, thus, a
form of a free space, analogous to those small-scale, secluded settings beyond the
direct control of the government or dominant groups in which dissent has always
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flourished, and performs important cultural functions in social movements. In the
most severe cases of authoritarianism, where discussion of anything remotely po-
litical is relegated to the private sphere, where the tight bounds put on interaction
with others and the ban placed on voluntary associations can lead to an atomized
society, the internet can serve as a space between the private and the public where
the lines of what can be said are not as clearly drawn, compared to “real life”. In
these cases, internet fora can help build the groundwork for future mobilizations
by allowing its participants to envision alternative models of society and reflect on
strategies to enact them.
From its early days, the internet was occupied by political dissidents and oppo-
sitional groups, serving as a source for information that was otherwise difficult or
impossible to obtain. However, from the beginning, the internet was more than
a virtual newspaper stand, because its interactive features provided a means to
actively engage in political discussions. Of course, the actual place where debate
occurred shifted over time, moving from mailing lists in the early days of the
internet to blogs, and finally social network sites. On mailing lists, usually themat-
ically linked to the issue of human rights, members would reply to long threads
of emails, discussing human-rights abuses and strategies to publicize them. Blog-
ging, on the other hand, is characterized by frequent references to other bloggers’
writings, the inclusion of like-minded blogs in blogrolls (hyperlinks to other blogs
in a dedicated section), as well as frequent visits and oftentimes vivid discussions
in the comments section at the bottom of the page. The very term “blogosphere,”
while referring to the connections formed between blogs, implies a network of
people and their online conversations, and not computers. The fact that bloggers
almost exclusively link to like-minded blogs while ignoring blogs of other polit-
ical leanings, as shown by Adamic and Glance (2005), reinforces the notion that
blogospheres, despite being public, are closer to a community of the like-minded
than a public sphere as such. Finally, social network websites, while changing the
nature of online debates through their design, gather a large part of one’s potential
audience on the same platform, making it much easier to distribute one’s message
through a growing network of followers.
Just like the free spaces Johnston identified in his studies of resistance in the So-
viet Union, however, there is an awareness that this space is not perfectly shielded
from surveillance, that there are spies and agents provocateurs. In many authori-
tarian countries with limited political opportunity structures, cyber-dissidents are
subject to those same “real life” modes of repression like other activists, including
prison sentences, as well as several forms of repression of online activism, most
readily reflected in the blocking of a website in a given country, i.e. online censor-
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ship. Technically, online censorship is accomplished by either instructing or forcing
internet service providers to block access to specific websites, or it is done directly
by the government when the entire internet infrastructure is state-owned (as is the
case in Tunisia). Many countries in the world, including democracies, block access
to certain websites or require search engines to display certain results under the
premise of them being unlawful or harmful, such as child pornography websites.
In authoritarian states, it is also fairly common to block websites that themselves
facilitate circumvention of internet censorship, in addition to politically critical
websites, and they are transparent about it to varying degrees. Whereas censorship
in democracies is legitimized through court orders, it is usually enacted without
such judicial procedures in authoritarian states.
The impact of online censorship is multifaceted. On the one hand, its efficiency
is limited, given that there are numerous ways to circumvent it.1 However, while
knowledge about the availability of these circumvention techniques is increasingly
widespread, it cannot be assumed that every internet user is aware of them. More
importantly, through the censorship of websites, the state signals which online
speech is permissible and which is considered as crossing the line. The preci-
sion of online censorship of a predetermined list of websites makes this signal
particularly strong. As for the impact of censorship on bloggers themselves, they
often perceive internet censorship as a badge of honor indicating their own rel-
evance to the authorities. Given that censorship means that bloggers lose their
audience, the most common reaction is to create a new blog under a different
address. As for the general public, they are usually unaware of concrete online
censorship cases. As long as the government targets bloggers that write openly
about politics, censorship is likely to be perceived as legitimate by a population
accustomed to limits to what can be said in public. This truce between authori-
tarian regimes and the population they rule is part of an implicit social contract
linking the promise of economic development and political stability. Thus even
when censorship becomes public, it signals that the blogger violated the implicit
social contract by crossing a red line and those not opposed to the government
will say that they “deserved” to be silenced. However, similar to the mechanisms
uncovered by Mason and Krane (1989), if the government proceeds to censor indis-
criminately; namely, when its target shifts to less politically-vocal internet users or
1 The ease of circumvention is due to the interconnectivity of the internet itself, with the servers
controlling access displaying the website as censored only if they receive queries from a certain
location. Given that these nodes also serve as relays for the global internet network, they let
other traffic pass on to the desired website. Thus, by masking one’s location through the use of
an intermediary web server or proxy located in another country, internet censorship is relatively
easily circumvented.
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those avoiding politics completely, the perception of the legitimacy of censorship
changes, because the politically uninvolved can no longer expect to be immune to
repression by evading politics in their writings.
5.1.1 Strategic decisions in the face of repression
There are, to date, few studies dealing specifically with repression in the internet
age, most notably Morozov (2011), and by and large they follow the linear ratio-
nal choice models predicting that the enhanced state capacity to repress dissidents
will raise the cost of mobilization and eventually lead to demobilization. While
the internet is perceived by its users as a free space, or at least as freer than any-
where else in real life, the threat of repression, both of online discourse and in
“real life”, influences how cyberactivists perceive political opportunities and thus
which strategies they adopt. These strategic decisions are taken amid a tension
between the need to protect themselves and to be a widely-read blog perceived as
credible. The literature on framing processes stresses the importance of credibility
of a frame to be effective or to “resonate,” and one of the factors is the credibility
of the frame articulators or claim-makers (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 619). In
that sense, credibility is paramount for bloggers as well, as it ensures that their
writing is accepted as truthful, trustworthy, and persuasive. The use of one’s own
name contributes to the credibility of the political message, but at the same time it
exposes the writer to repression. Thus, the first strategic decision of a cyberactivist
involves the option of writing under the cloak of anonymity.
Following hypothesis 2.2, the relative absence of repression, both online and
offline, facilitates dissident migrant cyberactivism. In fact, the risk of repression
depends on a number of factors, such as the political positions the activist defends,
but also their personal exposure to regime repression. This encompass the many
ways a regime can influence activists’ lives by physically getting hold of them in
order to interrogate them, arrest them, break into their homes, intimidate their
families, or threaten their employers. This immediate power of the regime over
activists can be diminished by high individual social or economic status, and espe-
cially through well-positioned allies inside the administration. Ultimately, however,
if the regime perceives the activists as a threat, they can expect to be repressed.
The fact of living abroad permanently, thereby removed from the authoritarian
regime’s direct control, is a factor in this calculation. Dissidents abroad are not
only physically out of reach of the security apparatus, but also more generally
their livelihood cannot be easily affected by an authoritarian regime, for example
by pressuring an employer to lay his activist employee off. Therefore, the fact of
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living abroad could confer on activists a sense of security, enabling them to use
their real name. At the same time, this freedom from repression is not absolute,
since activists might still be targeted during visits or their families might be intim-
idated. Also, the very fact of living abroad might diminish the activists’ credibility
to speak out against the authoritarian regime, given that they do not endure the
looming threat of repression that activists living in the home country must endure.
Figure 8.: Strategic decisions
Given the tangible threat of physical repression for activists living in the country
of origin as well as the potential threat of online censorship and physical harm of
relatives for those living abroad, we expect cyberactivists to rationally weigh the
risks they incur. The strategic decisions to counter these threats to their freedom
of expression and physical integrity are laid out in figure 8. Hypothesis 2.3 states
that strategies employed vary according to the perception of risk and rewards
involved. The first strategic decision, as laid out in figure 8, pertains to the choice
of an activist’s online identity. In an authoritarian context, writing about political
subjects under one’s real name is potentially risky. Confronted with this risk, an
activist might arrive at the conclusion that they outweigh the potential benefits
of heightened credibility, but nevertheless want to discuss political issues online
anyway. Indeed, depending on both the strategies employed by the activist and
the state investment in surveillance capabilities, identifying the person behind a
specific blog or commentary can be difficult. Thus, if the risk is perceived as high,
detection can be inhibited by the use of a pseudonym. The use of pseudonyms was
wide-spread in the early days of the internet and it has been described as one of
the key aspects allowing free personal expression online by freeing the individual
from identity boundaries (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 16). Today, online anonymity is
often associated with cyberbullying and identity fraud, but this beneficial side of
hiding the speaker to allow him to speak true to his mind is crucial in authoritarian
contexts. Pseudonyms are still wide-spread in certain areas, such as the comment
sections of online newspapers, but in other places, such as the social network site
Facebook, one of the main loci of online activism at the time of writing, it is highly
discouraged. Given that the rules on Facebook are the same for everyone, activists
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living in high-risk contexts will go out of their way to circumvent its real-name
policy to protect themselves.
The use of a pseudonym is, however, only one step in the quest for online
anonymity. In fact, the internet was not designed for anonymity, but built around
IP addresses, which are transmitted any time a website or resource is accessed.
Thus, for true anonymity it is necessary to avoid transmitting one’s own IP address,
which is achieved through the use of anonymization software, most notably the Tor
network2 that routes internet users traffic through several relays in order to conceal
location and usage patterns. Anonymization software like Tor is advocated by var-
ious non-governmental organizations, such as in the Handbook for Bloggers and
Cyber-dissidents by Reporters without Borders. By and large, the continuous ef-
forts to develop tools ensuring the safety of activists online are counterbalanced by
increasingly sophisticated governmental3 internet monitoring capabilities, which
leads some to argue that instead of enabling activism in authoritarian countries,
the internet has made it far more dangerous. These authors point out that the in-
ternet provides dictatorships with information that conventional law enforcement
or secret services would struggle to acquire, ultimately empowering the state by
allowing them to easily identify emerging threats (Morozov, 2011, ch. 4). Hence
it follows that despite online anonymity being an important defense strategy, it
is rarely absolute, and its use requires great discipline and good judgement as to
what to reveal.
After having taken the decision on whether to use the real name or a pseudonym
on his or her blog, a second strategic decision involves the kind of discourse to
be employed. Here, the same cautions regarding repression apply. While the
internet is perceived to be a free space, in which the rules established in real life
to not apply to the same degree, internet users are aware that employing a radical
discourse clearly naming grievances and shaming those in power might expose
them to state repression. If this risk appears to be high, internet users living in the
repressive countries might choose to treat online discussions with the same caution
they would treat a political debate in real life. This approach is characterized by
the evasion of the so-called red lines; namely, taboo topics. In Middle Eastern and
North African countries, these usually include critique of religion and religious
authorities, calls for the accountability of the political leader, and sex – with the
first two taboos directly relating to state power and the latter to a societal taboo
enforced by the state. In addition to completely avoiding these issues, bloggers
2 TOR, short for The Onion Router, was first developed to protect U.S. intelligence communications
online and continues to receive funding from the U.S. government.
3 Governmental internet monitoring capabilities rely often both on in-house capabilities and private
(often Western) companies selling surveillance technologies (Wagner et al., 2015).
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might revert to oppositional speech acts using double entendre, metaphors, or
humor or satire. The same pressures would not apply to activists living abroad,
given that they are out of reach of the authoritarian government. However, if
they maintain strong ties to the country by returning frequently, for example, they
might opt for a cautious strategy as well.
Figure 9.: Roles varying according to location
Due to these variations in political opportunities afforded to bloggers and cy-
beractivists living abroad and in the home country, we see a tendency to assume
different roles inside the community. It should go without saying that these in-
formal roles emerge naturally, given that we are not dealing with organizations
with formal structures. The different roles assumed by activists according to their
location and the regime’s response to activism are laid out in figure 9. These di-
mensions are represented by two axes: the horizontal axis represents the regime’s
reaction to dissent, ranging from tolerance to repression, whereas the vertical axis
depicts the physical location of the activist in question, that is either abroad or in
the country of origin. The upper right quadrant represents cyberactivists and blog-
gers based abroad, who, due to the absence of repression, are able to take more
radical stances compared to their fellow countrymen living in their home countries.
They are likely to push for mobilization and, due to their relatively higher wages
and immunity to the more subtle economic repression exerted by authoritarian
states, provide otherwise scarce resources. With the freedom to communicate and
to travel, they also serve as brokers in the international activist community and
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are more easily in touch with traditional media. Their countrymen living under a
repressive authoritarian regime, represented by the lower right quadrant, tend to
be more concerned with repression both online and offline, therefore making them
less likely to go beyond oppositional speech acts.
In tolerant – but still authoritarian – regimes, bloggers and activists have more
room for maneuver if they limit their actions to the boundaries set by the regime.
Thus, non-governmental organizations are able to use the internet to mobilize fol-
lowers and supporters for demonstrations, and bloggers slowly push boundaries
of what can be said online, as represented in the lower left quadrant. In relatively
tolerant authoritarian regimes, the advantage for their colleagues living abroad are
less pronounced. As seen in the upper left quadrant, they might still be more likely
to be able to dispose of more resources and to be able to establish contacts with
international actors, but given that their counterparts in the country are capable to
mobilize as well, they are less of a pushing force than an equal partner.
5.2 light-handed control vs . suffocating online repression
From the beginning, both Tunisia and Morocco employed varying degrees of con-
trol over their internet infrastructure and users. In both countries, rather than
enacting internet-specific laws, control about what is published online is exerted
through restrictive press laws, regulating both online speech and traditional jour-
nalism. While the ascension of King Mohammed VI to the Moroccan throne in
1999 raised hopes that the country would undergo a process of democratization,
journalists and bloggers continue to this day to be harassed, censored, fined, and
jailed when they cross so-called red lines. Those taboo topics mirror Morocco’s
national motto “God, Homeland, King”; namely, to question religion, territorial in-
tegrity (notably regarding the issue of Western Sahara), and the monarchy (Open-
Net Initiative, 2009, p.1). The Moroccan government would react to breaches of
these taboo topics by shutting newspapers shut down as well as having journalists
physically attacked or arrested when they attempted to cover demonstrations or
trials (Reporters Without Borders - Morocco 2007). As a result of these violations of
the freedom of the press, in 2009, the non-governmental organization Reporters
Without Borders ranked Morocco 127th out of 175 countries in their World Press
Freedom Index.
While there were isolated cases of jailed bloggers, Morocco was relatively le-
nient regarding its control of its citizen’s online activities. Internet censorship was
at least temporarily applied to websites in support of the Polisario Front, which
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advocates for the independence of Western Sahara – annexed by Morocco in 1979.4
The blogging platform Live Journal was also blocked after hosting blogs support-
ing the Polisario Front rebels. These restrictions were lifted by 2009, at which point,
however, websites run by Islamist opposition groups were blocked instead (Open-
Net Initiative, 2009). It is worth noting that these were websites entirely dedicated
to one issue on the fringe of the Moroccan blogosphere, contrary to the Tunisian
approach of blocking websites that would feature a critique of the government
amongst other issues. An exception to this rule was Moroccan regime’s blocking
of the video sharing website YouTube for six days in 2008 after users had uploaded
videos deemed insulting to the king. Despite these red lines regarding the issue
of Western Sahara, the authority of the monarchy and the sanctity of Islam, inter-
net access in the country deemed relatively free by Moroccan bloggers such as the
pioneer blogger Larbi El Hilali, who stressed in 2008 that “everyone can comment
freely on such sensitive topics” (Benhaida, 2008). Not only were Moroccans free
to talk in a regime we can qualify as tolerant, but non-governmental human-rights
organizations and Islamist groups were also able to spread information about reg-
ular protest events using online tools (Moussa, 2011).
Contrary to Morocco’s approach, Tunisia’s regime used internet censorship in a
more heavy-handed fashion. While the constitution officially granted press free-
dom under “conditions laid down by law,” the country was de facto one of the
region’s most authoritarian regime in regard to civil liberties (Reporters without
Borders, 2009). The traditional media were brought into line with the government,
putting coverage of the President’s every move front and center – the three existing
oppositional newspapers were hampered in their production and critical journal-
ists arrested, imprisoned and banned from leaving the country. The politics of
denial of free speech extended to its dealings with the internet as well, often un-
der the guise of the fight against terrorism. In fact, the civil war in neighboring
Algeria and subsequently the 9/11 attacks served as arguments for the Tunisian
government to maintain its repressive practices, especially regarding Islamists. The
control of the internet in Tunisia was extensive, as the regime sought to exert tight
control, in line with countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and China. For instance,
video sharing websites were censored permanently, as well as a growing list of
websites of Western news outlets, blogs and even individual Facebook profiles,
4 The affected websites were arso.org, spsrasd.info, cahiersdusahara.com and wsahara.net, as well as
the site anonymiser.com after it was recommended as a tool to circumvent censorship.
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earning Tunisia top positions on lists of internet policing by non-governmental
organizations like the OpenNet Initiative or Reporters without Borders.5
In order to fully understand the implications of the extensive nature of the on-
line surveillance on internet users in Tunisia and the relative advantages enjoyed
by those living abroad escaping this system, we need to take a closer look. In fact,
from its early beginnings as the first Arab and African country to be connected
to the internet in 1991, the web was filtered, enabled by web-caching proxies in-
stalled at the main network transit point operated by the Tunisian Agency for the
internet (Agence Tunisienne d’internet - ATI). Since all internet traffic used this
transit point, every internet connection was affected. In the 2000s, email filtering
solutions were added to further control the online activities of known dissidents.
Emails of political activists were deviated and read by operators at the ministry of
interior, who erased or altered the content and eventually forwarded the emails to
the intended recipients. Subsequently, growing internet traffic due to the spread
of broadband access necessitated an upgrade of the internet control scheme. Start-
ing from 2007, these tasks were accomplished by the use of the most sophisticated
methods available on the market, notably Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). This tech-
nology allows for the examination of the data of a packet for sensitive keywords
and subsequently suspicious packets can be diverted to a different destination. It
allows governments to monitor the online activity of a given person and filter the
traffic on the network by removing “undesired” material from the actual body of
received emails. (Wagner, 2012)
The Tunisian state invested heavily into monitoring its population, both online
and offline. While extreme and visible forms of repression touched only the few
daring to take an open political stance, softer forms of police control were om-
nipresent, and other actors were involved in surveilling the population as well. In
this, the Tunisian state not only differed from Morocco, but also from other coun-
tries in the region. As such, if talking to taxi drivers in Egypt was a favorite exer-
cise for scholars and journalists alike to gauge popular sentiment, taxi drivers in
Tunisia were renowned state informants. Every village, every quarter even, had its
own dense network of surveillance comprised of police stations, party cells, neigh-
borhood committees and the local representative of the central administration in
the area, the Omda, ensuring that Tunisia’s sociopolitical control of its population
bordered on the totalitarian (Hibou, 2011, p. 83). However, not even the fact of
living abroad was not a guarantee to be shielded from government surveillance.
5 Tunisia was listed on RWB’s annual Enemies of the internet list since its first publication in 2006.
Tunisia moved to the “Countries under surveillance” list after the revolution in 2011 (Reporters
without Borders, 2013).
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In fact, the government’s reach extended to its institutions abroad, be it embassies
or the so-called Amicales. As the blogger Fayla related to me:
“When I lived abroad, I tried to avoid Tunisians by all means. I used
to stick around with Arabs and class mates. In Beirut, all the Tunisians
I knew were close to the embassy. . . when I found out that a girl was
attending the 7 November celebrations at the embassy (asking me if I
was going, too), I subsequently avoided her.” (Fayla, personal commu-
nication, April 25, 2015)
In light of this tight societal control, even the restricted freedom of speech on-
line was a well-cherished reprieve. Even greater was the surprise and relief of
many a blogger when accessing the web from abroad. In interviews conducted by
Romain Lecomte with bloggers like Sami Ben Gharbia, Houeida K. Anouar and
Malek Khadraoui, they highlight how using the internet from abroad, devoid of
censorship that characterized it in Tunisia, provided them with an unprecedented
access to information on their home countries for the first time. Malek Khadraoui
asserts: “One can say I suffocated a bit with the lack of freedom in my country. So
I left, and the first thing when one leaves to a slightly freer country [...] was to try
to get some information, it was the first reflex” (Lecomte, 2009, p. 204-205). As for
blogger and activist Sami Ben Gharbia, he stumbled upon dissident websites when
he tried to compile his dossier for his application for political asylum. He subse-
quently became a contributor to the forums popular at that time before creating
Nawaat and engaging in other dissident activities.
5.2.1 Anonymity for free expression and defense strategy
Websites resembling what were later called blogs; namely, a sort of an online diary,
whose posts would usually be displayed in reverse-chronological order to show the
first on top, existed since the advent of the WWW, with the generally recognized
first blog appearing as early as 1994. However, blogging platforms facilitating the
creation and maintenance of blogs by providing bloggers with templates sparing
them the time and effort to write code started to emerge at the turn of the century,
and they became mainstream in 2004. It is important to note that, at that time, the
use of online aliases was very much the norm. It was only with the internet be-
coming increasingly widespread and it’s use extending to formal communication
that using one’s real name became more commonplace. As a result, it should not
be surprising that most of the blogs appearing in the webcrawls in the previous
chapter were not using real names, both in the Moroccan and in the Tunisian cases.
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The use of pseudonyms was not only a protection from governmental reprisals,
but also a way to shield its user from intrusion in his private life more generally.
Thus, Hisham Almiraat, a Moroccan blogger living abroad at the time and one of
the most prominent bloggers in the Moroccan blogosphere, explains his motive as
such:
“My name is Hisham Almiraat. It’s a pseudonym. Offline, I’m known
as Hisham Khribchi, a medical doctor. I’m a Moroccan blogger living
in France and the reason I use a pseudonym has to do with my debuts
online. When I first started blogging I wanted my identity to remain
secret because I didn’t want my online activity to interfere with my
professional life. I wanted to keep both as separate as possible. I also
wanted to use a fake name because I wrote about politics and I was
critical of my own government. A pseudonym would shield me and
my family from personal attacks. I wanted to have a comfortable space
to express myself freely without having to worry about the police when
I visit my family back in Morocco.” (Almiraat, 2011)
Hisham’s rationale for using a pseudonym is two-fold. The first aspect refers
to the culture of pseudonyms at the time and their utility in dissociating a per-
son’s online activity from his or her personal and professional life. Writing using
an alias provides the writers with the freedom to develop their thoughts uncon-
strained from fears that they might alienate friends, risk their job or their children
being accosted at school because somebody from their direct environment reads
their intimate or political writings. The same reasoning is brought forward by Ibn
Kafka, a Moroccan lawyer and blogger, who maintains his pseudonym because his
opinions are “diametrically opposed to those of my employer,” besides his family
being “petrified” by the idea of writing on Moroccan politics (Ibn Kafka, personal
communication, August 21, 2015). Anonymity as a tool to free oneself from the
constraints of one’s real life persona is also present in the actions of the anarchic
Tunisian collective Takriz, founded in 1998. Describing themselves as a “ free, real
and anonymous movement” after their resurrection in 2009, their official rationale
for anonymity is that it allows its members to renounce the quest for personal rep-
utation and recognition and instead express their authentic selves, even though in
reality, this pursuit for notoriety was merely transferred to their aliases (Lecomte,
2013, p. 66).The choice of the pseudonym itself represents the first step in this
mode of expression, as Hisham also points out that the name Almiraat (mirror
in Arabic): “a mirror is about reflection and amplification, and this is precisely
what I like to do most online: reflecting and amplifying other people’s voices.”
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Hisham remains active in the online community up to today and continues to use
his pseudonym as a nom de plume.
In addition to keeping his online and his real life persona distinct, Hisham Almi-
raat chose a pseudonym to avoid harassment to his family or himself. He mentions
this concern despite the fact that he did not live in the country and that Morocco’s
approach to internet censorship and political mobilization can be considered toler-
ant; that is to say, a wide range of collective behavior within certain boundaries is
allowed. In the case of Morocco, direct criticism of the king, religion, or territorial
integrity is off limits, with varying degrees of freedom for other topics. Hisham’s
primary choice of online anonymity reflects the desire to speak his mind freely
without the fear of repercussions, be it from individuals or the state. In addition,
authoritarian regimes are characterized by uncertainty as to whether unwritten
rules about what is permissible to say will change, sometimes overnight. But he
also notes that at some point, keeping his real name secret was impractical because
real pictures were linked to his online profile. While some Tunisian bloggers like
the cartoonist -Z- have resolutely defended their anonymity even after the upris-
ing, Hisham’s benevolent reaction to revelation of his real identity indicates that
his experience taught him that he was not in immediate danger. Instead, Hisham
Almiraat has become the name he is known for online, a sort of a brand. He later,
in 2009, co-founded an award-winning English-language online forum advocating
free speech, Talk Morocco. There are many other pioneer Moroccan bloggers that
chose to mask their full name – one of them is the aforementioned Larbi El Hilali,
who is known online simply as “Larbi”.
If using a pseudonym was common in Morocco, the sophisticated control of the
Tunisian internet meant that this decision was a necessity. The fear of prosecution
was palpable and induced Tunisian bloggers to pursue various strategies of dis-
simulation. The threat to bloggers writing under their own names was substantial
before the uprising. According to Threatened Voices, a project of Global Voices6
advocacy listing all known prosecutions of people due to their online activities,
23 Tunisians were either arrested or threatened with arrest because of their on-
line activities from the first case in 2002 up to the eve of the 2011 uprising, from
dedicated cyberactivists like Zouhair Yahyaoui, the first cyber-dissident to be im-
prisoned, to a feminist retired university professor sentenced to eight months in
prison for spreading rumors on Facebook about a rumor of abducted children (for
a complete list, see the Appendix). During the same period, only six Moroccans
6 Global Voices is a community of bloggers who seek to “aggregate, curate, and amplify the global
conversation online – shining light on places and people other media often ignore” - see globalvoic-
esonline.org/about/
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suffered the same fate. According to these records Tunisia ranks fourth in the
Top 10 of repressive countries, below Iran, China, and Egypt until the website was
discontinued in 2012.7 However, the case of Zouhair Yahyaoui highlights that the
use of a pseudonym was not necessarily a sufficient precaution. Zouhair Yahyaoui
alias Ettounsi, was tracked down and jailed for 16 months despite the use of a
pseudonym. He died only 16 months after his conditional release, most likely as
a consequence of torture and denial of medical treatment in prison, cementing his
martyr status for the blogger community.8
Given that bloggers and activists living abroad were out of reach of the regimes
of their country of origin, one might assume that they would not feel the need
of hiding their identity behind an alias. However, as we have already seen in
the case of Hisham Almiraat, the use of pseudonyms by bloggers and activists
living abroad was not uncommon, grown out of a concern for the safety of them-
selves and their families in their countries of origin. This concern was particularly
strong amongst Tunisians given that the fear of repression loomed large within
the Tunisian community abroad. Thus, the contributors to the website Tunisnews,
a repository of oppositional articles and communiqués founded by a group of five
Tunisian refugees of the forbidden Islamist Ennahda movement in Sweden, ex-
plained the reason for their continued anonymity in an interview. “We insist to
remain anonymous for personal reasons, to ensure the safety of our families and
our relatives in the country.” (Ravenel and Lamloum, 2002, p. 250)
In addition to concerns regarding repercussions for family members, critical
bloggers living abroad but wishing to occasionally return to the home country
would chose to publish using a pseudonym as well. An example of this cautious
approach, with the fate of Zouhair Yahyaoui in mind while criticizing the govern-
ment ferociously, is Riadh Guerfali, or Astrubal, a lawyer with whom Sami Ben
Gharbia co-founded Nawaat in 2004. Guerfali worked at a university in France for
many years before returning permanently to Tunisia in 2009. During these years,
he made several trips to Tunisia, thus, contrary to his colleague Ben Gharbia, used
a pseudonym. He continued to write for Nawaat, however, after his return to
Tunisia, and he took extensive precautions to cover his tracks. Thus, he would not
put his own texts online because the Tunisian state controlled the network, but
sent them instead to his friend and colleague Ben Gharbia. Also, he stressed that
despite these precautions he suspected that he could be arrested at any given mo-
ment. He pointed out how he talked to his son about this eventuality and how he
7 Despite the fact that Egypt arrested several bloggers in 2012, the ranking still holds, with 30 Egyp-
tians either arrested or threatened until the 2011 uprisings.
8 After the 2011 uprising, then interim President Moncef Marzouki decreed that the day of Zouhair
Yahyaoui’s death, March 13, would become the national day of internet freedom.
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was relieved when his son left the country to study in France. Finally, for Guerfali,
the greatest threat of all was not physical repression, but the power of the regime
on the economic livelihood of its citizens. Similar to the point made by Béatrice
Hibou on the political economy of repression in Tunisia, Guerfali emphasizes that
upon his return, he chose to consume his savings to be independent of the good
will of the regime. According to him, this was also the main advantage of activists
living abroad (Riadh Guerfali, personal communication, October 14, 2014).
The financial criterion is what sets the residents abroad apart. (. . . ) The
main weapon of the regime was economic. They put people in prison
when they did not manage to silence them with this economic weapon.
(. . . ) The fact of working abroad immunized me from economic pres-
sures the regime could exert. If in terms of political actions, thanks to
the internet, living abroad makes absolutely no difference, however be-
ing financially independent, i.e. that one’s income does not depend on
the goodwill of the oppressive regime, makes all the difference.
On the other hand, it is important to note that radical critique of the Ben Ali
regime did not first emerge outside Tunisia. Sami Ben Gharbia explicitly mentions
Decepticus, a frequent contributor to Zouhair Yahyaoui’s TuneZine, as the first
Tunisian cyber-dissident. In fact, Zouhair Yahyaoui’s forum was the cradle of
online radical critique of the regime, and his imprisonment and subsequent death
from a heart attack emboldened the core group of contributors to the forum, who
used pseudonyms and were partly living in Tunisia and partly living abroad, to
further pursue their political struggle.
5.2.2 The question of credibility
The threat of imprisonment or intimidation did not stop all bloggers based in
Tunisia from using their real names. Generally speaking, bloggers living in Tunisia
were very cautious, but there were also exceptions to the rule, following a more
impulsive approach. Amine Kochlef, for example, claims – not without pride – to
have been “the first to blog under his real name.” However, the choice to write
under a real name carried a risk, which Kochlef admits, was for him part of the
game. He explains that writing about politics was exciting, that he was aware of the
risks but that both the adrenaline and the camaraderie in the blogging community
kept him going.
Then, the Tunisian state attempted to dissuade him from writing by intimidation.
Amine recalls that his house was burglarized three times, with the only stolen
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items being his computer and his camera every time. Other domestic bloggers
like Lina Ben Mhenni, Slim Amamou and Sofiene Chourabi were equally victims
of such break-ins and followed by secret police, and those intrusions with the
removal of usually only a few objects were perceived as a warning by the regime.
Amine pointed out that the intimidations built up. They would tell his parents as
well as his brother, who was working at the ministry of education, “talk to him, he
needs to stop”. These threats eventually prompted him to leave the country and
to immigrate to Canada when the opportunity presented itself (Amine Kochlef,
personal communication, January 11, 2014).9
While writing under an alias was fairly common in the Web more generally,
Amine’s emphasis on the fact that he used his real name demonstrates that this
choice carried weight. In an extremely repressive context like Tunisia, disclosing
your real name entailed to expose yourself to governmental repression, but for
him, it also added an additional layer of credibility to his writing. This quest
for trustworthiness was also important in a less dangerous context in Morocco,
where Hisham Almiraat’s anonymity eroded over time because he did not deem
it necessary to rigorously maintain it. He also concluded that keeping his real
identity secret was damaging to his position inside the community, feeling that “it
was necessary to disclose my real name as confidence was needed to build strong
relationships with fellow activists” (Almiraat, 2011).
While writing under one’s own name while living in the home country is a
decision that might have immediate consequences in the form of repression, cy-
beractivists permanently living abroad might take this decision more easily. One
of the most prominent examples of outspoken activists living abroad is Sami Ben
Gharbia. Blogger since 2002 and co-founder of the collective blog Nawaat in 2004,
Ben Gharbia has been a well-connected freedom of expression activists from the
advent of blogging. In addition to his position as a full-time activist as Advocacy
Director at the international blogger network Global Voices, he was one of the most
vocal bloggers of Tunisian origin. As a political refugee in the Netherlands, he did
not expect to return to his home country before the fall of the Ben Ali regime. He
himself admitted that “living outside the country made it easier to be an activist
in your own name.” However, despite the fact that Tunisians were by and large
protected from repercussions by the rule of law in their host countries, the use
of one’s real name was rather the exception than the norm. Indeed, the concerns
about the safety of their families remained. Ben Gharbia conceded that his family
suffered from his engagement by receiving nightly visits and threats. Nevertheless,
9 Amine Kochlef left just before the uprisings in November 2010.
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he stresses that his family respected his political engagement (Sami Ben Gharbia,
personal communication, March 14, 2014).
At the same time, using one’s own name is not necessarily enough to be a cred-
ible activist. Actually, the fact of living abroad can be detrimental to the cause.
Thus, Amira Yahyaoui (daughter of Moktar and cousin of Zouhair Yahyaoui), who
left the country in 2004, revealed that she hesitated to be vocal about politics be-
cause she felt that those living abroad had “less legitimacy” than those living in
the country because they did not suffer the consequences of their activism (Amira
Yahyaoui, personal communication, 29 December 2015). This reasoning was also
brought forward in a heated discussion on political blogging in which Sami Ben
Ghabia deplored the lack of political standpoints in the blogosphere. In the dis-
cussion to this post, a user calling himself “x” expressed the reasons why bloggers
might choose to avoid political statements or chose to stay anonymous:
“Stop criticizing others if you have chosen exile. We must not forget that
there are people amongst us who still frequent Tunisia... I find it silly
that a blogger does not preserve his anonymity and at the same time
criticizes the government and returns to Tunisia in fear.”(Comment on
the blog post “Blogs Tunisiens: des zones Touristiques!” on the blog of
Ben Gharbia (2005))
5.2.3 To write or not to write - Political speech vs. Self-censorship
Whether to use one’s real name or a pseudonym is not the only decision to be
made. Another strategy, which can be adopted either in conjunction with the use
of the pseudonym or by itself, consists of treating the internet more like a situation
in real life; namely, to assume the same restrictions to speech that characterize a
conversation in public in an authoritarian state. Reactions to this perceived dan-
ger range from self-censorship to the heavy reliance on symbolism. Finally, events
of censorship and the persecution of bloggers stimulate debates inside the blogo-
sphere on how to deal with censorship and political speech.
In Morocco, the existence of so-called red lines is a secret to none. Thus, while
criticizing the government and certain decisions of the king are common, showing
open support to the Polisario, promoting atheism or to call for the establishment
of a republic crosses those lines. In the case of Polisario, there are websites oper-
ated by associations based abroad, such as Solidarité Maroc that is based in France.
However, Islam and territorial integrity are central to Moroccan identity, thus to
question them by championing atheism and the independence of Western Sahara
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removes the speaker far from public consensus. As for the king, the monarchy
was and remains very popular in Morocco, and this extends to the Moroccan com-
munity living abroad as well. Of the three taboo topics, this is the one that can
be more easily debated, but as well within its limits, which are also obvious to
Moroccan bloggers living abroad. Thus, when blogger Une Marocaine, living in
France, was asked what she would write about if she would return to Morocco
definitely, she mused: “I would write more about Morocco (. . . ) but honestly, I
could not adopt the tone I allow myself here to criticize the French president, to
talk about the king of Morocco” (Une Marocaine, 2009). Thus, while some would
prefer a truly constitutional monarchy like in Spain, they will not directly criticize
the king.
Censorship was, for a long time, limited to those websites that addressed the
widely accepted taboo topics. Thus is why the case of Fouad Mourtada, the first
Moroccan persecuted for his online activities, unsettled many in the Moroccan
blogosphere, igniting debates on what was permitted to write and what was off-
limits. Mourtada was sentenced to three years in prison in 2008 for creating a fake
Facebook profile of the Moroccan king’s brother Moulay Rachid, interpreted by a
Casablanca court as “villainous practices linked to the alleged theft” of the prince’s
identity, shattered the wide-spread perception that Morocco enjoyed an otherwise
“incomparable freedom of expression compared to other countries of the Arab and
African world, and that this was especially true for the internet” (Drissi Bakhakhat,
2008). A number of bloggers reacted by closing down their operations, the most
prominent case being the closure of the IT blog MoTIC, one of the most popular
Moroccan blogs that had been voted Best IT Blog at the Maroc Web Awards in
2008. His owner Mohamed Drissi Bakhkhat, professor of economics at the Abdel-
malek Essaâdi University of Tangier, explained his retreat by “the very dangerous
and serious turn the Fouad Mourtada affair is taking and the ridiculous reasons
for which he was arrested, lynched, tortured and held prisoner without possibility
to be released on bail, this does not bode well for bloggers (. . . ) if the creation
of a fake Facebook profile warrants this treatment, then the next could be a blog-
ger.” The 113 comments on the blog post express regret but also understanding.
Contrary to commentators announcing to shut down their blogs to “create a new
one that does not criticize anything”, Drissi Bakhkhat maintains he “prefers not to
write than to write under constraints.” (Drissi Bakhakhat, 2008)
In Tunisia, these debates took place much earlier because its first cyberdissident
to be imprisoned was Zouhair Yahyaoui in 2000. Given that this case occurred be-
fore blogging became popular, it influenced how Tunisians behaved online. Thus,
when the blogosphere grew, a conflict emerged on how to deal with political writ-
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ing, with activists claiming their space in the global debate while the majority of
bloggers, stemming from a society where talking about politics was an absolute
taboo, was wary of the consequences of the inclusion of the activists. An example
for the tensions existing at this point between those arguing for radical critique of
the regime, came to the fore in December 2005, when Houssein Ben Ameur, a com-
puter scientist living in Canada since 1999, refused to list Sami Ben Gharbia’s blog
on his blog aggregator Tn-blogs.org, comparable to a telephone book for blogs. At
that time, the number of Tunisian bloggers had risen sharply. The multiplication
of blogs was judged critically by some long-established bloggers who deplored
the quality and the subjects covered on the new blogs. As in other countries, the
democratization of the blogosphere resulted in a diversification of its content, re-
flecting the interests of the average users. Going beyond topics that agitated the
first users of the internet, like computer developments and politics, the new blogs
covered various topics including, but not limited to, fashion, poetry, cooking and
other hobbies. The avoidance of political issues by the large majority of Tunisian
bloggers incited some of the political bloggers to violently criticize this develop-
ment (Adibs1, 2006). Subsequently, Sami Ben Gharbia wrote a widely commented
blog post accusing Ben Ameur of listing only “politically correct” bloggers, and
thereby splitting the Tunisian blogging community in two. Gharbia’s intuition was
proven right when Ben Ameur acknowledged that the reason of the refusal was
the political nature of the blog. Ben Ameur’s main argument was his fear of seeing
his blog censored:
“I am like many bloggers on Tn-blogs, youth who are thirsty for free-
dom, who are torn between the desire for freedom and their morbid
fear, instilled by a system that you know very well. You’re right to be
angry, be angry with us. I salute your courage and all those who mil-
itate openly. I don’t have it.” (comment on the blog of Ben Gharbia
2005)
When pressed about the issue, Ben Ameur maintains that the reason for his
decision was the fear of having his website censored in Tunisia and not repercus-
sions for his family living in the country. He argued that Tn-blogs.org aspired to
be a directory of all (well, almost all) Tunisian blogs, hence if it was blocked, it
would have made itself redundant (Houssein Ben Ameur, personal communica-
tion, 6 March 2015). Indeed, one blocked blogger indicated that the censorship
of his blog had divided his readership by six (Boukornine, 2010). This initial dis-
pute was eventually resolved and Ben Ameur added a number of dissident blogs,
amongst which were Sami Ben Gharbia’s and that of the outspoken human rights
5.2 light-handed control vs . suffocating online repression 122
activist and Tunisian judge Mokhtar Yahyaoui (the uncle of Zouhair Yahyaoui). Tn-
blogs.org was eventually blocked at the end of 2010 (Houssein Ben Ameur, personal
communication, 6 March 2015).
With time passing, the conflict lines between partisans of confrontational speech
and those preferring to keep a low profile and to either avoid politics due to a lack
of interest or self-censorship faded away, and netizens living in Tunisia starting to
increasingly write about politics in 2008/2009. However, with the expectation of
the state and its agents searching the internet for political debates to monitor and
possibly censor in mind, they preferentially resorted to oppositional speech acts;
namely, a highly-coded language peppered with symbolism and allusions. In the
best of cases, the adoption of oppositional speech acts gives way to an indirect and
witty style meant to evade the more superficial kind of censorship that searches
for certain keywords common in political debates. In Tunisia, this style flourished,
with potentially dangerous keywords like “Ben Ali” being substituted with coded
references to the regime. For example, bloggers would mention the mauve, the
color of the ruling RCD and omnipresent in the idolatry of the regime; ridicule the
regime’s insistence on “Change” for more than twenty years. Another frequent
symbol ridiculed was the number seven, which refers to the date of the “medical
coup” against state founder Bourguiba on 7 November 1987, but also lend it name
to a television channel (Tunisie7) and an airline (Sevenair). A representative of
the coded, witty style was Fatma Arabicca, whose blog was highly appreciated
in the Tunisian blogosphere, as she wrote in a very poetic, sometimes sarcastic
way. Using a pseudonym and a subtle critique, she avoided censorship. However,
the authorities were monitoring her given that she was detained for a few days in
November 2009 because she was accused of blogging on a more radical blog, DE-
BATunisie, whose caricatures use the aforementioned symbolism extensively. She
was liberated after -Z-, the blogger behind DEBATunisie, posted a new caricature
proving that Fatma Arabicca was not the cartoonist.
This subtle, indirect style also created the mythical image of Ammar. In the heav-
ily monitored and censored Tunisian internet, Ammar refers to the false “404 File
not found” error message concealing the actual “403 Access Forbidden” displayed
on blocked websites. Ammar is imagined as the impersonation of the censor him-
self, pictured as a brainless policeman. While the exact origin of the mythical
figure is uncertain, one theory is that the “404 File not found” was identified with
the driver of a Peugeot 404, a very common car in Tunisia driven by the lower
classes. Ammar, a very common name, hence represents a random, lowly police
officer in charge of blocking contentious websites who earns just as much as to
afford the 404. Over time, the references and artwork featuring Ammar prolifer-
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ated. The cartoonist -Z- portrayed Ammar as a policeman in a purple uniform
using golden scissors. However, this symbolism and the campaigns build on them
were not acceptable to the more outspoken activists, for whom the figure of Am-
mar was a mere smokescreen hiding the real culprit; namely, the Tunisian police
state. Nawaat and their comrades-in-arms sought to “name and shame” the gov-
ernment directly, insisting that it was the Tunisian internet Agency and the regime
of Ben Ali and not some mystical figure that were responsible for internet censor-
ship. However, in hindsight, Sami Ben Gharbia concedes that the figure of Ammar
did help the cause because it allowed apolitical netizens to talk about censorship,
but in his opinion, the tentative nature of the discourse “postponed the revolution”
(Sami Ben Gharbia, personal communication, March 14, 2014).
5.3 conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that the monitoring practices of the state influenced
the behavior of web users in the respective countries. Particularly the variation of
political opportunities between bloggers based in Tunisia and those based abroad
explain why the most ferocious and persistent critique of the Tunisian regime was
voiced by the latter rather than by the former. However, we also saw that the
relationship between repression and activism is complex, with bloggers employ-
ing various coping strategies, depending on their willingness to take risks and, in
the case of the diaspora, whether they expected to return to their home country.
Tunisians abroad were not the instigators of radical critique of the regime, but the
fact of living abroad facilitated their political activism, because they were not con-
cerned for their physical integrity and their economic livelihood. These relatively
favorable conditions enabled them to take on the role of the radical mobilizers,
allowing them to persist in their political activism, which involved the investment
of time and money.
In the case of Morocco, however, the circumstances were different. While the
monitoring of the population in Tunisia was omnipresent and obvious to all, with
every conversation remotely touching politics deemed suspicious and dangerous,
the so-called red lines in Morocco were subtler, and they were more widely ac-
cepted by the population at large. In fact, the web emerged as a space for political
debate most prominently in Tunisia, where the space for public debate tightened
with the years, whereas the spread of the internet in Morocco coincided with a pe-
riod of political détende and the expectation that newly-crowned King Mohammed
IV would advance the democratization of the country. Discussions about politics
in general were permitted if they do not criticize the political system as a whole,
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up to the 2011 Arab uprisings, the large majority of bloggers and especially the
most widely read and well-known, stuck to these rules. Setbacks like Fouad Mour-
tada affair incited some bloggers to quit and others to self-censor. However, on-
line speech was considered so free that an oppositional speech act style similar to
Tunisia did not emerge. Thus, we can confirm the hypotheses that in the context
of high online and offline repression, the relative importance of repression in the
diaspora facilitates dissident migrant cyberactivism and that strategies employed
vary according to the perception of risk and rewards involved.
6
C O L L E C T I V E I D E N T I T Y
The spread of the internet throughout the world has been accompanied by the
expectation that it would serve as a potent tool for democratization. Already be-
fore the Arab uprisings, in January 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton praised the revolutionary potential of the Internet, poised to advance polit-
ical transformation worldwide and to fundamentally change the rules of political
engagement and action. In her speech, she compared non-violent online political
speech with the circulation of pamphlets during the Cold War, which according
to her “helped pierce the concrete and concertina wire of the Iron Curtain” (Rod-
ham Clinton, 2010). This is reminiscent of Egyptian We are all Khaled Said Facebook
group manager Wael Ghonim’s “if you want to liberate a government, give them
the internet.” These appraisals and analogies to previous revolutions are at the
heart of many questions scholars of online contention ask, notably to what extent
findings on political contention online challenge established tenets of social move-
ment theory, or as Earl and Kimport call it, lead from the adaptation of established
theories to the creation of a “theory 2.0” (Earl and Kimport, 2011, p. 27). One of
the facets of collective action sought to be affected by the internet is the need for
co-presence and, linked to this, for the development of a strong collective identity
for collective action to take place.
This chapter will investigate whether a collective identity emerged inside the re-
spective blogosphere and if so, what this collective identity revolves around. While
addressing this major question, this chapter will also deal with two related ques-
tions; namely, which diaspora activists will be most prominent in the respective
contexts and how do diaspora activists frame their political engagement? During
this chapter, we will see that while collective action can, today, be spurred by indi-
viduals, durable relationships and a collective identity remain important for more
protracted campaigns seeking to channel these decentralized initiatives.
125
6.1 collective identity and internet activism 126
6.1 collective identity and internet activism
One of the major benefits of internet-based campaigns beside speed and scale of
the spread of information has been that it abolished the need for co-presence for so-
cial movements, enabling collective action without being physically being together
(Earl and Kimport, 2011, ch.6). As shown in the preceding chapters, blogging
and internet activism can take place decoupled from time and space, with actors
living thousands of kilometers apart and participating whenever they have time
to write their next post. But does this mean that the cultural aspects of social
movements, most notably the formation of a collective identity, loose their impor-
tance? A collective identity “describes what makes people occupying a category
similar”, whereas “personal identity is the bundle of traits that we believe makes
us unique” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.298). A collective identity thus consists of
several individuals’ shared identities to form the identity of the specific group. As
a result, an individual can associate with several groups and thus hold several so-
cial identities, whereas a collective identity consists of an identity shared by many
individuals. The concept of collective identity framing was embraced by sociolo-
gists seeking to explain why actors form groups and identify with them, a cultural
dimension of collective action that resource mobilization theory failed to explain
(Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). Instead of focusing on how social movements
mobilize resources to pursue their aims, this cultural approach allowed researchers
to explain behaviors and motivations of movement actors. Since then, scholars of
contentious politics have established that a highly developed collective identity re-
sults in a higher inclination of individuals to protest on behalf of that group (De
Weerd and Klandermans, 1999). At the same time, it must be stressed that link-
ing a movement with a collective identity does not suppose that the participants
sharing this identity are necessarily homogeneous (Della Porta and Diani, 1999,
p. 24).
The constructivist approach emphasizing the importance of discursive elements
in the formation of social movements has similarly been applied to research on
transnational groups like diasporas, which formally focused on more essentialist
perspectives in assuming group formation as the automatic result of migration,
exile and dispersal. Thus, discursive elements, notably the presence of a group
consciousness, were integrated when the definition of diaspora was expanded to
groups other than the classic Jewish and Armenian diasporas, and serve as com-
plements to the objective criteria of diasporas in the now widely-used definitions
by Safran and Cohen (1991; 1997). Other approaches stress that the importance
of a shared identity goes beyond being a mere compliment to essentialist criteria,
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with diasporas requiring an effort of construction and imagination of community
analogous to Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities.” In fact, a strand of
literature in the field has used elements of social movement theory to explain the
formation of diasporas as a mobilization process (Sökefeld, 2006; Adamson, 2012).
With regards to the influence of the internet in the formation of transnational identi-
ties, Brinkerhoff (2009) advances that the rootedness of contemporary migrant pop-
ulations in both their adopted and their inherited cultures enables them to identify
with both, thereby become ambassadors in both places. However, this chapter will
show that the most committed participants in the respective blogospheres are first
generation migrants whose identification with the diaspora is ambivalent. This
underscores the question brought up by the literature of transnationalism whether
today’s migrant communities develop such a high level of cohesion in terms of
identity to be grouped together with traditional diasporas (e.g. Al-Ali and Koser,
2002).
With regards to the importance of a collective identity in the age of online mo-
bilization, there are indications that it loses in importance for certain kinds of col-
lective action. Before, the formation of a collective identity through collaboration
and co-presence was beneficial to counter the “costs” of protest such as police re-
pression and stigma attached to attending street protests (Melucci, 1989; Fantasia,
1988). At that time, scholarship on the formation of a group consciousness has been
largely premised on face-to-face interaction and shared spaces. As we have seen
in the previous chapter, however, the internet can serve as a free space in author-
itarian regimes where true public spaces have been suffocated. Earl and Kimport
cautiously indicate that the development of a collective identity is not necessary
for online tactics that are not dangerous (Earl and Kimport, 2011, p. 145). Indeed,
one of the aspects the internet seems to have changed in collective action is the em-
powerment of the individual and the emergence of collective action with relatively
little involvement of traditional social movement organizations and weak collec-
tive identities. There are examples for one-off online campaigns in democracies,
most commonly referred to by their Twitter hashtag, such as the 2013 anti-sexism
campaign #Aufschrei in Germany (Eckert and Puschmann, 2013). A notable ex-
ample for a more durable campaign of this new mode of “connective action” was
the Indignados movement in Spain, which emphasized a personalized identity and
relegated formal organizations to the margins (W. L. Bennett and Segerberg, 2013,
p. 20). However, the picture is more complex in authoritarian regimes, towards
which the discourse of the internet as a liberation technology is primarily directed
(see for example Diamond, 2010). While these decentralized, personalized forms of
communication played a major role during the Arab uprisings, they were accom-
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panied by efforts to pool the information available to make the communication
flows more efficient. These efforts were not undertaken by individuals, but de-
veloped as part of conversations among groups of activists who knew each other
from previous activities and shared a collective identity.
6.1.1 Individualist bloggers and collective identity
Before the domination of social media platforms that is characteristic of today’s
internet, blogging was hailed as a tool with the potential to revive the public sphere
in the West and to enable otherwise impossible conversations about political topics
in authoritarian regimes. It was assumed that information circulating online would
induce citizens to hold their governments accountable. From this it was implied
that the actors on these platforms such as bloggers would be crucial in bringing
about social change, and Western governments and organizations devised training
programs targeted at bloggers. However, it should not be forgotten that bloggers
are primarily simply internet users who choose to publish texts in a specific format.
By nature, bloggers – to the extent that they can be considered a group at all – are
a very heterogeneous one, and bloggers are not necessarily politicized. In fact, a
case could be made that bloggers are not necessarily ideal candidates to form a
social movement requiring coordination since they are engaged in a particularly
individualistic activity. Despite the features of the blogosphere that make blogging
a less solitary and more social activity such as commenting and the blogroll, one
of the key characteristics of blogs is their diversity in terms of content and style.
In fact, blogging is rooted in the kinds of intimist accounts of daily life that
emerged in the 1990s in the form of online diaries and threads. Most often, these
public diaries reported personal accounts of day-to-day activities and were highly
individualistic. A blogger can address any number of issues, ranging from lit-
erature to personal everyday life experiences to politics. As there was no edi-
tor controlling what was being published and writing under a pseudonym was
common, bloggers took great liberties in the choice of topics and viewpoints they
addressed in their posts. Blogging was a leisurely activity, during which some
would write poetry while others would write political pamphlets. More politically-
inclined bloggers often embraced either the role of political commentator or that
of a citizen-journalist. Citizen-journalism has been defined as either as “when
the people formerly known as the audience employ the press tools they have in
their possession to inform one another” (Rosen, 2008) or occasionally slammed by
journalists as a “pyjama army” of generally anonymous, self-referential amateurs
spreading gossip and scandal while considering themselves to be serious journal-
6.2 complex modern transnational identities 129
ists (Keen, 2007, p. 47). While this dispute stimulates reflections about whether
we can trust the veracity of information online, it should not obscure the fact that
this kind of amateur journalism is highly appreciated in countries where tradi-
tional journalism fails to inform the population effectively, such as in authoritarian
regimes where the media often follows the government line. It should therefore
not be a surprise that other definitions directly stem from the experience of blog-
gers in authoritarian regimes and these definitions presuppose an activist point
of view, such as “an alternative and activist form of newsgathering and reporting
that functions outside mainstream media institutions, (. . . ) driven by different ob-
jectives and ideals and relies on alternative sources of legitimacy than traditional
or mainstream journalism” (Radsch, 2013).
While a certain affinity of citizen-journalism and activism cannot be denied,
given that reporting on issues that are otherwise ignored in the mainstream me-
dia can be considered a critique of these media, effective and sustained political
activism requires more than an individual with a dissident stance. Especially in
authoritarian contexts, finding reliable allies through collaboration remains key to
mounting durable campaigns and to defend against possible repression. The major
contribution of the internet in this context is the facilitation of finding like-minded
people in the first place. Bloggers are not a monolithic group as they often take on
a great variety of viewpoints, but it must be noted that they often do share a com-
mon middle-class background given that – especially in developing countries – a
certain degree of material wealth and education is necessarily to afford a computer
and an internet connection as well as the ability to use them. This common socio-
economic background coupled with their common activity of writing makes them
more sensitive to certain issues than the general population. As such, the fight
for freedom of expression is likely to become a major unifier, the one issue a large
share of bloggers can identify with, even more so when it touches them personally.
It appears that at this point, the identification with blogging per se supersedes
other divisions that may characterize a given blogosphere, thereby contributing to
the development of a collective activist identity.
6.2 complex modern transnational identities
Using Social Network Analysis, this thesis started with the realization that a num-
ber of actors of the Tunisian and Moroccan blogospheres active during the 2011 up-
rising had been, in fact, based in Europe. In the subsequent interviews with blog-
gers and cyberactivists of both Tunisia and Morocco, several differences emerged.
For one, at least before the 2011 uprisings, the repressive stance of the Tunisian
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state towards its population – both at home and abroad – effectively inhibited the
development of a strong diaspora consciousness. As we have seen before in the
chapter on repression, mistrust among Tunisians was wide-spread and avoided
dealing with Tunisian institutions such as embassies and consulates because they
were associated with the repressive regime. In addition, there were several activists
in exile, such as Nawaat’s Sami Ben Gharbia, who fled Tunisia in 1998 after being
persecuted as an Islamist. As he notes in his book, France was not a recommended
destination for Tunisian Islamists seeking refuge from persecution, because it was
a traditional ally to the Tunisian regime. Thus, it did not recognize their claim to
asylum and a number of them were assigned to residence, which is the reason why
Tunisian Islamists preferred to claim asylum in other countries such as the UK or
Sweden (Ben Gharbia, 2003, p. 233). There was, however, a small community of
secular political refugees, among which was, for example, the later interim pres-
ident Moncef Marzouki. Actually, Marzouki owned a website, but he used it to
publish political communiqués and did not engage with other websites or the blo-
gosphere, which in part explains why he did not appear in the network presented
in chapter 4. These well-known figures of the Tunisian opposition would regularly
gather for party meetings and conferences. However, generally speaking, the new
generation of internet activists were not interested in the opposition figures in ex-
ile, and the two worlds rarely touched. The opposition parties in exile struggled
to attract new, young militants and they rarely entertained online presences. This
split between internet activism and traditional associations was not reserved to
the community abroad. The number of associations grew considerably under Ben
Ali, in part because the regime encouraged associative life because it served as a
façade and gave the illusion of a participatory life, while the few unruly associ-
ations, such as the Women’s Democratic Association (Association Tunisienne des
Femmes Démocrates), were harassed (Hibou, 2011, p. 95). As Amira Yahyaoui, cy-
beractivist and daughter of the prominent Tunisian judge Moktar Yahyaoui points
out:
“A priori, there was a schism between the cyberactivist community and
the associations. Most cyberactivists were not engaged in normal po-
litical activism. My father was the only one engaged in both. Even
Moncef Marzouki did not debate online and was not in contact with cy-
beractivists.” (Amira Yahyaoui, personal communication, 29 December
2015)
It appears that, in the years preceding the 2011 uprising, some politicians of the
opposition in exile reached out to bloggers, who were mainly students studying
6.2 complex modern transnational identities 131
abroad, but the latter were unwilling to engage in traditional party politics. The re-
lationship between the two camps was dysfunctional at best. There was a general
feeling that the opposition had been largely ineffective, preferably churning out
one communiqué after another without any sizable effect. Sometimes, this critique
was mixed with a pinch of youthful conceit. As such, the blogger Arabasta re-
lated to me that “after having written on my blog for two years, more people were
interested in what I was writing than them, who had been in politics for fifteen
years, affiliated to parties that were largely unknown” (Arabasta, personal com-
munication, 7 July 2014). He also claims that when bloggers organized their first
real demonstration in Tunisia including demonstrations in solidarity in Paris, the
traditional opposition sought to pocket the event and imprint their own political
message on it:
“When Amira [Yahyaoui] wanted to register the demonstration here in
Paris, she realized that this had already been done by others. These
were politicized people, whereas we wanted to make it an apolitical
demonstration to be able to gather a maximum of people. They chased
us, they wanted to pocket this freshness of ours, because we knew how
to write for a young public.” (Arabasta, personal communication, 7 July
2014)
Thus the relationship between Tunisian politicians in exile and political bloggers
was difficult and there was no shared identity. Many of the most active cyberac-
tivists living abroad were exiles, such as Sami Ben Gharbia and Amira Yahyaoui,
and they were certainly amonst the most radical activists. However, another group
of very active cyberactivists was students, thus, hypothesis 3.1, which states that
exiles will be the most active among cyberactivists living abroad, can only be par-
tially confirmed. While the political reason to emigrate makes it more likely that
immigrants remain politically involved after their departure, another factor ap-
pears to be the person’s history of migration, that is whether they are the first
generation of immigrants or whether they were born abroad.
The importance of the personal history of migration is particularly palpable in
the Moroccan case, because the liberalization of its political system had caused
the return of the leftist opposition, whose leaders had fled the country, from ex-
ile. As a result, there is no sizable community of Moroccans in exile today, with
the exception of assumed atheists, who have begun to be more vocal about their
non-belief since the uprisings, notably on social network sites (Dalle, 2016).1 Thus,
1 Outspoken atheist constitute a marginal group in the Arab world, were citizens are often assumed
to be Muslims by birth by default. Those who publicly voice their non-beliefs are regularly sued.
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the Moroccan community abroad today comprises primarily economic migrants
from the 1960s, their descendants and more recent immigrants, notably students.
As a result, there is a group of Moroccans living abroad that developed a modern
diasporic identity, which also expresses itself online. Next to the existence of fo-
rums catering to the diaspora, the success of yabiladi.com, for which there is no
Tunisian equivalent, is an indicator for this development. As its founder Mohamed
Ezzouak points out, the French-language website successfully filled a niche when
it first went online in 2002. Until today, its audience is predominantly based abroad
(up to 80 percent), as much attracted by articles on political and social issues in
Morocco as by the forums and helpful guides on everyday matters. The articles
published on Yabiladi take the specific interests of Moroccans living abroad into
account. For example, the website regularly features articles on environmental is-
sues, a topic, Ezzouak explains, that resonates more with Moroccans living abroad
than with the local population, linked to the diasporic concern of the preservation
of the homeland.
As to the interest the diaspora pays to politics in their country of origin, across
both cases, I found that it is closely related the person’s history of migration. Ya-
biladi’s founder, who looks back to almost fifteen years of adapting his websites
to the needs of his diaspora audience, related to me that the first generation of im-
migration, which left the country in 1970/80s, remain very attached to Morocco’s
political landscape. This so-called ‘old generation’ is the most active group with
regards to politics on Yabiladi, reading and commenting on articles on political
events in Morocco. According to Ezzouak, they also participate at conferences in
their host countries and will join demonstrations. However, the old generation
of migrant activists did not join the blogosphere and do not actively use internet
tools to mobilize. According to one account, “the old generation is surpassed by
the events and by technology; they have developed their way of doing things a long
time ago and they struggle to adapt to new technologies” (Mohamed Y, personal
communication, 19 July 2014). Consequently, the cyberactivists I encountered were
almost exclusively middle class students or young professionals in their twenties
or early thirties, born and raised in Morocco or Tunisia. Mohamed Y confirmed
this impression, stating that these Moroccan activists typically left the country after
having completed high school or first courses at university, and their political con-
sciousness remains firmly attached to their home country. In contrast, the second
and third generations are disconnected from political questions in their supposed
Examples include the case of Jabeur Mejri, who was condemned to 7 years in prison for publishing
caricatures “insulting Islam” in 2012 (he was freed in 2014), and Kacem El Ghazzali, a Moroc-
can atheist who sought refuge in Switzerland in 2010 after receiving numerous death threats and
suffering from discrimination by agents of the Moroccan state.
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homeland – they are generally less well informed about the details in Moroccan
political life, less knowledgeable regarding political parties and politicians. Hence,
while there might have been second and third generation immigrants at demonstra-
tions in solidarity in Paris and elsewhere, the organizers derived predominantly
from the first generation of immigrants. Due to the political climate in Morocco,
they often also arrived in Paris with an activist past, thus with a completely dif-
ferent approach towards formal organizations. In fact, Mohamed X, after years of
activism in the Moroccan student union, contributed to the creation of a Parisian
branch of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH). It appears that the
liberalization of the political system in Morocco allowed Moroccan students not
only to become activists in Morocco, but to pursue their activism once they settled
abroad. This indicates that hypothesis 3.2, namely that the majority of political
diaspora bloggers in the context of severe governmental control is not affiliated
with a formal diaspora organization, is correct, although the aversion of Tunisians
to formal organizations appears not solely linked to the fear of surveillance, but
also to the perceived ineffectiveness of the political parties in exile.
While a strong attachment to the country of origin is primarily a phenomenon of
first generation immigrants, there are, of course, exceptions to the rule. For exam-
ple, there were also a few second-generation participants in the Parisian branch of
the February 20 movement in Morocco. However, the coordinator of the February
20 group in Paris pointed out that their interest in the movement seemed to be
different. Whereas the first-generation students’ priority was significant political
change in Morocco, the second generation Franco-Moroccans present at the events
were either content with the political situation in Morocco or they wanted the
country to become more conservative (Mohamed Y, personal communication, 19
July 2014). Another exception is Hasni, a French-Tunisian based in Paris, who has
both nationalities but does not speak any Arabic. His political epiphany occurred
after he finished his studies, got his first job and went for a trip to Tunisia. While
there he met a journalist who took him home and closed the shutters, at which
point Hasni realized the degree to which freedom of expression was stifled in the
country. After his return to France, he became one of the leading figures of one
of the first Tunisian political forums, TuneZine and later RéveilTunisien. However,
the early Tunisian political web also shows the limits to the construction of a dias-
poric identity. His lack of knowledge of the Arabic language, combined with the
fact that several other managers of the platform were French nationals sympathiz-
ing with the Tunisian cause, but without direct ties to the country, caused a fierce
controversy when the original manager of the website, Zouhair Yahyaoui was sen-
tenced to prison. The forum and later highly successful collective blog Nawaat
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was founded at that moment, underlining that it was “100 percent Tunisian”, al-
though it was in fact managed by Tunisians living abroad. This episode highlights
the fuzzy borders of diasporic identity, in which certain aspects such as language
seem to be non-negotiable. It also highlights a similar episode in the post-2011 Con-
stitutional assembly, when Karima Souid, a representative of the diaspora spoke
French instead of Arabic in the plenum and caused a controversy (Pouessel, 2015).
The question of belonging to a diasporic community remains complex. Some
struggle with the notion of diaspora or the terms their home countries use to cate-
gorize them, such as blogger UneMarocaine: “MRE is a label that others, notably
the administration, put on us, but I don’t mind it, I would not give it away. (. . . )
I am against choosing certain aspects of my identity. (. . . ) I am several things
at once and I want to keep this “plurality” and to enrich it as much as possible”
(Politoconaute, 2009). Others assume the label more directly by using it in the
headlines of their blogs, but for most migrant bloggers, the fact of living abroad
is not mentioned specifically. Whether a blogger resides abroad is usually only
detectable through anecdotes described in blog posts that contains clues on the
location through the mentioning of certain places or customs (TheSanae, personal
communication, 2 September 2015). Finally, the new generation of recent immi-
grants struggles with the desire to return to their countries of origin. While some
nurture a diffuse desire to return at some point in their lives, comparable to the
first generation of immigrants in the 1960s, the highly politicized are more likely
to act on it. Following the departure of Ben Ali, many of the most vocal bloggers
in exile returned to Tunisia in a bid to actively participate in the establishment of
a true democracy in the country. Nawaat, for example, was transformed into a
proper news outlet with paid staff and it also trains citizen-journalists in remote
regions of the country. Another cyberactivist, Amira Yahyaoui, co-founded a non-
governmental organization monitoring parliamentary votes and debates. While
the return of exile bloggers to Tunisia is hardly surprising, four members of the
Moroccan activist news website Mamfakinch returned to Morocco as well, enthu-
siastic to continue their political struggle on the ground.2
6.3 developing a collective identity
Did these complex transnational personal identities influence the collective identity
that evolved in the respective blogospheres? As we have seen in earlier chapters,
bloggers living abroad were active members of the blogospheres in their countries
of origin. While the crawl of the Moroccan case in chapter 4 was not appropriate
2 Another activist had to leave Morocco again due to political persecution.
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to draw conclusions about the state of the Moroccan blogosphere, my interviewees
confirmed that Moroccans living abroad were overrepresented in the part of the
Moroccan blogosphere that readily discussed political issues (Lbadikho, personal
communication, 30 August 2015). However, as we will see, political campaigns
were sporadic and the online activist sphere remained comparatively divided. As
for Tunisia, we have seen in chapter 5 that there were fights opposing political ac-
tivists living abroad to most bloggers in Tunisia proper, paralyzed in fear. The
eventual emergence of a collective-activist identity in Tunisia, which build the
groundwork for much of the 2011 uprising’s initiatives, is related to the fight
against internet censorship, that became a major rallying point for the Tunisian
political web over the years. While the issue of freedom of expression was sec-
ondary for the Tunisian population at large, it resonated deeply with bloggers as
censorship spread.
6.3.1 Tunisia’s bloggers rally for fight for freedom of expression
The collective blog Nawaat formed the hard core of the group of cyber dissidents,
developing a range of sophisticated campaigns to raise awareness about the repres-
sive nature of the Ben Ali regime. To achieve their goal of attracting the attention of
other internet users, they made eclectic use of Web 2.0 tools, using them to spread
their texts and video montages, but also for innovative campaigns that were recog-
nized to be at cutting edge of cyberactivism at that time. For example, Astrubal of
Nawaat created a video as part of a campaign calling for the boycott of the 2004
presidential elections in Tunisia, which remixed a commercial based on George
Orwell’s 1984, in which a screen showing Tunisian president Ben Ali speaking is
smashed. It has been noted that this was a particularly early example of the now
common practice to remix (Zuckerman, 2007). In 2007, the Nawaat made creative
use of interactive maps to highlight abuse of presidential power and political re-
pression. The first initiative involved the documentation of the movement of the
Tunisian Presidential plane using data from planespotter sites, revealing that Ben
Ali’s wife secretly used the Presidential airplane for her extensive shopping trips to
Europe. The second linked the location of the Tunisian prison with details about
the political prisoners’ cases and videos showing pleas from their families. The
campaigns devised by Nawaat and associates were highly innovative at the time
and made Tunisian cyberactivists widely known among their international peers,
investigative journalists, and Human Rights organizations (Zuckerman, 2007; In-
ternet.artizans, 2007). In fact, the blogger organization Global Voices contacted
Nawaat to inquire about the Prison Map which eventually led to Sami Ben Ghar-
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bia’s employment in the organization as Advocacy Director (Sami Ben Gharbia,
personal communication, 14 March 2014). This provided Sami Ben Gharbia with
an income and connected Nawaat with a network of other groups fighting for the
freedom of the Internet.
The campaigns developed by Nawaat over the years are also an example for
a durable group of committed activists in repressive surroundings. Contrary to
short-lived online campaigns such as online petitions or joining a Facebook group
that do not require co-presence, Nawaat’s projects require a level of trust that
is usually built through face-to-face contact. In this case, the internet often is
the place of first contact, but whenever possible, bloggers and cyberactivists tend
to meet physically, either privately or during so-called meet-ups of a group. As
we have seen in chapter 5, physical meetings allowed bloggers inside Tunisia to
overcome the fear of repression through the realization that a group of like-minded
people existed concretely. One prominent example of the importance of strong
relationships for an activist group to persevere over time is Nawaat. This tightly
knit group of four activists based abroad, assembling Sami Ben Gharbia, Riadh
Guerfali (Astrubal) and his brother Sofiene (Centrist) as well as Malek Khadraoui (El
Ansari), were at the center of most Tunisian online campaigns.3 Sami and Sofiene
knew each other personally, and thus by extension Sami knew his brother Riadh,
for a long time before launching the collective blog. Riadh points out that choice of
alliances mattered greatly in the activist sphere. Often, he says, groups like Nawaat
experience infighting and schisms due to the strong egos of the persons involved.
The members of the group overcame occasional fights because of great mutual
respect, knowing that the reason for the fight was the issue at hand and that it was
not personal (Riadh Guerfali, personal communication, October 14, 2014). Thus,
while strong relationships between participants are less important for a one-off
online protest, protracted collaborations are more likely to emerge around a core
group of long-term, dedicated activists that trust each other. According to Riadh
Guerfali,
“Good working relationships are greatly enabled by personal contact.
The internet does not replace this, on the contrary, it facilitates it. Hu-
man, physical relationships are absolutely indispensable.” (Riadh Guer-
fali, personal communication, October 14, 2014)
While freedom of expression was an important issue for this group of political
bloggers, it was by far not the only one. Instead, online censorship was seen as
3 The team also included Mistral and Radical at the beginning.
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one facet of a generally repressive regime, to which they sought to attract atten-
tion, not only amongst Tunisians, but also among international public. For exam-
ple, they seized events during which the attention of the international community
was focused on Tunisia to highlight the repressive nature of the regime when
they launched the online campaign Yezzi Fock Ben Ali! (it translates as “Enough is
enough, Ben Ali! ” in Tunisian dialect) on the occasion of the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005. It aimed at
raising awareness on the state of Internet censorship in the country, directing inter-
national attention to the fact that the United Nations had chosen a very unsuitable
place to hold the second phase of the WSIS. To reach this goal, the “Tunisian Asso-
ciation for the Defense of Cyberspace” (ATPD) was created, assembling a group of
sixteen cyberactivists out of which at least eleven were based abroad, among them,
Nawaat’s co-founders Ben Gharbia and Guerfali.
Yezzi did not culminate in events on the ground, but in a virtual demonstra-
tion. Individuals were called to send in pictures of themselves carrying the slogan
“Yezzi!” written for example on a placard held by hand or added to the photo using
editing software. Also, they called upon Tunisian websites and blogs to show their
solidarity by inserting a logo. Many of the roughly hundred demonstrators shown
on the site on the day of its launch chose to mask their face to remain anonymous.
Despite the fact that the website was blocked inside Tunisia eighteen hours after
its launch, the campaign was considered a success since, according to the group,
the number of page views rose to a peak of nearly 14,000 connections per day after
being only four days online (Nawaat, 2005). After this period, the website was
hacked and its content completely erased. The campaign was subsequently moved
to Facebook to tap into its growing user base as well as to protect it from future
hacks (Ben Gharbia, 2010).
This relatively high number of pageviews was achieved in part because the
group had placed ads through the search engine Google, advertising their cam-
paign for a list of keywords related to searches on the WSIS and the situation of
freedoms in Tunisia (Nawaat, 2005). The ads were displayed a total of 170,363 times
during the ten days around the summit (12-22 November 2005), with adwords
displayed on websites relying on income from Google advertisement, including
Tunisian news magazines. This strategy succeeded in attracting attention of inter-
national media like CNN Arabic and Al Jazeera (Al-Jazeera, 2005). The campaign
was also highly publicized on Tunisian association sites, websites of oppositional
political parties and blogs. In the years that followed, Yezzi was heralded as the
first successful campaign against internet censorship and for freedom of expres-
sion in Tunisia. The slogan, close to Egypt’s “Kefaya”, although not as ubiquitous,
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endured over the years and was revived during the 2011 uprisings. The campaign
has been credited among one of the first signs of transgression that ultimately
incited the Tunisian revolution, figuring among its origin stories (Chomiak, 2014,
p. 23).
The Yezzi campaign is an example for the kind of creative and confrontational
campaign that was favored by the highly-politicized strand of the Tunisian blogo-
sphere. For this group of activists, the censorship of their websites by the regime
was a nuisance, but ultimately it proved to them that they relevant. Many of them
apparently saw it as a badge of honor, thus they would quite literally display this
information clearly visible on their main page. However, others were opposed to
the provocative tone these activists adopted. In fact, the initial conflict between
activists based abroad keen to address the issue of censorship full frontal with
bloggers living in Tunisia afraid to speak their mind out of fear of repression sub-
sided, to be replaced by a struggle over the choice of the most appropriate strategy
to attract the support of the apolitical. A group of cyberactivists, living both in
Tunisia and abroad, was concerned that the impact of websites offering a funda-
mental critique of the Tunisian regime would be limited, given the high likelihood
of censorship this strategy entailed. If a political website was censored, it lost
its chance to attract a diverse readership because it would be unreachable from
Tunisia unless the users used a proxy. However, those using proxies can be consid-
ered to be already in defiance with the government, thus writing about politics on
a censored website was the equivalent to preaching to the choir.
The group devised a strategy to overcome this problem was to moderate their
discourse, or what they called “the middle ground approach”, consisting of blog-
gers engaging with political issues, emphasizing the importance of human rights,
and freedom of expression, while at the same time not challenging Ben Ali’s regime
in a frontal way, could avoid censorship and thereby remain accessible to the unini-
tiated who did not use technical tools to circumvent the regime’s online censorship
(Tarek Kahlaoui, personal communication, 23 May, 2015). The schism between
moderates and openly critical bloggers also conditioned the kind of cyberactivist
campaigns that would emerge. The moderates focused on the fight against on-
line censorship, such as “Je blogue pour la liberté d’expression” (I’m blogging
for freedom of expression) in July 2007 and “la journée nationale pour la liberté
d’expression” (National Day for Freedom of Expression), which was scheduled
to coincide with a court hearing for a trial initiated by the blogger Zied El Heni
against the Tunisian Internet Agency for having temporarily blocked Facebook
(Ben Mhenni, 2008). Following the public outcry, the Tunisian reversed its decision
to block the social network and opted to block individual profile pages instead.
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Other online actions in the early days included Blank Post days on 25 December
2006 and on 25 December 2007 (Ben Gharbia, 2008). Eventually, in December 2008,
a dozen Tunisian bloggers, including Lina ben Mhenni and Sofiane Chourabi, cre-
ated a collective website promoting free speech, the “Network of Tunisian Bloggers
for Free Blogging,” with the number of contributors doubling in 2009, even though
enthusiasm dwindled in early 2010.4 It was here that the meme5 of “Ammar 404”
emerged, in reference to the false “404 File not found” concealing the actual “403
Access Forbidden” displayed on blocked websites. However, the campaigns failed
to attract a major following since censorship only concerned a minority of primar-
ily political bloggers.
The eventual radicalization of the moderates
Eventually, the radicalization of the moderates would be driven by a massive cen-
sorship campaign that hit the Tunisian web in April 2010. As we have seen in
previous chapters, censorship was not new to Tunisia, however contrary to previ-
ous waves of censorship it now affected more mainstream websites. In addition to
a growing number of blocked blogs, the Tunisian censors added new video share
websites to its blacklist, as well as popular websites like the photo sharing portal
Flickr. According to the blogger Lina Ben Mhenni
“past campaigns against censorship were mainly sponsored by elite
politicians and rights activists as the blocking was mainly directed at
political and news websites, but it has now moved to websites that have
nothing to do with politics, including photo, video, and music shar-
ing websites, cooking websites, and even those dealing with arts and
theatre.” (Dbara, 2010)
The outrage at the extend of Internet censorship induced a group of cyberac-
tivists to plan an anti-censorship demonstration, called “une manifestation rélle
pour une liberté virtuelle” (“a real protest for virtual freedom”) or “Nhar 3la
3mmar” (the day against Ammar), in Tunis on 22 May 2010. In fact, the event was
conceived by activists living abroad, notably Amira Yahyaoui, but also Arabasta
and Tarek Kahlaoui. The challenge was to organize an activity in Tunisia itself
while they themselves were out of the country. They were aware of the irony that
they were rallying for something to be done without being actually capable of do-
ing anything, thus necessitating to “co-opt people who will risk going to prison
for us” (Amira Yahyaoui, personal communication, 29 December 2015).
4 http://yatounes.blogspot.it/
5 An Internet meme is a short phrase, picture, or combination of both spread through the Internet,
for example via message boards or social networking services like Facebook.
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In addition to the demonstration in Tunis, simultaneous protests in solidarity
were planned at Tunisian embassies in Paris, Brussels, Bonn, Montreal and at the
Mission to the UN in New York. In order to appeal to the average Tunisian citizen
afraid to talk about political issues, the event was declared apolitical with the
only demand being the abolition of Internet censorship and the unblocking of all
censored websites. In addition, to achieve the legality of the protest, two bloggers6
volunteered to file an official “declaration of gathering” in Tunis, however the
authorities declined to accept their declaration in person or by mail (Malek404,
2010). According to fellow blogger Azyz Amami, besides being willing to put
themselves in the line of the regime, as middle-class university-educated engineers
with children, they also embodied the success story of social rise through education
promoted by the Ben Ali regime, making their revolt and spearheading of the
protest even more shocking (Azyz Amami, personal communication, 26 May 2015).
A few days before the demonstration, a Facebook group called “Ce Samedi, je
m’habille en blanc et je vais prendre un café sur l’Avenue!” announced that all
those willing to express their solidarity but afraid to demonstrate openly were
invited to drink a coffee in one of the numerous coffee shops on Avenue Bourguiba.
The day before the announced demonstration, the bloggers were summoned to the
Ministry of Interior, held for several hours, and told to call off the rally. The next
day, a ten to fifteen people in white t-shirts succeeded to reach the city center,
which was blocked by a reinforced police guard patrolling Avenue Bourguiba and
surrounding streets (Associated Press, 2010). Tarek Kalahoui, who was active in
the student movement before leaving the country to study in the United States,
assessed the success of the event as follows:
“May 22 was not as we planned it, but it was also not worse that what
we might have feared. (. . . ) Regular people went, put on white shirts
and went to Bourguiba. It was surprising for us. When I was in the stu-
dent movement, we would be suppressed when we did street demon-
strations even inside the university. The moment we tried go outside
university, the police would go crazy. I was arrested at least two times
in the 1990s because we tried to move the street demonstrations out-
side of campus. To go to the streets was a red line for Ben Ali and his
regime.” (Tarek Kahlaoui, personal communication, 23 May, 2015)
The demonstration did not prove an immediate success, and besides the fear of
repression, one of the reasons that not more people took to the streets is most likely
6 Slim Amamou and Yassine Ayari, assisted by Lina Ben Mhenni and Azyz Amami
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that the fight for freedom of expression did not rank as high on their list of priori-
ties than for the bloggers. An indicator for these different priorities are the slogans
used later in the 2011 uprisings, most notably “work, freedom, national dignity”
(’shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniya’), in which the lack of employment and thus pri-
mary needs rank first, even though the desire for freedom and a life in dignity are
present as well. Thus, even if the object of the protest might not have resonated
as strongly with the general population as it did with bloggers, the implications
of the event for the cyberactivist sphere were substantial. In fact, the “Nhar 3la
3mmar” protest was the first campaign that congregated the moderate and the
outspoken activists. For Arabasta, who had participated in the organization of the
events from abroad, it was a major breaking point:
“For me, it was the first step, the first time that we moved from the
internet to the streets. It was the breaking point that the internet could
have an impact on real life, on politics. While I think it had no effect on
the regime itself, it was important to us, it was a sign of hope that we
could change something.” (Arabasta, personal communication, 7 July
2014)
This alliance would endure, forging a community comprised of activist bloggers
in Tunisia and beyond. The events created a new collective identity of Tunisian
cyberactivists, which surpassed the previous fault lines between moderates and
radicals, between Tunisians abroad and in the country. The tools and personal
connections established during the May demonstration were used again during the
summer, when local activists and Tunisians living abroad on vacation in Tunisia
attempted to stage a so-called flashmob in the tourist village of Sidi Bousaid, which
was preempted by the authorities. These protracted activities laid the structures
that would prove useful during the subsequent uprisings in December 2010.
The road paved for the 2011 uprisings
On 17 December 2010, revolts broke out following the self-immolation of twenty-
six-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi in the remote town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December
2010, and they rapidly spread to other deprived cities in the South before reaching
the capital Tunis on 26 December. While the revolt in Sidi Bouzid were sponta-
neous, they were characterized by a level of organisation and sophistication which
indicate the dedication of those involved. In fact, the local sections of the Tunisian
union UGTT played an important role in organizing the protests in the Tunisian
south, notably during the 2008 uprising in Gafsa (Arieff, 2011, p. 13), and their ac-
tivists helped organize the protests in Sidi Bouzid and in other cities as well. Self-
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immolations had been increasingly common over the last years in Tunisia, thus the
main novelty of was that locals found a way to break through the media blackout
(Hmed, 2012). The extensive spread of the videos on social media sites was in-
strumental in mobilizing for protests throughout the country. This indispensable
street activism was complemented online on platforms like Facebook, where the
story of Bouazizi’s self-immolation was told. Ironically, the Tunisian government’s
extensive censorship campaign had resulted in the centralization of the country’s
social media ecosystem. Unlike dedicated video sharing site like YouTube or Daily
Motion and others, Facebook was not censored in Tunisia, thus Tunisian internet
users flocked to this website to watch and share videos. It is here that a number of
activists started to share videos and eye-witness accounts recorded on cellphones
on Facebook. The sharing of these rather unusual photos and videos – notably
showing police forces shooting on protesters – unleashed a virtuous circle among
regular Tunisian Facebook users who usually would not share this kind of mate-
rial. According to Mohamed-Ali Razgallah, who was not politically active neither
on- or offline before the uprisings but joined a group of cyberactivists after the fall
of Ben Ali, in this gradual process, the wall of fear was broken by the activists first,
who subsequently emboldened regular Facebook users like himself, following the
logic of “they cannot put everybody in prison, and if they come for me, so what”
(Mohamed-Ali Razgallah, personal communication, 11 October 2014).
While the regime had succeeded in containing the flow of information in 2008,
this time it was unable to do so. Personal relationships between bloggers built in
the year preceding the uprisings had been fostered through their first open chal-
lenge to the regime in the organization of the “real demonstration for a virtual
freedom”. This had created a durable network of activists who were ready to use
their communication skills to help spread the information at home and abroad.
When the police cut off all communication lines to the town, these videos were
transported using USB drives. The spread of information was greatly helped by
the fact that the blogger Azyz Amami, who had been active during the May 2010
protest, was originally from Sidi Bouzid and received regular updates and videos
from friends and family on the ground. He passed on the information to his net-
work of activists, such as the well-connected blogger Slim Amamou (Azyz Amami,
personal communication, 26 May 2015). Subsequently, other bloggers like Sofiane
Chourabi and Lina Ben Mhenni went to the regions to report on the protests taking
place. So even if most of their blogs were blocked in Tunisia – and thus inacces-
sible to the average Tunisian Internet user – their experience in citizen journalism
acquired over the years, coupled with the distributional power of social networks,
made their contribution extremely valuable. Finally, in an attempt to win the
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“information warfare”, that is to gather the attention of international mainstream
media, the Nawaat activists, based abroad, assembled all the photos and videos
available online in one place and translated online footage in Tunisia’s dialect into
standard Arabic, French and English for TV channels like Radio France Interna-
tionale, France24 and Al Jazeera (Della Ratta and Valeriani, 2012). Notably the
latter, barred from opening a bureau in Tunisia by the regime, gave significant
airtime to the protest relying on online material they received through a Face-
book group linking activists on the ground with journalists working for Al-Jazeera
(Tarek Kahlaoui, personal communication, 23 May 2015) as well as through Nawaat
(Zuckerman, 2011).
Morocco’s fragmentation
Compared to Tunisia’s highly repressive censorship regime, access to the internet
has been rather liberal in Morocco until the February 20 movement emerged in
2011. There was a liberty of tone unprecedented in the Arab World, which ex-
plains why the Moroccan blogosphere produced several political campaigns over
the years. These were occasionally in reaction to governmental action, such as the
We are the 9 percent campaign in response to the censorship of the magazine Tel
Quel that had dared to publish a poll on the satisfaction of Moroccan subjects with
the reign of their king Mohamed VI. While 91 percent declared to be happy with
his reign, the mere publication of a poll on such a matter was judged inadmis-
sible by the regime, hence it was pulled from the newsstands. Other initiatives
were standalone campaigns, such as Bla Francia (which translates into “without
French”), an initiative seeking to promote the use of the Arabic language online.
Another campaign sought to increase participation in the legislative elections in
2007, provoking a major debate between potential voters and partisans of a boycott.
Questions of the social and economic development of the country were controver-
sially discussed as well, for example the project to install a high-speed train at great
expense in a developing country, as well as the dire state of the education system
in Morocco, with a petition gathering several hundred signatures. Finally, a few
dozens of people launched the secularist Mouvement alternatif pour les libertés in-
dividuelles (MALI) calling for freedom of religion (and most notably the freedom
from religion), amongst others by calling for a public break-fast during the day in
holy month of Ramadan, however, in the end, more policemen “attended” than
activists (Goebel, 2010).
Thus, there was a great variety of political campaigns in Morocco that originated
online. However, for the most part participation in them was confined to a small
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minority of activists. However, in contrast to Tunisia the Moroccan mainstream
media occasionally took up discussions and protests of the blogosphere, enlarg-
ing the echo chamber and contributing to what the blogosphere considers as its
greatest successes. One of these campaigns was the so-called Sniper of Targuist in
2007, which tackled the issue of police abuse and corruption. In the small town of
Targuist in the north of Morocco, an anonymous person made videos showing po-
licemen and gendarmerie taking bribes and published them on the video platform
YouTube. It was the first campaign that has serious repercussions, because after
mainstream media took up the story, the gendarmerie arrested and pursued sev-
eral of its agents (Bensalah, 2012, p. 104). However, the state also conducted a bru-
tal search to find the activists behind the Targuist Sniper videos and four witnesses
faced charges of humiliation of the police institution (Ben Gharbia, 2007). The Bl-
ogoma also set up campaigns to protest against censorship when several websites,
most notably Google Earth, but also YouTube and several Islamist websites were
blocked. The resulting uproar led to traditional media reporting on the issue, ac-
cording to Mohamed Drissi Bakhkhat, who previously blogged at MoTIC, “the
unprecedented reaction throughout the Moroccan blogosphere [on censorship] in-
spired many articles in almost all of the Moroccan independent press, [as well as
in], the two most popular Moroccan newspapers” (Ben Gharbia, 2007).
As we have seen in chapter 5, the physical persecution of bloggers such as the
case of Fouad Mourtada, sentenced to prison in 2008 for creating a fake Facebook
profile of the Moroccan king’s brother, did make an impression on bloggers, no-
tably on Drissi Bakhkhat, who stopped blogging altogether. Subsequently, there
were other cases, such as Mohamed Erraji only a few months later, who was con-
demned to two years in prison for an article criticizing the practice of King Mo-
hamed VI to grant favors such as concessions to run a taxi at will, published on
the information website Hespress.7 On these occasions, Moroccan bloggers would
react on their blogs, discussing the issue at hand and denouncing the overreach.
Support committees set up websites to rally support, such as www.helpfouad.com,
proposing to visitors to sign a petition calling for Mourtada’s release. They would
also adopt forms of protest similar to the ones used in Tunisia, such as the blog
strike. Often, mobilizations would take the form of one-off initiatives initiated by
individuals. For example, in the Mourtada case, the francophone blogger Larbi
would publish pictures with support messages similar to the Yezzi campaign on
his own blog, writing “If you would like to show your support and solidarity,
wherever you are, please take a picture of yourself with a sign that includes your
message of solidarity with Fouad” (Larbi, 2008). Thus, similar to the Tunisian case,
7 His sentence was later acquitted by the court of appeal due to a form error.
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the fight against censorship would ignite the Moroccan blogosphere most effec-
tively, and after the first cases, the most politically active bloggers formed a loose,
informal group. Whenever a new case emerged, an email would be send among
a group of bloggers who would usually intervene to plan the protest (Lbadikho,
personal communication, 30 August 2015). However, it must be stressed that the
reactions to these cases were not unanimous across the blogosphere. The divisions
of the Blogoma operated on two different dimensions, that is on a linguistic and
on a political level.
On the one hand, there was relatively little interaction between the French-
language and the Arabic-language clusters of the Blogoma, and it bears reminding
that in addition to these groups, there are even smaller groups such as the Amaz-
ingh community, as well as the Hispanophone community. Indeed, as we have
already seen in the chapter 4, the Moroccan blogosphere was characterized by a
much greater linguistic diversity due to historical legacies, which led to a great
fragmentation along these language divisions. In fact, whereas the use of French
is very common in Tunisia, it is much less so in Morocco: according to the 2010
report of the Francophonie, 64 percent in Tunisia know how to speak and write
French, compared to only 32 percent of the Moroccan population, (Francophonie,
2010, p. 11, 14). The language used in written communication also reflects socio-
economic realities of the Moroccan society. In Morocco, French, together with Clas-
sical Arabic, remains the language of education, administration and business. It is
associated with middle and upper class urban classes (Ennaji, 2005, p. 103). At the
high time of the blogosphere, whose transition to other platforms coincided with
the 2011 uprisings, many Francophones perceived writing Arabic on a computer
as particularly cumbersome, as many computers had keyboards with only Latin
characters. The popularization of smartphones made writing Arabic much easier.
This difficulty to write Arabic did not impede reading Arabic-language blogs, of
course, but it encumbered commenting on the articles, which is the life-blood of
any blogosphere (Politiconaute, personal communication, 26 October 2015).
In addition to these linguistic concerns, the Arabic and the French-language Bl-
ogoma had different political tendencies. A study based on research in 2007-2009
suggests that Arabic language bloggers were less likely to discuss the Mourtada
and Erraji case, and are also more politically and religiously conservative (Robin-
son and Parmentier, 2014, p. 195). This religious conservatism finds its online
expression in the continuous use of forums, which are otherwise obsolete, such
as Mumtadayait, the forum of the members of the Moroccan Islamist association
Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality). Similarly, my interviewees stressed
that the general tendency in Francophone Blogoma was more liberal, even though
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there were conservative voices here as well. For example, some bloggers rejected
the strike when Erraji was arrested, suggesting that Erraji had gone too far and
that despite the rather open climate in terms of freedom of expression in Mo-
rocco, it was not an absolute right (El Ferdaous, 2008), and there have been Fran-
cophones openly critical to the 2011 February 20 movement (most prominently
Citoyen Hmida).
In addition to these linguistic and political divisions, the Moroccan blogosphere
was not a primary locus of political activism, but even in its most political layers
rather a meeting point for political critics and commentaries. The logic of personal
diary prevailed, political initiatives derived from this personal approach and inter-
est in a given topic and not from a logic of a collective mobilization (Politiconaute,
personal communication, 26 October 2015). The initially very personal outlook of
many Moroccan blogs can be exemplified at the title of the well-known franco-
phone blog Moi, dans tous mes états (Me, in all my states) by the engineer Mounir
Bensalah, before he changed to a more general title with Des maux à dire, Regards
sur l’humanité. As Moroccan blogger and co-founder of Mamfakinch Lbadikho ex-
plains the relative inertia of the Moroccan blogosphere with its relative freedom,
especially compared with Tunisia. It was rarely censored, when its bloggers were
arrested they were swiftly freed, thus by and large the Moroccan was a lightly
persecuted blogosphere. As a result, Moroccan bloggers did not acquire the same
political savviness, technical maturity and creativity than their Tunisian colleagues
simply because it was not necessary. However, there was an awareness amongst the
more politically inclined bloggers that the separate spheres of Morocco’s various
blogospheres needed a common platform to discuss subjects of common interest.
Thus, Talk Morocco was born in December 2009, founded by cyberactivists Hisham
Almiraat and Jillian C. York, who had previously covered the Blogoma for Global
Voices Online, in a bid to united the fragmented Moroccan blogosphere. It was
conceived as a forum to concentrate the debates of the various strands of Moroc-
can blogosphere by encouraging bloggers of all languages to express themselves
on a pre-defined political theme every other month, contributing to “enlightened
& free discussions on what matters” (according to the website’s subtitle). Interest-
ingly, it also explicitly mentions the diaspora as one of the actors in the Moroccan
blogosphere (Almiraat, 2009). Over the months of 2010, subjects such as the dys-
functional freedom of the press in the country, the place of women in Moroccan
society, what constitutes modern Moroccan identity and red tape in the Moroc-
can bureaucracy. While the impact of Talk Morocco on the Moroccan blogosphere
as a whole is a matter of debate, it was the rallying point for cyberactivists the
Moroccan blogosphere was missing until that point. It also received acclaim in-
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ternationally, winning the prestigious 2010 Deutsche Welle Best of Blogs Award
for Best English-language blog. More important, however, where the relationships
formed through the initiative, which were going to lead to the creation of Mamfak-
inch, one-stop website catering to the entire blogosphere, in the wake of the Arab
uprisings.
Creating a one-stop Moroccan citizen media
As for Morocco, the regional dynamic clearly informed its actions in 2011, even
though the origins of the Moroccan movement preceded the events in Tunisia
and Egypt. The impetus to form a Moroccan protest movement in 2011 emerged
from several parallel initiatives. On the one hand, a number of bloggers, inspired
by their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, rallied behind a call for extensive
political reforms. The blogger Mounir Bensalah published a petition calling for
democratic reforms in Morocco, on a petition platform. The call initially gathered
32 signatories, mainly bloggers, leftists and human rights activists, which were
followed by 139 others who signed up using the petition website. The demands
centred on the archival of full citizenship, decrying the stalled democratization pro-
cess, rampant nepotism, the king’s omnipotence and Morocco’s rent economy. The
demands were controversial in their direct naming of contentious issues, several
activists who would later emerge as vocal activists of the 20 February movement
retroactively withdrew their signatures (Bensalah, 2012, p. 126). In addition to this
online initiative, the impetus to create a Moroccan protest movement in the wake of
the Arab Spring emerged after the same activists, who coordinated through a Face-
book group, repeatedly met at sit-ins organized in solidarity with the movement
in Egypt in front of the embassy in Rabat (Hamza Mahfoud, personal communi-
cation, 23 December 2014). The repression of these sit-ins induced the activists
present to develop a campaign advocating a more democratic and equal Morocco.
One aspect that set the Moroccan movement apart from its counterpart in Tunisia
was the role played by traditional civil society organizations. In Tunisia, the rank
and file of the country’s union UGTT were actively engaged in the uprisings, but
the leaders of the union UGTT hesitated to embrace the revolts and the country’s
formerly proud human rights organizations were in shambles. In Morocco, how-
ever, a first press conference of the February 20 movement was held at the office
of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in Rabat. The February
20 Movement had a strong internet component. Local events were mainly orga-
nized via Facebook groups, with one general page for the movement as a whole,
complemented by pages coordinating the protest events in the various cities. The
main group, whose number of subscribers rose to 20,000 by February 20th (Rah-
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man, 2012, p. 6), made an effort to reflect the country’s linguistic diversity on
the page and in the videos it used to mobilize for the demonstrations. However,
the Moroccan press close to the regime attempted to suppress the movement by
reporting leading smear campaigns against its organizers and subsequently report-
ing low attendance of protests. Thus, for the largest demonstration in front of the
Parliament in the capital, the organizers claimed a turnout of 20,000 protesters,
Associated Press reported 3,000 to 5,000, while the Moroccan news agency MAP
reported a “weak turnout” of 2,000 (Alaoui, 2011). At this point, the more ex-
perienced cyberactivists, notably TalkMorocco’s Hisham Almiraat and Lbadikho,
launched the website Mamfakinch (meaning “we will never give up”), to create a
medial counterweight, aggregating the content produced by the various branches
of the movement. Theirs is another example for the importance of strong personal
relationships in long-term cyberactivist initiatives. Actually, plans to launch such a
website, explicitly taking Nawaat as a model, was discussed among the bloggers of
the English-language platform Talk Morocco for half a year, starting in June 2010.
Mamfakinch thus emerged from a group of bloggers who already knew each other
from prior collaborations and in many cases had met personally. In fact, Hisham
Almiraat proposed the project to fellow blogger Lbadikho during a visit.
We were frustrated by the reactivity of the media, but also by the ac-
tivists and human rights associations, who used the internet in a rather
ineffective way, publishing their press releases here and there, so we
needed a one-stop alternative media outlet. Mamfakinch did not call
for demonstrations, but it was designed to be a powerful media weapon.
(Lbadikho, personal communication, 30 August 2015)
For the founders of Mamfakinch, Tunisia’s Nawaat served as a direct model, and
they adopted some of the same tools on the same platforms, such as raw news feed.
The initiators subsequently made the deliberate choice to recruit widely, forming
a team composed of long-time militants for Moroccan Human Rights associations
alongside a number of bloggers to ensure close contact with the associations in-
volved on the ground. At first, Mamfakinch’s members were mainly based abroad,
but soon activists in Morocco proper were included to collect information on the
ground.
According to members of Mamfakinch I interviewed, living the mobilizations
from abroad was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the fact of being re-
moved from the action was personally dissatisfactory, so whenever they could
afford it, activists would travel to Morocco to personally attend a demonstration
and to contribute to the mobilization effort on the ground. On the other hand,
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being removed from the action was advantageous to their work. The work on the
ground in Morocco was very time consuming, and eventually better carried out by
activists engrained in the local communities.
Being at a distance was important because it allows you not to be too
preoccupied by the preparation of press releases, or by what happens
on the ground. (...) Being here allowed us to take the time to cover the
protests, to aggregate information, to do things properly and to take a
step back. It was important to have one part abroad and one part in
Morocco. (Mohamed X, personal communication, 10 July 2014)
Being in Western countries, on the other hand, insured a good internet connec-
tion, which often was not the case for local activists. Thus, finding and aggregat-
ing videos from the various places all over the country was more efficiently done
from abroad (Lbadikho, personal communication, 30 August 2015). Many activists
invested themselves heavily, putting other parts of their lives aside, such as Mo-
hamed X, who admits “honestly, during one year of my doctoral thesis, I didn’t do
anything, I wasted, I dedicated one year of my thesis to activism and Mamfakinch”
(Mohamed X, personal communication, 10 July 2014).
As to whether the fact that its initiators lived abroad was problematic for ac-
tivists in Morocco proper, Mounir Bensalah, who was part of the redaction com-
mittee, was very pragmatic about it, saying “we needed to create a citizen-oriented
media, whether people were based in Morocco or Stockholm did not matter, the
internet solved that problem.” (Mounir Bensalah, personal communication, 10
September 2015)
The track record of Mamfakinch was mixed. According to the members’ ac-
counts, the website exceeded their expectations in terms of audience, effectively
allowing the public to verify the authenticity of the news broadcast by the main-
stream media and to find the information spread over various social media chan-
nels in one place, providing a balance account of the events and scope, “more
objective than the Ministry of the Interior’s estimates and less enthusiastic than
the allegations of demonstrators” (Mamfakinch, 2014). Their biggest success was a
number of articles that were subsequently picked up by traditional media outlets.
Also, Mamfakinch played a major role in the disclosure of the GPS coordinates of
an infamous detention center near Rabat in May 2011. This disclosure provoked
a popular march onto this detention center, which was the first march violently
repressed by the security services. However, Morocco’s linguistic diversity con-
tinued to be a challenge. As Lbadikho admits, due to the activists’ careers and
francophone daily life, they were not used to writing in Arabic. Thus, oftentimes
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the content they relayed through their channels were in Arabic, but the title would
be written in French, “which kills everything in terms of audience.” For him, this
is not a detail, because it influenced to what extend an article was shared.
6.4 conclusion
Cyberactivists and bloggers played an important role during the 2011 mobiliza-
tions in Tunisia and Morocco, both by collecting information on the ground and
subsequently processing and distributing it online. Cyberactivists abroad per-
formed a distinct function within the community because their location provided
them with better technical means as well as the distance allowing them to devote
their time efficiently to the “information warfare”. Also, their experience accumu-
lated over the years enabled them to adopt sophisticated communication strategies,
helping to channel the information to a national and an international audience
more efficiently than their peers in their countries of origin.
Contrary to the narrative of the spontaneity of the protest and the internet as a
silver bullet to topple dictators, these initiatives emerged from groups of bloggers
and cyberactivists who had collaborated repeatedly over the years, characterized
by a distinct group consciousness. The formation of this collective identity was not
an inevitable process, given that blogging served primarily as echo chambers for
intimist writings in both cases. The group identity that eventually emerged was,
however, distinctively non-diasporic, even though much of the most political blogs
were written by bloggers based abroad. The majority of activists based abroad
were either students or political exiles such as Sami Ben Gharbia, the co-founder
of the platform Nawaat, confirming hypothesis 3.1, namely that exiles will be the
most active among cyberactivists living abroad.
The comparison between the Tunisian and the Moroccan case highlights how the
severity of governmental control influences whether activists decide to be affiliated
with a formal diaspora organization. Whereas the contacts of Tunisian cyberac-
tivists with formal organisations were sparse, Moroccan students created offshoots
of Moroccan Human Rights organizations abroad. This contrasting behaviour con-
firms hypothesis 3.2, namely that the majority of political diaspora bloggers in
the context of severe governmental control is not affiliated with a formal diaspora
organization. Furthermore, the development of a strong activist identity also indi-
cates that cyberactivists living abroad engaged in political action directed at their
home societies downplayed the fact that they lived abroad (hypothesis 4.1). How-
ever, given that they were, for the most part, either students or political exiles, it
remains an open question whether they actually had a strong diasporic identity
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to begin with. It seems more likely that their recent immigration history explains
their strong attachment to their home country’s politics.
Finally, even when bloggers are politically inclined, in a relatively open climate
numerous political initiatives can emerge without having a larger impact. While
campaigns originating online face problems of passing over to the streets and find-
ing approval among the larger population anywhere, the linguistic and political
stratification of the Moroccan blogosphere proved a challenge to gather support
even among bloggers alone. Concurrently, in both countries bloggers started to
converge, in Morocco due to a deliberate initiative to create a forum for political
debates, whereas in the case of Tunisia, it was the intensification of censorship cou-
pled with its increasingly indiscriminate targeting that provided the community of
bloggers with a common enemy, creating a sense of solidarity unseen before, bridg-
ing prior divides between radical activists and moderates. While the protest of 22
May 2010 was not important in numerical terms, it served as a dress rehearsal for
the social mobilizations later that year, during which cyberactivists applied their
writing, reporting and communication skills honed over time. Within these in-
creasingly politically conscious communities, bloggers living abroad took actively
part, and especially during the 2011 uprising, performed an important role as co-
ordinators of the concentrated dissemination of information online. These groups,
comprised of students and young professionals in Morocco, and of students and
activists in exile in the Tunisian case, performed tasks that were otherwise more
difficult to perform inside the country, following a logic of division of labour. Their
contribution was viewed as an organic part of the mobilization effort, benefiting
from better technological means at their disposal as well as the possibility to ded-
icate themselves fully to the cause because they were either full-time activists or
students that could defer their studies.
7
C O N C L U S I O N
7.1 findings
In this thesis I carried out a comparison between the Tunisian and the Moroccan
online activist sphere in the years preceding and during the 2011 uprising with a
particular focus on bloggers and activists based abroad, taking into account the in-
fluence of repression and collective identity. In this concluding chapter, I integrate
and evaluate the main findings of the study. In order to explain the 2011 uprisings
in Tunisia and Morocco and the nature of the participation of cyberactivists abroad,
this thesis relies primarily on concepts and theories developed in the literature on
contentious politics, but also draws on the literature on cyber activism and polit-
ical engagement of migrants. Given the authoritarian nature of both states, the
concept of political opportunity structures was used to elucidate how exogenous
factors such as the threat of repression structure the strategic choices actors make.
In these authoritarian regimes, the internet can serve as a free space allowing neti-
zens to temporarily evade the control of the state. Whereas the literature on social
movements focuses primarily on how the internet empowers non-governmental
organizations to scale up their mobilization efforts by providing a low-cost, ef-
ficient organizational and communication tool, this thesis focuses on campaigns
and movements that originate online. In this context, underlying structures and
hierarchies, the impact of repression on political opportunity structures as well as
the development of collective identities were analyzed.
The weblink analysis in chapter four revealed that migrants were among the
leading figures in both the Moroccan and the Tunisian blogospheres, although the
networks differ in terms of structures and connectivity. In the context of great di-
visions along language lines, an engineer living in France was the undisputed
leading voice in the French-language part of the Blogoma. The platform Talk
Morocco was designed to overcome the polycentric nature of the Moroccan blo-
gosphere, and while it was not an authority in the presented graphs, its influence
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grew over time and generated long-lasting collaborations amongst politicized blog-
gers. In a densely and more evenly connected Tunisian network, the most widely
referenced blogger was based in Tunisia while the majority of bloggers with com-
parable authority were based abroad. Tunisian migrant bloggers were particularly
overrepresented in the subcluster of blogs and portals dedicated to politics. The
presence of such a subcluster attests to the dedication of activists to use the inter-
net as a means to protest against the Ben Ali regime in general and its internet
censorship in particular. The very fact that the political websites form a distinct
subcluster indicates that Tunisian cyberactivists used their blogs to spread their
political messages and to connect to like-minded people, while their connections
to the general blogosphere via certain bridge bloggers implies that they succeeded
in attracting the attention and support of a number of less politicized bloggers.
Finally, the statistical analysis confirmed my hypothesis that age is a significant
factor to predict the number of inlinks a blog or website receives. However, it also
found that the location of a blogger is inconsequential to his level of authority,
given that nodes did not receive more inlinks by virtue of being located abroad.
This result suggests that bloggers based abroad were not more authoritative and
attractive by themselves, although it is possible that bloggers based in Tunisia re-
frained from linking to blogs based abroad that often were more politically radical
to avoid being targeted.
In fact, state monitoring and censorship of online activities had a substantial
impact on how netizens behaved, as laid out in chapter five. Even Moroccan web
users, who enjoyed considerably greater freedom online, were aware of so-called
red lines not to be crossed. Debates of various policy areas including such topics
like the persistent failure of the country’s educational system were permitted as
long as they did not question the political system as a whole, and especially the
role of the king. These taboo topics were largely accepted as a given, and when the
Moroccan regime repressed individual internet users with jail terms, some promi-
nent bloggers reacted with self-censorship or stopped blogging altogether. In this
regard, the Moroccan blogosphere largely reflects the consensus of Moroccan so-
ciety at that moment in time, which expected a seemingly benevolent ruler to
advance the country above all economically, with political rights being secondary,
at best. A similar social contract, exchanging economic growth with the acceptance
of the political status quo, had characterized much of President Ben Ali’s reign in
Tunisia. However, in the last years of King Hassan II, Morocco had embarked on a
path of political liberalization, permitting the return of the leftist political opposi-
tion from exile and its inclusion in a “government of change”. The result from the
cooptation of the left was a largely pacified Moroccan society, including its dias-
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pora, which the government mobilized to contribute to the economic development
of the country, a policy manifested online as well, with numerous inter-linked web-
sites catering to the diaspora. Meanwhile, the Islamists transformed into the only
significant political force, their main concern being to further their social conser-
vative agenda and not to fundamentally challenge the authority of the king. This
large societal consensus preferring political stability in the face of chaos ensuing
the 2011 uprisings allowed King Mohamed VI to preempt extended protests by in-
ducing mild reforms and appealing to those fearing loss of the economic progress
that had been achieved.
In Tunisia, however, the repression was more pronounced and formative, with
even the lightest critique of a given governmental policy being perceived as risky,
in real life conversations and extending to online debates as well. These circum-
stances provoked a range of reactions from internet users both in the country and
abroad, depending on the perceived risk incurred, and, in the case of the diaspora,
whether they expected to return to their home country or not. As a result, bloggers
based in Tunisia often adopted a very poetic, indirect style, whereas the most fero-
cious and persistent critique of the Tunisian regime was voiced by bloggers living
abroad. In fact, their location abroad facilitated their political activism because
they felt secure, both for their physical integrity and their economic livelihood. As
a result, they were able to adopt the role of the radical mobilizers, and the most
dedicated cyberactivists invested a considerable amount of time and money.
The increasing severity of repression of online activities was also an important
element in the creation of a strong collective activist identity in Tunisia. The esca-
lation of the government’s censorship regime led to the radicalization of formerly
moderate bloggers, who joined their politicized comrades-in-arms in their fight
against censorship. Where there had been a strong divide in the blogosphere, the
seemingly indiscriminately targeted repression of an increasing number of blogs
created a common grievance. It culminated in the first self-organized street demon-
stration in Tunisia for years, even though the protest was still framed as a single-
issue – and ostensibly apolitical – action to persuade frightened Tunisians to turn
out. While in pure numbers the protest was not important, it was considered a
success by the activists involved and encouraged them to plan other events in the
following months. Thus, while the cyberactivist sphere was unable to create a
revolutionary movement by itself, as the low turnout of the May protest attests,
it could mobilize technical abilities, resources and international contacts to pro-
mote the 2011 uprising nationally and internationally. It is important to note that
the group identity that emerged was a decisively non-diasporic activist identity,
although bloggers living abroad were amongst the instigators of the May protest
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and subsequently served as the coordinators of the concentrated dissemination of
information online during the 2011 uprisings. At this point in time, their contri-
bution was perceived as an organic part of the mobilization effort, and the fact of
living abroad was seen as conducive to their tasks, which involved a heavy use of
the internet connection often unavailable in their countries of origin as well as the
time-intensive curation of existing sources. While the Moroccan blogosphere did
not experience the same level of repression and was characterized by a high level
of fragmentation, the efforts of a few bloggers to create a common space of debate
succeeded in gathering a small, dedicated group of cyberactivists, who were joined
by a number of young activist of Moroccan Human rights organizations to form
the movement’s communication platform Mamfakinch.
7.2 broader implications
The findings of this thesis suggest several general observations. First of all, the
thesis provides a glimpse into the dynamics of contemporary migrant populations
and their continued ties with their countries of origin. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
this thesis indicates that first generation and temporary immigrants and especially
exiles tend to be more involved in their home country’s politics than second and
third generation immigrants. While these recent immigrants may have attempted
to influence their homeland’s politics before the invention of the internet, this
thesis supports the notion that the internet provides them with a means to di-
rectly participate in and shape mobilizations from afar on an equal footing with
their comrades-in-arms. Unquestionably, the relationship between activists abroad
and their fellow countrymen can be troubled at times, however, being removed
from the country of origin can occasionally be beneficial, be it to evade repres-
sion or to provide the movement with otherwise unavailable resources, such as
a steady internet connection and contacts to international media organizations.
This internet-facilitated inclusion of overseas citizens in national social movements
also adds an additional layer as yet largely unaccounted for in the literature on
social movements. So far, the literature has regarded transnational protest primar-
ily as “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists
against international actors, other states, or international institutions” (Della Porta
and Tarrow, 2005, p. 2-3), with its most notable example being the Global Justice
movement. Other approaches focused on transnational networks such as transna-
tional corporations and banks, epistemic communities and transnational advocacy
networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Finally, there are attempts to conceptualize di-
asporas, which are primarily defined by a shared collective identity, as a fourth cat-
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egory in Sikkink and Keck’s typology of transnational networks (Adamson, 2012,
p. 32). However, the cases laid out in this thesis do not seem to fit into either
category. While many cyberactivists I interviewed for this thesis might subscribe
to a certain amount of cosmopolitanism inherent in the Global Justice movement,
their primary focus was decisively local; that is, on their country of origin. On the
other hand, those involved in the movement did not mention the typical collective
identity, which not only refers to a sense of belonging to their homeland, but also
denotes a connection to the diaspora as a whole. Thus it seems that the internet
is enabling a new kind of activism that is transnational in nature, but at the same
time bound to national identity, motivated by a feeling of “distant proximity” to
the motherland. In fact, the title of the thesis emerged during my interview with
the Moroccan activist Mohamend X, when he described how it felt to be in France
during the 2011 uprisings:
“Living abroad, it’s a distant proximity. In France, there is the language
proximity and the media were reporting on the events in Morocco. Also,
there are a lot of Moroccans here, so it was possible to do some of the
coordination of the 20 February Movement here, in addition to covering
the events online for Mamfakinch. (...) I was at a distance, but if felt
like I was living the events like someone who was there.”
The thesis underscores the differing relevance of organizations – including dias-
pora organizations – to the population in authoritarian contexts of varying degrees,
highlighting once again the relevance of the concept of political opportunity struc-
tures. Thus, in highly repressive regimes that border on dictatorship, engaging in
political activities beyond those directly sponsored by the government implies de-
fiance of the regime in power. In this context, for citizens living abroad traditional
diaspora organizations are potential agents of the state, reporting the activities of
their members to the regime. Furthermore, political parties in the diaspora are not
necessary instigators of change, because the focus on their role as victims of the
regime fails to propose more inclusive avenues for political engagement to polit-
ical newcomers. In this context, political parties in exile are largely perceived as
obsolete and out of touch. Combined with the fear of attracting the attention of
the authoritarian regime, politically sensitive citizens tend to seek other avenues
for political engagement, such as to debate issues of interest online. In less re-
strictive environments, however, organizations are able to appeal to the politically
interested citizen and even to expand to the diaspora as well. As a result, varying
degrees of repression impact on the kind activist careers likely to prevail. While
low repression leaves room for traditional organizations, high repression pushes
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the politically interested to alternative channels such as the internet. As envi-
sioned by the proponents of the idea of the internet as a “liberation technology”,
the internet can serve as a free space in authoritarian regimes, allowing netizens to
temporarily evade the control of the state. However, while online fora enable other-
wise atomized netizen to meet like-minded people they otherwise would probably
never have met, the majority of bloggers do not start blogging because they are
politically engaged, but because they feel the urge to share their most intimate
thoughts with a wider audience. While there might be some that are politically in-
terested from the beginning, others need to undergo a politicization process. This
politicization process is largely an individual one, which possibly could delay or
even thwart collective action. Also, the perceived online fame of a person does not
necessarily translate into offline political success. As such, cyberactivists as well
as independent local activists are unlikely to wind up as ministers, presidents and
party leaders because they lack the political capital and networks necessarily to
emerge victorious from a popular vote.
Finally, the months immediately following the Arab uprisings were dominated
by superficial debates on the role of the internet and regime change through social
mobilizations. Policy makers and social scientists concentrated on questions of
direct causation, asking whether the internet caused the revolutionary movements
or not. The initial enthusiasm was countered by a wave of articles seeking to “de-
bunk” the idea that the Arab uprisings were single-handedly triggered by the inter-
net. These articles often used false dichotomies, claiming “the Arab Spring was not
set off by Facebook, but by the people,” as if those were mutually-exclusive. How-
ever, the spread of internet access and its integration into daily life of ever growing
strata of the population emphasizes that what happens online is an integral part
of the “real” world. Furthermore, revolutions are always characterized by multiple
causes. Contemporary protest movements such as the so-called Arab Spring can-
not be comprehended without taking into account the role played by the internet.
At the same time, any account of the uprisings would be incomplete without a ref-
erence to socio-economic pressures and increasing dissatisfaction with corrupt and
crony regimes in the area, coupled with a lack of opportunities for the youth. Also,
the uprisings would not have happened without the sacrifice of the millions of
protesters that took to the streets, as well as to the dedication and strategic skill of
long-term activists. Major events such as the Arab uprisings are thus characterized
by multiple, interacting dynamics. This thesis modest aim was to contribute to a
demystification of the use of internet tools in political mobilization, highlighting
how it reconfigures and augments common practices by creating new spaces and
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enabling new forms to connect, coordinate and collaborate, for individuals living
scattered across several continents.
7.3 limitations and avenues for future research
Besides its findings, this thesis also has several limitations. For one, this study
uses webcrawls that were not designed by myself. Instead, the webcrawls were
created by a research project and subsequently modified to suit my need. Given
that I was not involved in the design of the datasets, they contain certain flaws that
could have been avoided. However, as I pointed out in the relevant chapter, web
crawls provide only a snapshot of the connections existing at this very moment and
cannot be conducted retroactively. Unfortunately, at the moment the revolutions
were unfolding I was not yet admitted to the doctoral program at the European
University Institute, but working for the non-governmental organization Reporters
without Borders. I thus had to rely on crawls conducted by others around the time
of the uprisings. Thus, to conduct this kind of study, a researcher must have
all methods in place at the moment an event occurs. Given the low scholarly
interest in Tunisia prior to the revolution, there were very few scholars familiar
with the political and social realities in the country that were ready to employ
digital methods to explore the online facet of the mobilizations. On the other hand,
there were a number of media scholars who collected data during the uprisings
without being knowledgeable about the specifics of the cases to accurately target
their data collection or to provide a satisfactory analysis. For all researchers who
were unable to collect their own data at the time, this data becomes their primary
source material, with all its benefits and flaws.
A second limitation of this study is that in its details, the studied phenomenon
is contingent on time. While diasporas continue to engage with each other and
their fellow countrymen online, the form online communities take is influenced
by the technology prevalent at that time, and thus subject to fashion. In fact,
online practices and platforms rise and fall in popularity only to be replaced by
others. At this moment, large numbers of users move from one platform to another,
motivated by the desire to remain connected to the largest audience possible. The
increase in value that occurs when the number of users of a product or service
increases is referred to as a “network effect” (Katona, Zubcsek, and Sarvary, 2011).
The rise and demise of now largely forgotten platforms such as MySpace and
Friendster are examples of these gravitational shifts in the primary locus of online
sociability.
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The events of the Arab uprisings took place during such a gradual move from
one internet tool to another. The first manifestations of the Arab uprisings surfaced
in December 2010, at a time when the membership of social network sites (SNSs),
most importantly Facebook, were on the rise in the countries experiencing protests.
Data gathered by the Arab Social Media Report show that the events triggered an
increased growth rate of the website. Already before the uprisings started, in May
2010, Facebook was the most visited website in Tunisia, even before the search en-
gine Google, which is the most visited website worldwide (Kuebler, 2010, p.47). In
January 2011, however, Tunisia’s Facebook users grew by 14 percent and Morocco’s
by 12 percent, compared to a growth rate of 3 percent and 4.4 percent respectively
in the month before the uprisings (Mourtada and Salem, 2011).1 This dramatic rise
in the number of subscribers in the course of one single month can be attributed
to omnipresent media reports linking the website to the protest movement (“Face-
book revolution”), creating the perception amongst Tunisians and Moroccans that
important information was shared on this website and one had to create a profile
on it to access it.
The Arab uprisings took place during what can be considered a watershed mo-
ment when the once dominant form of online sociability, blogging, converged with
other platforms. Whereas before, politicized Facebook users had felt the need to
create a blog in order to be recognized by the online activist community, now the
majority of bloggers slowly moved their main activity to social network sites. As a
result, after the political community that emerged from the blogosphere played an
important role in the online campaigns that accompanied the Arab Spring, many
former bloggers quit blogging and moved on these platforms given their ease of
use and promise of a wider audience. The platforms have become so central to
online social life that for many, Facebook as become synonymous with the internet
at large, inducing public institutions to embrace the platform as well, especially in
Tunisia, where ministries prefer to publish press releases on Facebook instead of
using rarely updated websites.
On the other hand, the political web in both countries has witnessed a wave of
professionalization. Former bloggers have become professional journalists, founded
civil society organizations or created highly professional webzines, thereby erod-
ing the community that emanated from the blogosphere. Eatbees, an American
blogger living in Morocco, described the new situation in May 2013 as follows:
1 At the end of 2011, roughly 27 percent of the Tunisian population had an account on the social
network, compared to 17.5 percent at the end of 2010. Similarly, 17.5 percent of the Moroccan
population had an account at the end of 2011, compared with 12.5 percent one year before.
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“Many of my friends from that era simply stopped blogging, and they’ve
stopped coming here to comment on new pieces I write. Their blogs are
either updated so rarely as to have gone into a coma, or they’ve disap-
peared altogether. (...) As a blogger, at a certain point one has to make
a decision. Either one is going to “turn pro,” become an “authority,” or
keep doing what one is doing as a purely personal venture. Nearly all
of the bloggers I follow regularly now are the ones who’ve gone pro. Ei-
ther they are working journalists who keep blogs as part of their work,
or they are academics who follow social, political, and economic trends
regularly and in depth. A few are activists who have made a name for
themselves, and made the leap to being full-time policy voices.” (Eat-
bees, 2013)
As a consequence of these developments, to study online diaspora engagement
today, a researcher cannot bypass social network sites because they constitute the
main locus of online sociability today. As a consequence, she would have to modify
her methods, either by acquiring permission and assistance by social network sites
to explore their databases or by reverting to manual methods such as analysing
pages visually only.
Furthermore, besides investigating how the shift to new internet tools affects the
form online diaspora engagement today, there are other aspects of the Arab upris-
ings that remain understudied. One of these concerns the involvement of interna-
tional organizations. As we have seen throughout this thesis, for years, Western
politicians were eager to praise the revolutionary potential of the internet, most no-
tably after the prominent use of internet tools for political protest in the summer of
2009 in Iran and, of course, in the so-called Arab Spring. Given this fervent belief
in the internet as a “liberation technology,” several Western development agen-
cies and political organizations initiated training sessions and fellowships aimed
at equipping activists with the necessary technological skills to voice their criticism
of corrupt governments while employing measures to ensure their personal safety.
Given this concern for personal safety, however, bloggers living in strict authoritar-
ian contexts might be less available for these agencies, possibly turning members
of the diaspora into preferred references for international organizations, given the
higher freedom of movement afforded by Western passports. If this is the case,
activists living abroad might therefore attend more trainings and receive more op-
portunities to network with other activists. The acquired training and networking
might in turn increase their status inside their own blogosphere. The role played
by diaspora bloggers put aside, it would be sensible to research whether the afore-
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mentioned training and networking sessions had an impact, that is whether those
bloggers and activists receiving them were at the core of the mobilizations.
Finally, the mobilizations in Tunisia were characterized by several important so-
called “white lies.” These included the framing of the death of Mohamed Bouazizi
as an act of desperation by a university graduate even though he never graduated
from high school, as well as the rumor that General Rachid Ammar, chief of staff
of the Tunisian Armed Forces, refused Ben Ali’s request to repress the uprising.
Whereas the former originated with local activists embellishing Bouazizi’s story as
they talked to the media, the latter circulated online and was later claimed by the
diaspora cyberactivist Yassine Ayari. Furthermore, in the months and years follow-
ing the ouster of President Ben Ali, the media, both offline and online, abounded
with rumors and misinformation. At the time, this development seemed to stem
from the sorry state of Tunisian journalism. Decades of tight control of the press
had resulted in a profession lacking reporting skills and deontology, coupled with
a population skeptical of the truthfulness of traditional (read: official) media out-
lets. Instead, Tunisians flocked to Facebook, where rumors spread like wildfire.
However, in the months before the 2016 American elections it became clear that
propaganda spread through online channels is not a phenomenon limited to coun-
tries with a structurally weak journalistic profession. During the campaign, pre-
posterous news pieces pretending to emanate from respectable sources spread on
Facebook, scrupulously crafted to maximize circulation and subsequent advertise-
ment revenue. It thus seems that in times of crisis, the media can lose its credibility
in favour of internet rumors in democracies as well. The analysis of the factors
contributing to the crisis of journalism and the rise of “fake news” in democracies
consequently ranks high on the research agenda of media scholars. A comparative
approach, including case studies of countries in transformation such as Tunisia,
might enlarge the scope of such an investigation and provide valuable insight.
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A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 web crawls
The web crawls used in chapter 4 derive from the openly available e-Diasporas
Project developed at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris by
Dana Diminescu. The following sections contain complete lists of the nodes in-
cluded in the network as well as those removed and merged. It must be noted that
the categories used by the e-Diaspora project vary. Given this caveat, the categories
as given are listed here for completeness, however, in the thesis, only the relative
presence of the category “blog”, both individual and collective, is compared across
the cases.
a.1.1 E-diasporas.fr crawl Tunisia









With its data collected between
April and July 2011, the Tunisia
crawl from the e-Diasporas Project
contains three blog aggregators.
Given that these operate as an
equivalent to a registry, they link
by definition to most blogs in the
network, even though they are not
actors per se, unless they refuse
to list certain actors out of princi-
ple. Such conflict has been over-
come since the clash between polit-
ical bloggers and tn-blogs.com in 2002. Finally, a website of a German journalist
working in Tunisia and publishing her texts on her website was removed as well.
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Table 8 contains a complete list of all websites included in the Tunisian network,
as well as their category and location. For the purpose of the regression in chapter
4, the location was converted into a binary variable “diaspora”, with websites
located abroad coded as 1 and websites in Tunisia coded as 0. As visible in the
table below, two websites were coded as located both in Tunisia and abroad. This
is the case for democratietunisienne.com and fhimt.com, websites created in the
wake of the 2011 uprisings and were managed by both members of the diaspora
and their allies in Tunisia. For the purpose of the regression, they were coded as
diaspora.

















































































































britishtunisiansociety.blogspot.com collective blog other
atunisiangirl.blogspot.com blog Tunisia





















artisticmouv.blogspot.com collective blog Tunisia
bab-bhar.blogspot.com portal Tunisia
nared2009.blogspot.com blog Tunisia
elcalammagreb.blogspot.com collective blog Spain
stranger-paris.blogspot.com blog France
rafrafi.blogspirit.com blog France


































The e-Diasporas Project provides two crawls for Morocco.
The first network was created in April 2010 as part of
a trial for the project. The second network represents
an update of the first network’s links in July 2011. The
crawls contain four websites that can be considered be-
yond the boundaries set for this study. These discarded
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websites include a blog on Moroccan cooking, a photo
blog, as well as two websites of a telecommunication
company catering to the Moroccan diaspora.






































































































































































a.2 interviews and personal correspondence
Tunisia
sami ben abdallah (Paris, 17.04.2010)
yassine ayari (Tunis, 25.06.2012)
hamadi kaloutcha (Tunis, 27.06.2012)
liliopatra (Tunis, 13.07.2012)
amine kochlef (Montreal, 03.01.2014)
hasni reveiltunisien (Paris, 13.03.2014)
sami ben gharbia (Paris, 14.03.2014)
arabasta (Paris, 07.07.2014)
riadh guerfali (alias astrubal) (Tunis, 14.10.2014)
mohamed-ali razgallah (Sidi Bou Said, 11.10.2014)
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ghassen ben khelifa (video call, 12.11.2014)
khelil ben osman (video call, 01.12.2014)
houssein ben ameur (online correspondence, 06.03.2015)
fayla (video call, 25.04.2015)
tarek kahlaoui (Tunis, 23.06.2015)
azyz amami (Tunis, 26.06.2015)
-z- (Paris, 25.07.2015)
mohamed madhkour (online correspondence, 25.09.2015)
zizou from djerba (video call, 31.10.2015)
nadia a . (online correspondence, 01.11.2015)
amira yahyaoui (video call, 29.12.2015)
Morocco
mohamed x Mamfakinch (Paris, 10.07.2014)
mohamed y Mamfakinch (Paris, 19.07.2014)
mohamed ezzouak (Yabiladi) (Casablanca, 27.10.2014)
ghali bensouda (Capdema) (video call, 03.11.2014)
hamza mahfouz (video call, 23.12.2014)
eatbees (online correspondence, 15.08.2015)
ibnkafka lawyer (video call, 21.08.2015)
une marocaine (video call, 23.08.2015)
l badikho (Mamfakinch) (video call, 30.08.2015)
thesanae (video call, 02.09.2015)
mounir bensalah (video call, 10.09.2015)
politiconaute (phone call, 26.10.2015)
citoyen hmida (phone call, 31.10.2015)
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a.3 interview guidelines for semi-structured interviews
1. Politicization
• Why did you start blogging / When did you become a cyberactivist?
• Was there a specific event that triggered this decision?
2. Internet censorship
• How did you deal with the censorship regime in your home country?
• How did it affect your online activities?
3. Collective identity
• People living abroad characterize themselves in different ways. Some
identify as members of a diaspora community, which can imply the
fighting for collective rights in their host country and concerted action
towards the homeland. They are also often courted by the home country.
What does it mean for you to be a Tunisian/Moroccan living abroad?
4. On living abroad
• Why did you leave your country?
• How do you keep in touch with those stayed home?
• Where do you inform yourself on what happens in the country of origin?
5. Being a cyberactivist based abroad
• Did the fact that you live/lived abroad matter to the rest of the commu-
nity? If so, how?
6. Online - offline
• How did you interact with your fellow activists?
• Did you meet other cyberactivists face-to-face prior to the uprisings?
